Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[Atla]

2. Since there is ZERO scientific evidence that qualia is a restricted to neural networks, the best scientific explanation is that qualia isn't restricted to neural networks.

Surely not, since there is zero scientific evidence for the panpsychistic assertion that consciousness is independent of animal brains and organisms and also occurs outside the animal kingdom; and there is sufficient scientific evidence for the brain-dependence of animal consciousness. Of course, panpsychists can reply that it doesn't follow that nonanimal consciousness is brain-dependent. But…

Again you are mixing the easy and hard problems together, and also throw in panpsychism, and then conclude that therefore materialism is the best candidate, so you make about three errors at once.

- there is zero scientific evidence that qualia is restricted to neural networks: ruling out the materialist explanations of qualia
- and all scientific evidence shows that animal consciousness (not counting qualia) can be equated or correlated with animal brains: ruling out the kind of panpsychist explanations of consciousness you mentioned

Panpsychism is a lot closer to the correct picture than materialism, but it too is just a crude dualistic view from Western philosophy. Taking the material, and a distorted mental, and having them everywhere.

"Then there is the question of the need for a brain. We normally suppose that one of these is pretty useful when it comes to having a mind, indeed a sine qua non (even if it’s made of silicon); we suppose that, at a minimum, a physical object has to exhibit the right degree of complexity before it can make a mind. But the panpsychist is having none of it: you get to have a mind well before even organic cells come on the market, before molecules indeed. Actually, you get mentality—experience—at the point of the Big Bang, fifteen billion years before brains are minted. So brains are a kind of contingency, a kind of pointless luxury when it comes to possessing mental states. It becomes puzzling why we have them at all, and why they are so big and fragile; atoms don’t need them, so why do we? And this puzzle only becomes more severe when we remind ourselves that the panpsychist has to believe in full-throttle pre-cerebral mentality— genuine experiences of red and pangs of hunger and spasms of lust. As Eddington puts it, the mental world that we are acquainted with in introspection is a window onto the world of the physical universe, and the two are qualitatively alike: introspection tells us what matter is like from the inside, whether it is in our brain or not. But then the brain isn’t necessary for the kind of experiential property it reveals to us; it is only necessary for the revealing to occur. What is revealed by introspection is spread over the entire physical universe. In fact, it would not be stretching a point to say that all bits of matter—from strings, to quarks, to atoms, to molecules, to cells, to organs, to animals—are themselves brains. There can be brains without brains! But if so, why bother with brains?"

Again totally mixing together the easy problems (mental states, "contents" of experience) with the hard problem (qualia and experience itself) and arriving at nonsense.

By the way plants almost certainly have rudimentary sensations as well.

[Consul]

Again you are mixing the easy and hard problems together,…

I don't think I am, and I don't see why you think so.

…and also throw in panpsychism, and then conclude that therefore materialism is the best candidate, so you make about three errors at once.

- there is zero scientific evidence that qualia is restricted to neural networks: ruling out the materialist explanations of qualia
- and all scientific evidence shows that animal consciousness (not counting qualia) can be equated or correlated with animal brains: ruling out the kind of panpsychist explanations of consciousness you mentioned

What do you mean by "consciousness (not counting qualia)"? When you talk about (phenomenal) consciousness you thereby talk about phenomenal (experiential) qualities (qualia).

"[T]he problem of qualia is not just an aspect of the problem of consciousness; it is the problem of consciousness. You can talk about various other features of consciousness—for example, the powers that the visual system has to discriminate colors—but to the extent that you are talking about conscious discrimination you are talking about qualia. I think that the term 'qualia' is misleading because it suggests that the quale of a state of consciousness might be carved off from the rest of the consciousness and set on one side, as if you could talk about the rest of the problem of consciousness while ignoring the subjective, qualitative feel of consciousness. But you can't set qualia on one side, because if you do there is no consciousness left over."

(Searle, John R. The Mystery of Consciousness. New York: New York Review of Books, 1997. p. 29)

Again, there is a lot of scientific evidence for the total brain-dependence of human consciousness and all other forms of animal consciousness, and there is no scientific evidence for brain-independent consciousness beyond the animal kingdom. The empirically ascertained systematic psychoneural correlations are very strong evidence for a natural unity or even identity of (conscious) minds and brains, such that brainless or "disembrained" (conscious) minds seem naturally impossible. As Colin McGinn says: "Minds and brains are not ships that pass in the night; the brain is the very lifeblood of the mind."

