Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Jklint]

I respond to logic not magic even if when replying directly to someone's post. As mentioned, I replied directly to your post, easy to understand even if you disagree. Your response was non sequitur to what you wrote and what I responded to. Btw, terrorists don't attack with magic; they attack with bombs and weapons. Magic doesn't kill sixty people at one time.

Exactly, you are a direct man, but magic only works indirectly and among non sequiturs. People don't tremble because bombs go off; people tremble because bombs might go off.

Of course they're going to tremble. Where catastrophes happen as a matter of routine not knowing what to expect next who wouldn't? What's it got to do with magic?

[Consul]

Vagueness and indefiniteness are different things. Consider the statement, If x is a man then x is mortal. That little word "a" is the indefinite article. Without words that point to something indefinite - a/an, any, all, some etc. - one could not speak in generalities and therefore one could not make any scientific laws. For all x, is x is F, then x is G. If that indefiniteness exists only in thought, then all scientific laws are only "in the mind" and either reality "out there" is lawless or a mind, maybe The Mind, creates and controls the world.

"All", "every", "each", "no" are definite quantifiers. In logic "some" means "at least one", so it's more definite than indefinite. Examples of indefinite quantifiers are "few", "several", "many", "most".

As for the indefinite article and indefinite noun phrases: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/#IndDes

"[T]here are referential and quantificational uses of indefinite descriptions and these are a reflex of a genuine semantical ambiguity."

For example, the sentence "I want to buy a car" is ambiguous, because it can mean "There is a particular car that I want to buy" or "I want to buy a car, but there's no particular car that I want to buy".

[GaryLouisSmith]

Exactly, you are a direct man, but magic only works indirectly and among non sequiturs. People don't tremble because bombs go off; people tremble because bombs might go off.

Of course they're going to tremble. Where catastrophes happen as a matter of routine not knowing what to expect next who wouldn't? What's it got to do with magic?

Magic works at the interface between the subjective and the objective. It is where the possible might be actual. It is where the Irrealia are real. Where determinacy sinks into indeterminacy. It is where you begin to struggle to keep your mental balance. It is hypnagogia, the unplace between being awake and dreaming.

There really is such a thing as pure chance. For no reason something happens, an accident, a bothersome inconvenience. Why now, why here? Science doesn’t predict such irritating trivialities. But that is where the spirits of magic f*ck with your life. For fortune or misfortune, some spell from somewhere in the future, the past or another time that is now. Who? Why? In the interstices of pure chance magic works. And you are undone.

[GaryLouisSmith]

Vagueness and indefiniteness are different things. Consider the statement, If x is a man then x is mortal. That little word "a" is the indefinite article. Without words that point to something indefinite - a/an, any, all, some etc. - one could not speak in generalities and therefore one could not make any scientific laws. For all x, is x is F, then x is G. If that indefiniteness exists only in thought, then all scientific laws are only "in the mind" and either reality "out there" is lawless or a mind, maybe The Mind, creates and controls the world.

"All", "every", "each", "no" are definite quantifiers. In logic "some" means "at least one", so it's more definite than indefinite. Examples of indefinite quantifiers are "few", "several", "many", "most".

As for the indefinite article and indefinite noun phrases: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/#IndDes

"[T]here are referential and quantificational uses of indefinite descriptions and these are a reflex of a genuine semantical ambiguity."

For example, the sentence "I want to buy a car" is ambiguous, because it can mean "There is a particular car that I want to buy" or "I want to buy a car, but there's no particular car that I want to buy".

Yes, I understand dictionary meanings. I understanding semantics and how logic works. But I am asking the ontological question of what existent those words refer to. But maybe you are an idealist and you think it is all thought thinking about thought.

[Consul]

Yes, I understand dictionary meanings. I understanding semantics and how logic works. But I am asking the ontological question of what existent those words refer to. But maybe you are an idealist and you think it is all thought thinking about thought.

Wittgenstein famously said (Tractatus 4.0312): "My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives."

According to him, "Ax", "Ex", "&", "v", "~", "–>" refer to nothing, being syncategorematic terms.

I don't believe in universally or existentially quantified, negative, distributive, or conditional facts as nonlinguistic entities in the world; but I have no ontological problem with conjunctive facts if "&"/"and" is interpreted as the "+" of mereological summation.

By the way, Reinhardt Grossmann believed in negative facts and quantified ones, including quantifiers in his category system:

"I conclude that numbers are neither individual things, nor properties, nor relations, nor structures, nor sets, nor facts, and since these are all of the categories which we have, I infer that numbers form a category of their own. I shall call the category 'quantifier'.
The feature of being exemplified by sixty-four things or by three things is very much like the feature of being exemplified by some things or by all things. And this obvious similarity promises to shed further light on the nature of the category of quantifier. Let me call 'some', 'all', 'no', 'almost all', 'quite a few', etc. 'indefinite quantifiers', in order to distinguish these things from the 'definite quantifiers' which are the numbers."

(Grossmann, Reinhardt. The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology. London: Routledge, 1992. pp. 69-70)

(I don't call "all" and "no" indefinite quantifiers.)

[GaryLouisSmith]

Yes, I understand dictionary meanings. I understanding semantics and how logic works. But I am asking the ontological question of what existent those words refer to. But maybe you are an idealist and you think it is all thought thinking about thought.

Wittgenstein famously said (Tractatus 4.0312): "My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives."

According to him, "Ax", "Ex", "&", "v", "~", "–>" refer to nothing, being syncategorematic terms.

