Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GaryLouisSmith]

Holism is the philosophy that's most popular today. It is the belief that the universe, the natural world, is sufficient unto itself to explain everything. No outside supernatural entity is necessary.

That's not holism but naturalism!

How do you describe Holism? Are you a Holist? What is its relation to German Idealism, especially Hegelianism? I, of course, am neither a Holist nor a naturalist.

[Consul]

The pieces are disconnected to any whole. The Whole doesn't exist.

According to mereological universalism, any two or more things compose a whole. It doesn't matter whether they are objectively (spatially, temporally, causally) connected or not. There are even wholes such as "the collection composed of Julius Caesar, the Albert Memorial, and the last sneeze of Horace Walpole" (C. D. Broad).

There's an essential difference between set theory and mereology: There is no universal set—the set of all sets—, but there is a universal whole that is the sum of all things. Since mereological parthood is reflexive, the universal sum is consistently part of itself.

However, some have argued that it's not only possible for there to be "atomless gunk"—i.e. that all things have proper parts—, because it's also possible for there to be "universeless junk" or "worldless junk"—i.e. that all things are proper parts—, such that there is no universal whole of which everything is part. I believe that atomless gunk is really possible, but I doubt that universeless/worldless junk is really possible too.

"One can think of Junk as a kind of weird and wonderful alter ego of Gunk. For whilst a gunky world is one in which everything has proper parts, a junky world is one in which everything is a proper part. In a junky world, then, there is no maximal fusion (what one would ordinarily call ‘The Universe’) than contains everything else as proper parts."

(Cornell, David Michael. "Why there is Only One Thing: A Defence of Ontological Monism." PhD diss., University of Leeds/UK. 2013. pp. 143-4)

[GaryLouisSmith]

The pieces are disconnected to any whole. The Whole doesn't exist.

According to mereological universalism, any two or more things compose a whole. It doesn't matter whether they are objectively (spatially, temporally, causally) connected or not. There are even wholes such as "the collection composed of Julius Caesar, the Albert Memorial, and the last sneeze of Horace Walpole" (C. D. Broad).

There's an essential difference between set theory and mereology: There is no universal set—the set of all sets—, but there is a universal whole that is the sum of all things. Since mereological parthood is reflexive, the universal sum is consistently part of itself.

However, some have argued that it's not only possible for there to be "atomless gunk"—i.e. that all things have proper parts—, because it's also possible for there to be "universeless junk" or "worldless junk"—i.e. that all things are proper parts—, such that there is no universal whole of which everything is part. I believe that atomless gunk is really possible, but I doubt that universeless/worldless junk is really possible too.

"One can think of Junk as a kind of weird and wonderful alter ego of Gunk. For whilst a gunky world is one in which everything has proper parts, a junky world is one in which everything is a proper part. In a junky world, then, there is no maximal fusion (what one would ordinarily call ‘The Universe’) than contains everything else as proper parts."

(Cornell, David Michael. "Why there is Only One Thing: A Defence of Ontological Monism." PhD diss., University of Leeds/UK. 2013. pp. 143-4)

Yes, but what about HolISM?

[GaryLouisSmith]

According to mereological universalism, any two or more things compose a whole. It doesn't matter whether they are objectively (spatially, temporally, causally) connected or not. There are even wholes such as "the collection composed of Julius Caesar, the Albert Memorial, and the last sneeze of Horace Walpole" (C. D. Broad).

There's an essential difference between set theory and mereology: There is no universal set—the set of all sets—, but there is a universal whole that is the sum of all things. Since mereological parthood is reflexive, the universal sum is consistently part of itself.

However, some have argued that it's not only possible for there to be "atomless gunk"—i.e. that all things have proper parts—, because it's also possible for there to be "universeless junk" or "worldless junk"—i.e. that all things are proper parts—, such that there is no universal whole of which everything is part. I believe that atomless gunk is really possible, but I doubt that universeless/worldless junk is really possible too.

"One can think of Junk as a kind of weird and wonderful alter ego of Gunk. For whilst a gunky world is one in which everything has proper parts, a junky world is one in which everything is a proper part. In a junky world, then, there is no maximal fusion (what one would ordinarily call ‘The Universe’) than contains everything else as proper parts."

(Cornell, David Michael. "Why there is Only One Thing: A Defence of Ontological Monism." PhD diss., University of Leeds/UK. 2013. pp. 143-4)

Yes, but what about HolISM?