Panpsychism is a lot closer to the correct picture than materialism, but it too is just a crude dualistic view from Western philosophy. Taking the material, and a distorted mental, and having them everywhere.

No, panpsychism is very far away from the truth, and it's even preposterous as a mere possibility. For how could a nonorganism without any sense organs possibly have any subjective sensations? How could a single subatomic particle, atom, or molecule possibly (consciously) see, hear, smell, or taste anything? The panpsychistic dissociation of consciousness and life results in metaphysical nonsense!

"[P]anpsychism is metaphysically and scientifically outrageous. We are being invited to believe that bits of rock and elementary particles enjoy an inner conscious life, on the strength of an a priori argument about how complexes of matter like animals can have minds. But why did we not acknowledge this fact before we came upon the problem of supervenience? Because, simply, mere matter gives no signs of having mental properties, either behavioural or physiological; so there would be no saying what mental states these bits of matter possessed. Are we to suppose that rocks actually have thoughts and feelings which they happen to be unable to communicate? Also, do the mental properties of the constituents of matter have any causal powers? Presumably they must if they are to give rise to mental states that do but how is it, then, that particle physicists have not had to reckon with such causal powers in developing their theories of matter? If the mental properties of electrons bear upon how they will behave, then predictions about them will not be derivable from their physical properties alone: but we know this not to be the case—so the mental properties would have to be declared causally inefficacious. Clearly these accusations of absurdity could be multiplied."

(McGinn, Colin. The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 34)

Again totally mixing together the easy problems (mental states, "contents" of experience) with the hard problem (qualia and experience itself) and arriving at nonsense.

No, I'm not doing so—neither totally nor partly.

I'm the one who's "arriving at nonsense"? Come on, you gotta be kidding!

By the way, conscious/experiential states are mental states; and whether all distinctively and genuinely mental states are conscious/experiential ones is a contentious issue in philosophy&science. (For example, Descartes is one of those equating the mind with consciousness/experience.) Moreover, the qualia are the subjective contents of experience.

By the way plants almost certainly have rudimentary sensations as well.

No, they almost certainly have not. Now you're mixing something up: mere physiological sensitivity (= reactiveness/responsiveness to stimuli) and psychological sentience (= subjective sensations/sense-impressions).

There are some similarities between the electrophysiological signal processing in plants and the neurological signal processing in animals, but these are much too weak to justify an analogical inference from animal consciousness to plant consciousness. The label "plant neurobiology" is actually a misnomer due to the fact that plants don't really have any nervous system, let alone a central one (brain). Nonetheless, the nonconscious physiological sensitivity of plants is an evolutionary precursor of the development of conscious psychological sentience in animals. (Note that phenomenal consciousness aka subjective experience started with primitive sensations.)

[Atla]

Again you are mixing the easy and hard problems together,…

I don't think I am, and I don't see why you think so.

…and also throw in panpsychism, and then conclude that therefore materialism is the best candidate, so you make about three errors at once.

- there is zero scientific evidence that qualia is restricted to neural networks: ruling out the materialist explanations of qualia
- and all scientific evidence shows that animal consciousness (not counting qualia) can be equated or correlated with animal brains: ruling out the kind of panpsychist explanations of consciousness you mentioned

What do you mean by "consciousness (not counting qualia)"? When you talk about (phenomenal) consciousness you thereby talk about phenomenal (experiential) qualities (qualia).

"[T]he problem of qualia is not just an aspect of the problem of consciousness; it is the problem of consciousness. You can talk about various other features of consciousness—for example, the powers that the visual system has to discriminate colors—but to the extent that you are talking about conscious discrimination you are talking about qualia. I think that the term 'qualia' is misleading because it suggests that the quale of a state of consciousness might be carved off from the rest of the consciousness and set on one side, as if you could talk about the rest of the problem of consciousness while ignoring the subjective, qualitative feel of consciousness. But you can't set qualia on one side, because if you do there is no consciousness left over."

(Searle, John R. The Mystery of Consciousness. New York: New York Review of Books, 1997. p. 29)

Again, there is a lot of scientific evidence for the total brain-dependence of human consciousness and all other forms of animal consciousness, and there is no scientific evidence for brain-independent consciousness beyond the animal kingdom. The empirically ascertained systematic psychoneural correlations are very strong evidence for a natural unity or even identity of (conscious) minds and brains, such that brainless or "disembrained" (conscious) minds seem naturally impossible. As Colin McGinn says: "Minds and brains are not ships that pass in the night; the brain is the very lifeblood of the mind."