I don't believe in universally or existentially quantified, negative, distributive, or conditional facts as nonlinguistic entities in the world; but I have no ontological problem with conjunctive facts if "&"/"and" is interpreted as the "+" of mereological summation.

By the way, Reinhardt Grossmann believed in negative facts and quantified ones, including quantifiers in his category system:

"I conclude that numbers are neither individual things, nor properties, nor relations, nor structures, nor sets, nor facts, and since these are all of the categories which we have, I infer that numbers form a category of their own. I shall call the category 'quantifier'.
The feature of being exemplified by sixty-four things or by three things is very much like the feature of being exemplified by some things or by all things. And this obvious similarity promises to shed further light on the nature of the category of quantifier. Let me call 'some', 'all', 'no', 'almost all', 'quite a few', etc. 'indefinite quantifiers', in order to distinguish these things from the 'definite quantifiers' which are the numbers."

(Grossmann, Reinhardt. The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology. London: Routledge, 1992. pp. 69-70)

(I don't call "all" and "no" indefinite quantifiers.)

Thank you. That is the kind of answer I wanted. I look forward to seeing what your ontological world looks like without those things. I of course do believe that those syncategorical words point to ontological things. That, I admit, makes my ontological world even farther away from our ordinary view of things. It becomes downright mystical and that appeals to few.

[Felix]

GaryLouisSmith: There really is such a thing as pure chance.

There's no possible way you could know if that is true.

Science doesn’t predict such irritating trivialities.

Science does not make predictions, only statistical analyses.

[GaryLouisSmith]

GaryLouisSmith: There really is such a thing as pure chance.

There's no possible way you could know if that is true.

Science doesn’t predict such irritating trivialities.

Science does not make predictions, only statistical analyses.

This morning when I was walking to the store I found a little, red and yellow plastic toy truck with broken wheels in the grass at an old construction site. Do you think science could calculate what the chances are of me finding that there then?

[Karpel Tunnel]

Science does not make predictions, only statistical analyses.

I think science makes predictions all the time. Say, when the next eclipse will be. Eintein's theory predicted that gravity would bend the course of light, and then tests confirmed this, in a specific case. And this would be used to predict that other large bodies would bend light. Science would be fairly useless without its power to predict.

Now one could quibble over the wording and say that science does not make predictions, scientists do. But then this would hold for statistical analysis also. Science doesn't make statisitical analyses, scientists do, or other people who use scientific knowledge to do this.

[Belindi]

The liminal is the threshold of being, neither one thing or another but could go either way. It's therefore not a thing but a state of being which is not determinate.The liminal may however be symbolised by a determinate thing or event.
Eternal forms(Plato) are totally unlike liminal states ; note 'eternal forms' includes the word 'eternal'.

One might experience the liminal state through meditation, when one is fully conscious and has dispensed temporarily with ego. Not 'magical' but scientific.

[GaryLouisSmith]

Science does not make predictions, only statistical analyses.

I think science makes predictions all the time. Say, when the next eclipse will be. Eintein's theory predicted that gravity would bend the course of light, and then tests confirmed this, in a specific case. And this would be used to predict that other large bodies would bend light. Science would be fairly useless without its power to predict.

Now one could quibble over the wording and say that science does not make predictions, scientists do. But then this would hold for statistical analysis also. Science doesn't make statisitical analyses, scientists do, or other people who use scientific knowledge to do this.

Well yes, but what about those times when no predictions, statistical or otherwise, can be made? The question is about those instances of pure chance. Do they exist?

[Belindi]

I asked a working physicist : physicists use mathematics including stats and also empirical evidence.

There would exist no scientists or no science unless prediction was the main motive. Societies and individuals don't waste time and energy for no reason. Even Darwin disembarked from the Beagle observing finches' beaks was limbering up to the grand prediction which is evolution by natural selection. All scientific theories are grand overarching predictions.

[GaryLouisSmith]

I asked a working physicist : physicists use mathematics including stats and also empirical evidence.

There would exist no scientists or no science unless prediction was the main motive. Societies and individuals don't waste time and energy for no reason. Even Darwin disembarked from the Beagle observing finches' beaks was limbering up to the grand prediction which is evolution by natural selection. All scientific theories are grand overarching predictions.

And when prediction is impossible you are just left dangling. You do seem to be content with your science and nothing else. Oh well, at least you are not wasting your time. Everything has a reason and one must look for it within the natural order. It seems rather bleak to me, but who am I to judge.

[Karpel Tunnel]

Well yes, but what about those times when no predictions, statistical or otherwise, can be made? The question is about those instances of pure chance. Do they exist?

I dunno, given my non-omniscience however the heuristic that chance exists will probably not do me any harm. Phenomenologically I will experience what will seem like pure chance.

I don't think that way. And I suppose it has helped me, or so it seems, to presume it wasn't chance. I think I have figured out a lot of stuff with the presumption that it was not pure chance.

So, on second thought, I don't think in terms of pure chance much. But I can't make a metaphysical call objectively, just noting my own heuristics.

****, I see motive where others just see chemical machines.

And then there are my friends the trees.

[Belindi]

And when prediction is impossible you are just left dangling. You do seem to be content with your science and nothing else. Oh well, at least you are not wasting your time. Everything has a reason and one must look for it within the natural order. It seems rather bleak to me, but who am I to judge.

Who are you to judge? You are the same as everyone else. We all have to live with uncertainty whether we like it or not. I try to understand and I can tolerate uncertainty. The person who cannot tolerate uncertainty is vulnerable to dangerous ideologies.