I like it when you put your answers in your own words and you don't just give me some quote or excerpt from some other author.

[Consul]

How do you describe Holism? Are you a Holist? What is its relation to German Idealism, especially Hegelianism? I, of course, am neither a Holist nor a naturalist.

I'm definitely a (metaphysical/ontological) naturalist; but I'm not sure what holism is, so I'm not sure whether or not I'm a holist. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy generally defines it as "any doctrine emphasizing the priority of a whole over its parts."

So is holism the doctrine that "a whole is more than the sum of its parts"?

Is it the doctrine that there are wholes (complexes, systems) with irreducibly emergent properties?

Is it the doctrine of priority monism:

"Priority monism targets concrete objects and counts by basic tokens. It holds that exactly one basic concrete object exists—there may be many other concrete objects, but these only exist derivatively. The priority monist will hold that the one basic concrete object is the world (the maximal concrete whole). To distinguish herself from the existence monist, she will allow that the world has proper parts, but hold that the whole is basic and the proper parts are derivative. In short, she will hold the classical monistic doctrine that the whole is prior to each of its (proper) parts. This doctrine presupposes that the many proper parts exist, for the whole to be prior to. Historically, priority monism may have been defended by Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Spinoza, Hegel, Lotze, Royce, Bosanquet, and Bradley, inter alia."

Priority Monism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/#PrioMoni

"The metaphysical holist believes that the nature of some wholes is not determined by that of their parts. One may distinguish three varieties of metaphysical holism: ontological, property and nomological holism.

Ontological Holism: Some objects are not wholly composed of basic physical parts.

Property Holism: Some objects have properties that are not determined by physical properties of their basic physical parts.

Nomological Holism: Some objects obey laws that are not determined by fundamental physical laws governing the structure and behavior of their basic physical parts."

Holism and Nonseparability in Physics: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-holism/

[GaryLouisSmith]

How do you describe Holism? Are you a Holist? What is its relation to German Idealism, especially Hegelianism? I, of course, am neither a Holist nor a naturalist.

I'm definitely a (metaphysical/ontological) naturalist; but I'm not sure what holism is, so I'm not sure whether or not I'm a holist. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy generally defines it as "any doctrine emphasizing the priority of a whole over its parts."

You are definitely a guy who loves definitions. Your problem is that you cannot make them come together in one Overall Definition. They remain fragments of some Whole, which you can never reach.

[Consul]

You are definitely a guy who loves definitions. Your problem is that you cannot make them come together in one Overall Definition. They remain fragments of some Whole, which you can never reach.

It's not my fault that both "holism" and "naturalism" have more than one meaning.

[GaryLouisSmith]

You are definitely a guy who loves definitions. Your problem is that you cannot make them come together in one Overall Definition. They remain fragments of some Whole, which you can never reach.

It's not my fault that both "holism" and "naturalism" have more than one meaning.

So do you think that fragmentation is ultimate and fatal? Or do you think that in the Hegelian Absolute they will all blend into One Thing?

[Consul]

So do you think that fragmentation is ultimate and fatal? Or do you think that in the Hegelian Absolute they will all blend into One Thing?

Even though I spent a year in a classroom of a school in Nuremberg where Hegel himself had been physically present as a teacher in the early 19th century, I don't care much about his abstruse idealistic philosophy. But I'm sympathetic to priority monism and the Spinozean idea that the whole world is one big substance, with all apparent ordinary substances being local complexes of attributes of the one substance.

[Consul]

Even though I spent a year in a classroom of a school in Nuremberg…

Not 24/7 of course.

[GaryLouisSmith]

So do you think that fragmentation is ultimate and fatal? Or do you think that in the Hegelian Absolute they will all blend into One Thing?

Even though I spent a year in a classroom of a school in Nuremberg where Hegel himself had been physically present as a teacher in the early 19th century, I don't care much about his abstruse idealistic philosophy. But I'm sympathetic to priority monism and the Spinozean idea that the whole world is one big substance, with all apparent ordinary substances being local complexes of attributes of the one substance.

Would an apparent ordinary substance be meaningful or even exist without being a part of the one big substance?

[Felix]

GaryLouisSmith: I believe in pure chance. Things happen for no reason. The pieces are disconnected to any whole. The Whole doesn't exist.

It's all or nothing with you, isn't it? (or maybe all and nothing). You said you believe in eternal forms, how can you have eternal order (eternal forms of order) within chaos?