Panpsychism is a lot closer to the correct picture than materialism, but it too is just a crude dualistic view from Western philosophy. Taking the material, and a distorted mental, and having them everywhere.

No, panpsychism is very far away from the truth, and it's even preposterous as a mere possibility. For how could a nonorganism without any sense organs possibly have any subjective sensations? How could a single subatomic particle, atom, or molecule possibly (consciously) see, hear, smell, or taste anything? The panpsychistic dissociation of consciousness and life results in metaphysical nonsense!

"[P]anpsychism is metaphysically and scientifically outrageous. We are being invited to believe that bits of rock and elementary particles enjoy an inner conscious life, on the strength of an a priori argument about how complexes of matter like animals can have minds. But why did we not acknowledge this fact before we came upon the problem of supervenience? Because, simply, mere matter gives no signs of having mental properties, either behavioural or physiological; so there would be no saying what mental states these bits of matter possessed. Are we to suppose that rocks actually have thoughts and feelings which they happen to be unable to communicate? Also, do the mental properties of the constituents of matter have any causal powers? Presumably they must if they are to give rise to mental states that do but how is it, then, that particle physicists have not had to reckon with such causal powers in developing their theories of matter? If the mental properties of electrons bear upon how they will behave, then predictions about them will not be derivable from their physical properties alone: but we know this not to be the case—so the mental properties would have to be declared causally inefficacious. Clearly these accusations of absurdity could be multiplied."

(McGinn, Colin. The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 34)

Again totally mixing together the easy problems (mental states, "contents" of experience) with the hard problem (qualia and experience itself) and arriving at nonsense.

No, I'm not doing so—neither totally nor partly.

I'm the one who's "arriving at nonsense"? Come on, you gotta be kidding!

By the way, conscious/experiential states are mental states; and whether all distinctively and genuinely mental states are conscious/experiential ones is a contentious issue in philosophy&science. (For example, Descartes is one of those equating the mind with consciousness/experience.) Moreover, the qualia are the subjective contents of experience.

By the way plants almost certainly have rudimentary sensations as well.

No, they almost certainly have not. Now you're mixing something up: mere physiological sensitivity (= reactiveness/responsiveness to stimuli) and psychological sentience (= subjective sensations/sense-impressions).

There are some similarities between the electrophysiological signal processing in plants and the neurological signal processing in animals, but these are much too weak to justify an analogical inference from animal consciousness to plant consciousness. The label "plant neurobiology" is actually a misnomer due to the fact that plants don't really have any nervous system, let alone a central one (brain). Nonetheless, the nonconscious physiological sensitivity of plants is an evolutionary precursor of the development of conscious psychological sentience in animals. (Note that phenomenal consciousness aka subjective experience started with primitive sensations.)

Then it's final that you don't understand what the hard problem is, and you also didn't understand my comments so far. All these years you probably have been trying to answer the wrong questions, just like pretty much everyone else, that's normal. Look at this word salad by Searle:

"I think that the term 'qualia' is misleading because it suggests that the quale of a state of consciousness might be carved off from the rest of the consciousness and set on one side, as if you could talk about the rest of the problem of consciousness while ignoring the subjective, qualitative feel of consciousness. But you can't set qualia on one side, because if you do there is no consciousness left over."

If he meant it the way I think he meant it, then the above is a typical Western philosophy error, mixing together "qualia/experience itself" and "mental states/contents of experience", the hard problem and easy problems. Taking two different issues, mixing them together, believing that they are one and the same, and calling it consciousness.

OF COURSE we can only start to make sense of the world, when carve off the quale of a state of consciousness and set it aside (for a while). And when we do so, we of course still have consciousness in the other sense left over.

[Atla]

...

Here's a Searle video (haven't looked into before where Searle goes wrong):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgWbExnceHE

The catastrophic mistake he makes is between 9:56 and 10:18. This confirms that he mixes the two different meanings of consciousness together without realizing that it has two different meanings. His facts 2 and 3 are not even wrong in this form.

[Consul]

Then it's final that you don't understand what the hard problem is, and you also didn't understand my comments so far. All these years you probably have been trying to answer the wrong questions, just like pretty much everyone else, that's normal.

