Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Mark1955]

Not if you contain it in pressure vessel at 2 bar, not if they're already dead. trite and obvious examples, but true nevertheless and I didn't even need to invoke 'unknown' variables.

Yes, my test conditions weren't fully specified. But they can be.

Can they, you can always be aware of all the factors impacting every test you do, really. I suspect you don't do much in the way of real life testing to make this claim. I used to grow yeast for a living and the rule was, when you've controlled the fixed parameters perfectly and varied the variable parameter precisely the bug still does what it wants.

[GE Morton]

Yes, my test conditions weren't fully specified. But they can be.

Can they, you can always be aware of all the factors impacting every test you do, really. I suspect you don't do much in the way of real life testing to make this claim. I used to grow yeast for a living and the rule was, when you've controlled the fixed parameters perfectly and varied the variable parameter precisely the bug still does what it wants.

Heh. Yes indeed. Unknown or uncontrollable variables confound testing, especially in biological systems. But in most physical systems that is less of a problem, and we can establish causal relationships with more confidence.

That is why attributing causes to human behavior is always specious. The number of variables involved and their interactions are huge and unpredictable.

[Felix]

GE Morton: Desires are motivators; they are not something distinct from them. Desires motivate acts. You seem to think there are three phenomena: desire --->motive --->act. But there are only two: desire --->act. The motive is just a verb linking the two.

I did not request a grammar lesson.... You said that human motives are uncaused, now you say they spring from desires, so then, these desires are uncaused?

[Belindi]

GE Morton wrote:

You think motives aren't causes? True, all causes are not motives. True to say all motives are causes.

You can say that motives are causes, but they differ from other causes in that they are themselves uncaused. (We're delving into the free will/determinism debate here).

Indeed we are. Why did you stop? Why did you not say you believe in Free Will?

Also true to say all motives are effects of causes.

Not so. To make the case that A is the cause of B you have to show that B always follows A, unless specified other factors are present. That cannot be done for any human motive or behavior. Humans are "unmoved movers."

Unless you are believe in an order of existence which is not natural, you must necessarily believe in an order of existence that is 'outside'/'beyond/ or even 'above' causality.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton: Desires are motivators; they are not something distinct from them. Desires motivate acts. You seem to think there are three phenomena: desire --->motive --->act. But there are only two: desire --->act. The motive is just a verb linking the two.

I did not request a grammar lesson.... You said that human motives are uncaused, now you say they spring from desires, so then, these desires are uncaused?

No, that is not what I'm saying. Motives don't "spring from desires." Motives aredesires.

And, yes, desires are uncaused. We can speculate and hypothesize causes for them, but we can't actually identify any.

[GE Morton]

No, that is not what I'm saying. Motives don't "spring from desires." Motives aredesires.

I should clarify that. Not all desires are motives, but all motives are desires. A motive is a desire that prompts an action.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton wrote:

You can say that motives are causes, but they differ from other causes in that they are themselves uncaused. (We're delving into the free will/determinism debate here).

Indeed we are. Why did you stop? Why did you not say you believe in Free Will?

Doesn't everybody who philosophizes about morality? It it is a presupposition of every moral theory.

My reason for embracing free will is less esoteric than some others, however. If a causal chain cannot be demonstrated for a system then any claim that that system is deterministic is unproven. No casual chain can be shown for most human behaviors; hence it cannot be claimed that human behavior is deterministic. So you're left with free will.

Unless you are believe in an order of existence which is not natural, you must necessarily believe in an order of existence that is 'outside'/'beyond/ or even 'above' causality.

I have no idea why you would think that follows. I'm not sure what "beyond/above causality" even means. I believe some phenomena are uncaused --- the choice there is either 1) some phenomena are uncaused, or 2) you have an infinite regress of causes. I find the former less objectionable logically than the latter. But uncaused phenomena are not "outside" or "beyond" reality. They are part of everyday reality.

[Felix]

GE Morton: the choice there is either 1) some phenomena are uncaused, or 2) you have an infinite regress of causes.

Those are not the possibilities. Phenomena are either caused or not, it's illogical to say that some are and some aren't - unless you can distinguish between the two. Human will is considered to be either causal/material or noncausal/immaterial (a.k.a., metaphysical) - this is to what Belindi was referring.

Infinite regress is not relevant to this discussion since we are mortal creatures.