[GaryLouisSmith]

GaryLouisSmith: I believe in pure chance. Things happen for no reason. The pieces are disconnected to any whole. The Whole doesn't exist.

It's all or nothing with you, isn't it? (or maybe all and nothing). You said you believe in eternal forms, how can you have eternal order (eternal forms of order) within chaos?

I’m having a little trouble understanding your response and I don’t really know how to answer, but I will give it a shot. I think you are objecting to my extremism. I will not settle for a moderate, middle ground. And as a result I end up far from the ordered world out in the marshes of chaos.

Are you saying that my philosophy is now wild and needs to be domesticated? Yes, there is a wildness to my philosophy. No, I do not want to be domesticated. You seem to think that the pure chance I speak of is chaos. Things happen for no reason. Only fragments everywhere, no whole. And you dislike chaos.

I have no objection to another person disliking my philosophical vision. To each his own. I suspect you like a homely life within a community of like-minded fellows. You may venture out for a while but basically you like the feel of a well-ordered home. That will make you a good citizen.

I on the other hand, say that I believe in and indeed worship the Eternal Forms which I call gods. Those Forms have no place in hearth and home. They really are wild things – as I see and feel them. Maybe in school you were taught differently. I don’t know what you mean by “eternal forms of order”. If you want to explain that more I would gladly read what you have to say.

[Karpel Tunnel]

GaryLouisSmith: I believe in pure chance. Things happen for no reason. The pieces are disconnected to any whole. The Whole doesn't exist.

It's all or nothing with you, isn't it? (or maybe all and nothing). You said you believe in eternal forms, how can you have eternal order (eternal forms of order) within chaos?

From my reading of him his ontology seems eclectic. I don't think he decides to reconcile everything. Now this might seem ridiculous, but I think most people actually function like this. They may think mind is like or determinism is the case or have their take on what is epistemically valid, but in practice they think and act in a variety of ways and even speak in a variety of ways. Unlike him they try at least to present a whole that is consistent. He doesn't seem to bother with that.

[GaryLouisSmith]

It's all or nothing with you, isn't it? (or maybe all and nothing). You said you believe in eternal forms, how can you have eternal order (eternal forms of order) within chaos?

From my reading of him his ontology seems eclectic. I don't think he decides to reconcile everything. Now this might seem ridiculous, but I think most people actually function like this. They may think mind is like or determinism is the case or have their take on what is epistemically valid, but in practice they think and act in a variety of ways and even speak in a variety of ways. Unlike him they try at least to present a whole that is consistent. He doesn't seem to bother with that.

I assume that the word "him" is me, Gary Smith. My writing isn't eclectic so much as a bricolage. If there is any reconciling of anything in my writing it is through the rhythm of my sentences. I do write what is called numerous prose. Yes, the rhythms are "chaotic" but it is there.

Here is George Saintsbury in his History of English Prose Rhythms

“It has, I have no doubt, occurred to other students of elaborate rhythmical prose that curiously large proportions of the most famous examples of it are concerned with dreams; and I should not suppose that many of them have failed to anticipate the following suggestion of the reason. Dreams themselves are nothing if not rhythmical; their singular fashion of progression (it is matter of commonest remark) floats the dreamer over the most irrational and impossible transitions and junctures (or rather breaches) of incident and subject, without jolt or jar. They thus combine—of their own nature and to the invariable experience of those who are fortunate enough to have much to do with them—the greatest possible variety with the least possible disturbance. Now this combination, as we have been faithfully putting forth, is the very soul—the quintessence, the constituting form and idea—of harmonious prose. Unfortunately it is not every one who has the faculty of producing this combination in words; fortunately there are some who have.”

There are a number of ways to achieve unity in a piece of writing, philosophical or otherwise. For philosophy, one of those ways is a clean, logical progression, another is a steady dialectical peeling back, but, as in that quote above, it can also be had in numerous prose, the rhythm of dreams, captivating metrical variation, telling repetition, the smooth jolt of the irrational.Something is awry. The thing itself is close at hand. The eye works into itself. And the soul is beside itself. The night trick. Fearsome, fearless philosophy.

Here is my favorite example of numerous prose -

"And her eyes if they were ever seen would be neither sweet nor subtle; no man could read their story; they would be found filled with perishing dreams and with wrecks of forgotten delirium."