If you think I don't understand "what the hard problem is", then please describe it here in your own words!

Look at this word salad by Searle:

"I think that the term 'qualia' is misleading because it suggests that the quale of a state of consciousness might be carved off from the rest of the consciousness and set on one side, as if you could talk about the rest of the problem of consciousness while ignoring the subjective, qualitative feel of consciousness. But you can't set qualia on one side, because if you do there is no consciousness left over."

If he meant it the way I think he meant it, then the above is a typical Western philosophy error, mixing together "qualia/experience itself" and "mental states/contents of experience", the hard problem and easy problems. Taking two different issues, mixing them together, believing that they are one and the same, and calling it consciousness.

OF COURSE we can only start to make sense of the world, when carve off the quale of a state of consciousness and set it aside (for a while). And when we do so, we of course still have consciousness in the other sense left over.

What is this "other sense" of "consciousness"?

David Chalmers, who coined the phrases "the hard problem" and "the easy problems" writes that "the easy problems are those of explaining cognitive and behavioral functions such as discrimination, integration, and verbal report. The hard problem is that of explaining conscious experience." (Introduction to The Character of Consciousness, Oxford UP, 2010, xiv). So the "easy problem" (which aren't really easy but just less hard than the "hard problem") are the functional-informational problems cognitive psychology deals with.

What Searle means by "consciousness" is subjective experience aka phenomenal consciousness and not cognition [* or perception. Cognitive or perceptive processes can be phenomenally nonconscious and thus lack qualia.
[* "cognition. The mental activities involved in acquiring and processing information." – Oxford Dictionary of Psychology]

What is clear is that the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness IS the problem of qualia. Searle is doubtless right: If you subtract the qualia, what remains is phenomenally nonconscious, subjectively unexperienced cognition or perception.

[Atla]

Then it's final that you don't understand what the hard problem is, and you also didn't understand my comments so far. All these years you probably have been trying to answer the wrong questions, just like pretty much everyone else, that's normal.

If you think I don't understand "what the hard problem is", then please describe it here in your own words!

Look at this word salad by Searle:

"I think that the term 'qualia' is misleading because it suggests that the quale of a state of consciousness might be carved off from the rest of the consciousness and set on one side, as if you could talk about the rest of the problem of consciousness while ignoring the subjective, qualitative feel of consciousness. But you can't set qualia on one side, because if you do there is no consciousness left over."

If he meant it the way I think he meant it, then the above is a typical Western philosophy error, mixing together "qualia/experience itself" and "mental states/contents of experience", the hard problem and easy problems. Taking two different issues, mixing them together, believing that they are one and the same, and calling it consciousness.

OF COURSE we can only start to make sense of the world, when carve off the quale of a state of consciousness and set it aside (for a while). And when we do so, we of course still have consciousness in the other sense left over.

What is this "other sense" of "consciousness"?

David Chalmers, who coined the phrases "the hard problem" and "the easy problems" writes that "the easy problems are those of explaining cognitive and behavioral functions such as discrimination, integration, and verbal report. The hard problem is that of explaining conscious experience." (Introduction to The Character of Consciousness, Oxford UP, 2010, xiv). So the "easy problem" (which aren't really easy but just less hard than the "hard problem") are the functional-informational problems cognitive psychology deals with.

What Searle means by "consciousness" is subjective experience aka phenomenal consciousness and not cognition [* or perception. Cognitive or perceptive processes can be phenomenally nonconscious and thus lack qualia.
[* "cognition. The mental activities involved in acquiring and processing information." – Oxford Dictionary of Psychology]

What is clear is that the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness IS the problem of qualia. Searle is doubtless right: If you subtract the qualia, what remains is phenomenally nonconscious, subjectively unexperienced cognition or perception.

Again:
Consciousness in the easy problems sense is about: what's going on with advanced nervous systems.
Consciousness in the hard problem sense is about: why there is qualia at all, and there is no reason to believe that this has anything to do with nervous systems.

Why keep mixing these together?

[Sculptor1]

Again:
Consciousness in the easy problems sense is about: what's going on with advanced nervous systems.
Consciousness in the hard problem sense is about: why there is qualia at all, and there is no reason to believe that this has anything to do with nervous systems.

Why keep mixing these together?

Why don't you address the question as to why materialism is supposed to be absurd?