Soft determinists believe that individuals possess the circumstantial freedom to do as they please and therefore we can attribute moral responsibility to them. They can be praised and blamed, rewarded and punished, for what they do, even though what they do was not freely chosen because they could not have done otherwise. Their action was determined by their entire past and constitution. However, it was their action and so they can be held responsible for it.

[Felix]

GE Morton: And, yes, desires are uncaused. We can speculate and hypothesize causes for them, but we can't actually identify any.

?? - We know that we get hungry and have a desire to eat because our bodies require nourishment. The cause of hunger is clear, we do not have to speculate about it.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton: the choice there is either 1) some phenomena are uncaused, or 2) you have an infinite regress of causes.

Those are not the possibilities. Phenomena are either caused or not, it's illogical to say that some are and some aren't - unless you can distinguish between the two.

No, it is not illogical. "All phenomena are caused," and, "Only some phenomena are caused" are contradictories. They are alternative hypotheses; either may be true. Only asserting both simultaneously is illogical.

And we can distinguish between caused and uncaused phenomena. We can say that a bullet to the heart was the cause of a death, but can give no cause for why a radium atom fissioned at a particular instant, or for why the Big Bang occurred.

Human will is considered to be either causal/material or noncausal/immaterial (a.k.a., metaphysical) - this is to what Belindi was referring.

I suspected something of the sort. Human will is either caused or uncaused; "immaterial/metaphysical" is a vacuous concept which explains nothing. If no causes for a desire or action can be given, then we may assume free will.

Infinite regress is not relevant to this discussion since we are mortal creatures.

Our mortality has no bearing on the logical problems with infinite regress.

Soft determinists believe that individuals possess the circumstantial freedom to do as they please and therefore we can attribute moral responsibility to them. They can be praised and blamed, rewarded and punished, for what they do, even though what they do was not freely chosen because they could not have done otherwise. Their action was determined by their entire past and constitution. However, it was their action and so they can be held responsible for it.

That position is self-contradictory. You are proposing to hold people responsible for acts for which, by your own hypothesis, they are not responsible. "Circumstantial freedom" is a verbal smokescreen for hiding that contradiction. Moreoever, per your deterministic hypothesis any decision we make as to whether to extend praise or blame, or hold someone responsible, is itself determined. Thus any moral justification we contrive will be moot.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton: And, yes, desires are uncaused. We can speculate and hypothesize causes for them, but we can't actually identify any.

?? - We know that we get hungry and have a desire to eat because our bodies require nourishment. The cause of hunger is clear, we do not have to speculate about it.

Hunger does not necessarily result in a desire to eat. Consider anorexics and hunger-strikers.

[Felix]

GE Morton said: "All phenomena are caused," and, "Only some phenomena are caused" are contradictories. They are alternative hypotheses; either may be true.

No, as I said, empirically speaking that is an illogical statement. Science presumes that all phenomenal processes are causal, because Nature operates according to causal laws. The alternative would be that they are supernatural.

If you worked as a lab technician and told your boss, "I found the cause of these two chemical reactions but not this third one and therefore it must have no cause," he'd start to think about replacing you ASAP.

GE Morton: but we can give no cause for why a radium atom fissioned at a particular instant,

That involves quantum mechanics, gauging statistical probabilities, but it is still considered to be a causal process.

GE Morton: or for why the Big Bang occurred.

This too, being a physical event, is considered to have a cause, even if the cause is unknown.

GE Morton: I suspected something of the sort. Human will is either caused or uncaused; "immaterial/metaphysical" is a vacuous concept which explains nothing. If no causes for a desire or action can be given, then we may assume free will.

It is less vacuous than your baseless assumption that "some phenomena are caused and some are not." Science deals with sensory phenomena. Rational proponents of free will consider the human will to be an intellectual rather than a sensuous faculty of desire and decision, and therefore outside of the domain of material (sensory) phenomena studied by science.

GE Morton: Our mortality has no bearing on the logical problems with infinite regress.

Only no bearing if you were not born (pardon the pun). One's physical birth is considered to be the starting point of one's personal history and the exercise of one's will - unless you believe in reincarnation.

GE Morton: That position (of soft determinism) is self-contradictory.

I agree, I don't personally accept it, I was just stating the position as I understand it. But you see, the determinists cannot avoid it if they will not accept the idea that the human will is immaterial, i.e., not wholly subject to the causal laws of nature.

GE Morton: Hunger does not necessarily result in a desire to eat.

Obviously, but it is the usual cause of it. When you have not eaten for 3 days, you'll have no need to speculate about the cause of your hunger.

[GE Morton]

Science presumes that all phenomenal processes are causal, because Nature operates according to causal laws. The alternative would be that they are supernatural.

Well, of course science presumes that (most) phenomena have causes; if they did not they would be inexplicable, and science would be a Quixotic endeavor. But "supernatural" is not the only alternative; indeed, a "supernatural" explanation is still a causal explanation. The alternative to caused is uncaused; i.e., random, spontaneous.

If you worked as a lab technician and told your boss, "I found the cause of these two chemical reactions but not this third one and therefore it must have no cause," he'd start to think about replacing you ASAP.

As he should. We understand chemistry well enough to know that chemical reactions have causes, and know of none that don't.

GE Morton: but we can give no cause for why a radium atom fissioned at a particular instant,

That involves quantum mechanics, gauging statistical probabilities, but it is still considered to be a causal process.

A statistical probability is not a cause. E.g., the statistical probability that it will snow in January somewhere in Alaska is 100%. But that is not a causal explanation for snow.

Nor is QM a "causal process;" indeterminancy is its hallmark characteristic. Though some physicists favor a "hidden variable" theory or other revisions or interpretations for rendering QM deterministic, others --- the majority -- accept quantum indeterminacy at face value. Perhaps a "Final Theory" will resolve this issue. In the meantime we cannot predict when a radium atom will fission, and can cite no cause when it does. So that the atom's decay was uncaused remains a possibility.

Good discussion of QM and determinism here:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dete ... aDetPhyThe

GE Morton: or for why the Big Bang occurred.

This too, being a physical event, is considered to have a cause, even if the cause is unknown.

Anything "can be said" to have a cause. Identifying and proving one is another matter.

GE Morton: I suspected something of the sort. Human will is either caused or uncaused; "immaterial/metaphysical" is a vacuous concept which explains nothing. If no causes for a desire or action can be given, then we may assume free will.

It is less vacuous than your baseless assumption that "some phenomena are caused and some are not."

That assumption is hardly baseless. It is based on the empirical facts that we can supply causes for some --- most --- phenomena, and cannot for other phenomena, despite diligent efforts to find them.

Rational proponents of free will consider the human will to be an intellectual rather than a sensuous faculty of desire and decision, and therefore outside of the domain of material (sensory) phenomena studied by science.

Free will is merely the hypothesis that moral agents are able to choose among possible actions in any given situation, and that their choices are not predetermined, not the the causal result of, the current states of any set of pre-existing variables. We adopt that hypothesis for two reasons, one objective, the other subjective. The objective reason is that we have been unable to identify any set of variables that reliably predict almost any human behavior. (Note that we can reliably predict the behavior of a particular person in a particular situation if we know the person well. But that is an inductive prediction based on observed past behavior; not a causal one). The subjective reason is our own experience of making choices, especially difficult ones, and the many considerations that enter into them, the weighing of the comparative costs and benefits of each option. The decision turns on the weights we subjectively assign to those various costs and benefits, which no one except the deciding agent can know in advance. That makes our decision intractably unpredictable by any third party (except, perhaps, in some cases, by persons who know us well).

GE Morton: Our mortality has no bearing on the logical problems with infinite regress.

Only no bearing if you were not born (pardon the pun). One's physical birth is considered to be the starting point of one's personal history and the exercise of one's will - unless you believe in reincarnation.

I have no idea what you think one's personal history has to do with the problem of infinite regress. The problem is that an infinite regress of causes is equivalent to no cause.

http://steve-patterson.com/the-logic-of ... e-regress/

GE Morton: That position (of soft determinism) is self-contradictory.

I agree, I don't personally accept it, I was just stating the position as I understand it. But you see, the determinists cannot avoid it if they will not accept the idea that the human will is immaterial, i.e., not wholly subject to the causal laws of nature.

Well, we seem to agree on that point. The will is not material (as, say, your arm is material), though it is a function or process of a physical system. But it is not one predictable from determinable physical states of that system.

When you have not eaten for 3 days, you'll have no need to speculate about the cause of your hunger.