[Atla]

Again:
Consciousness in the easy problems sense is about: what's going on with advanced nervous systems.
Consciousness in the hard problem sense is about: why there is qualia at all, and there is no reason to believe that this has anything to do with nervous systems.

Why keep mixing these together?

Why don't you address the question as to why materialism is supposed to be absurd?

I did, you couldn't answer my questions, just kept repeating your unsupported beliefs.

[Consul]

Again:
Consciousness in the easy problems sense is about: what's going on with advanced nervous systems.
Consciousness in the hard problem sense is about: why there is qualia at all, and there is no reason to believe that this has anything to do with nervous systems.
Why keep mixing these together?

I'm afraid you're the one creating confusion. The (naturalistic, substance-materialistic) hard problem of (phenomenal) consciousness "is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject." (Source1) – It "is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i.e., phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience? And why does a given physical process generate the specific experience it does—why an experience of red rather than green, for example?" (Source2)

There are many good reasons to believe that the qualia constituting (phenomenal) consciousness have everything to do with nervous systems, that they somehow result from (nothing else but) patterns of electrochemical activity in central nervous systems. The hard problem is to explain HOW!

[Consul]

The (naturalistic, substance-materialistic) hard problem of (phenomenal) consciousness…

By the way, the supernaturalists and substance dualists have their own hard problem: How can an immaterial soul be (phenomenally) conscious? How are qualia realized by an immaterial soul?
And the naturalistic panpsychists' hard problem is to explain not only how biological systems (living organisms or their brains) can be (phenomenally) conscious, but also how nonbiological ones and even single molecules, atoms, or elementary particles can.

[Consul]

Why don't you address the question as to why materialism is supposed to be absurd?

I did, you couldn't answer my questions, just kept repeating your unsupported beliefs.

I'm sorry, but what was your non-materialistic solution to the hard problem of qualia again?
Qualia don't magically pop into existence out of nothing, do they?

[Atla]

Again:
Consciousness in the easy problems sense is about: what's going on with advanced nervous systems.
Consciousness in the hard problem sense is about: why there is qualia at all, and there is no reason to believe that this has anything to do with nervous systems.
Why keep mixing these together?

I'm afraid you're the one creating confusion. The (naturalistic, substance-materialistic) hard problem of (phenomenal) consciousness "is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject." (Source1) – It "is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i.e., phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience? And why does a given physical process generate the specific experience it does—why an experience of red rather than green, for example?" (Source2)

There are many good reasons to believe that the qualia constituting (phenomenal) consciousness have everything to do with nervous systems, that they somehow result from (nothing else but) patterns of electrochemical activity in central nervous systems. The hard problem is to explain HOW!

Again: there is ZERO known reason to believe that qualia has to do with nervous systems.

And the quotes you picked are talking about "subjects" and "mental states" so already distorting the hard problem with a material vs mental dualism. It's also ridiculous to just start with asking why physical processes generate experience - there is zero reason to believe that it's being generated.

The real hard problem is simply this: why does qualia go with matter at all?

[Atla]

I did, you couldn't answer my questions, just kept repeating your unsupported beliefs.

I'm sorry, but what was your non-materialistic solution to the hard problem of qualia again?
Qualia don't magically pop into existence out of nothing, do they?

The problem of qualia was resolved 3-5 thousand years ago by Eastern nondualism.
You probably haven't debated a nondualist before so you may not realize that materialists are in a 30-move checkmate from the start.

[Consul]

Again: there is ZERO known reason to believe that qualia has to do with nervous systems.

You cannot seriously believe that the pain you feel when you step barefoot on a Lego brick has nothing to do with your nervous system, or that tummyaches, headaches and toothaches have nothing to do with nervous systems.

And the quotes you picked are talking about "subjects" and "mental states" so already distorting the hard problem with a material vs mental dualism. It's also ridiculous to just start with asking why physical processes generate experience - there is zero reason to believe that it's being generated.
The real hard problem is simply this: why does qualia go with matter at all?

Are you sorta psychophysical parallelist?

Anyway, what kind of things do you think are the bearers of qualia—if not material objects or processes?

[Consul]

The problem of qualia was resolved 3-5 thousand years ago by Eastern nondualism.
You probably haven't debated a nondualist before so you may not realize that materialists are in a 30-move checkmate from the start.

Can you concisely describe that (alleged) solution?