We know the causes of hunger. The causes of desires is what was in question.We can be hungry yet have no desire to eat.

[Felix]

GE Morton: The alternative to caused is uncaused; i.e., random, spontaneous.

No, that is not the only alternative, there are three empirical possibilities: (a) causal, (b) causally indeterminate (as in quantum mechanics), and (c) random, which has no apparent order at all. However, as I said, proponents of free choice consider the will to be an intellectual rather than a strictly physical/biological function, and therefore not ruled by empirical laws.

GE Morton: In the meantime we cannot predict when a radium atom will fission, and can cite no cause when it does.

Of course we can cite a cause, it is the process of nuclear fission, a process that is understood. Apparently you have the odd idea that a physical event must be entirely predictable to be called causal, only omniscience could give us that degree of certainty.

GE Morton: The will is not material (as, say, your arm is material), though it is a function or process of a physical system. But it is not one predictable from determinable physical states of that system.

If the actions of the will are not determinable, as physical (sensory) and emotional reactions are determinable, than we cannot assume that it is merely a function or process of a physical system. Other animals have the same "physical system" we do but, with a few exceptions, we do not see evidence that they exercise free will.

GE Morton: We can be hungry yet have no desire to eat.

You have your own private definition of hunger? - because the common one is a "craving or desire for food."

[GE Morton]

GE Morton: The alternative to caused is uncaused; i.e., random, spontaneous.

No, that is not the only alternative, there are three empirical possibilities: (a) causal, (b) causally indeterminate (as in quantum mechanics), and (c) random, which has no apparent order at all.

"Causally indeterminate" is oxymoronic. If it is indeterminate then claiming that it is causal is presumptuous.

However, as I said, proponents of free choice consider the will to be an intellectual rather than a strictly physical/biological function, and therefore not ruled by empirical laws.

Intellectual functions are themselves physical functions. There are no intellectual functions other than those performed by some physical system. We can speculate that a complete knowledge of the states of all the variables operative in such a system would allow us to predict its behaviors. But such knowledge is unobtainable in principle, and so that speculation is idle.

GE Morton: In the meantime we cannot predict when a radium atom will fission, and can cite no cause when it does.

Of course we can cite a cause, it is the process of nuclear fission, a process that is understood.

That is circular. You don't explain the fissioning of an atom by stating that it is an example of nuclear fission. The fact is we don't understand that process in a causal sense; only in a statistical sense. I.e., we don't know why this particular atom decayed; we only know that in a gram of radium a certain number of atoms will decay in a specified time. We don't know why any of them decayed. Atom "X" has maintained its integrity for a million years. Why did it just now emit an alpha particle?

Apparently you have the odd idea that a physical event must be entirely predictable to be called causal, only omniscience could give us that degree of certainty.

Yes, it must be entirely predictable to be called causal. But no, omniscience is not required for something to be entirely predictable. That death will follow from firing a large caliber bullet into the heart is entirely predictable. That heating water to 100C at sea level will cause it to boil is entirely predictable. No omniscience necessary.

If the actions of the will are not determinable, as physical (sensory) and emotional reactions are determinable, than we cannot assume that it is merely a function or process of a physical system.

I assume that by "determinable" you mean causally predictable. But we need to clarify here: the will is not an actor, not an entity or causal agent distinct from the person whose will it is. The agent is the actor, and the agent is a physical system. The "will" is just another word for choice; we can always substitute "Alfie chose to do X," for, "Alfie willed to do X." By reifying "wills," a verb, into a noun ("the will") we delude ourselves into thinking it names some entity. But it is just a figure of speech for describing behavior. It merely denotes that the agent acted as he did for reasons internal to him, and was not forced to do so by external causes.

So, yes, we may assume that what a person wills --- what choices he makes, what actions he performs --- are processes of a physical system. We can know that because if we disturb that system in various ways those choices and actions will cease.

Other animals have the same "physical system" we do but, with a few exceptions, we do not see evidence that they exercise free will.

What?! You must never have lived with a dog or a cat.

GE Morton: We can be hungry yet have no desire to eat.

You have your own private definition of hunger? - because the common one is a "craving or desire for food."

Well, "desire" there is used loosely. Hunger is indeed a craving for food, but one may desire food even when one is not hungry, and may not desire it when one is.