Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[Tamminen]

You mention Descartes, and you actually sound like a Cartesian substance dualist, who regards souls not only as spatially unextended but also as spatially unlocated. Of course, if consciousness is a property or state of a spatially unlocated soul, it is spatially unlocated too. Are you really a Cartesian substance dualist?

I thought I said clearly enough that I do not believe in soul-substances any more than material substances. Consciousness is not a property of soul any more than it is a property of matter. It is the subject's way of being in the world. And if there were no subjects, there could be no consciousness, because there is no soul-substance floating around independent of matter and the subject. As I said, we need no other substance than the triadic structure 'the subject's consciousness of the world'. The subject alone, consciousness alone, and matter alone, are mere abstractions of this "holy trinity", and this triadic structure can be found in everything real. This is also the reason why the idea of a possible world without subjects is a mere abstraction without a real correlate even in imagination.

[Consul]

I thought I said clearly enough that I do not believe in soul-substances any more than material substances. Consciousness is not a property of soul any more than it is a property of matter. It is the subject's way of being in the world. And if there were no subjects, there could be no consciousness, because there is no soul-substance floating around independent of matter and the subject. As I said, we need no other substance than the triadic structure 'the subject's consciousness of the world'. The subject alone, consciousness alone, and matter alone, are mere abstractions of this "holy trinity", and this triadic structure can be found in everything real. This is also the reason why the idea of a possible world without subjects is a mere abstraction without a real correlate even in imagination.

What you haven't said clearly enough is what you think subjects are. You say they are neither souls nor bodies, and I don't understand what it means to say that they are "mere abstractions of this 'holy trinity'." Of course, an (actual) subject and its consciousness are interdependent in the sense that there cannot be one without the other: A(n actual) subject necessarily has consciousness, and consciousness necessarily has a subject. But a/the world doesn't necessarily have subjects in it that are conscious of it!

[Consul]

So you really don't even realize that pages aren't actual parts, we just pretend that they are, it's a way of thinking?

I don't "realize" that because I think it's really not the case. The books I have are composed of pages (plus a front and back cover, and a spine), which are actual material things.

And that we just pretend that a "thing" like a book is an actual part of the universe

Are you a mereological nihilist? Do you think all (actual/real) things are simple things, i.e. mereological atoms lacking proper parts, and never compose anything/any thing?

[Atla]

So you really don't even realize that pages aren't actual parts, we just pretend that they are, it's a way of thinking?

I don't "realize" that because I think it's really not the case. The books I have are composed of pages (plus a front and back cover, and a spine), which are actual material things.

And that we just pretend that a "thing" like a book is an actual part of the universe

Are you a mereological nihilist? Do you think all (actual/real) things are simple things, i.e. mereological atoms lacking proper parts, and never compose anything/any thing?

Why would I believe in refuted ideas? There are no known separate things in nature, therefore there are no "things" and composed things at all.

A "thing" is when we take a non-separable "part" of the universe and separate it anyway in our thinking. And a composed thing is when we take such apparently separate things and glue them back together in our thinking.

[Sculptor1]

Can you explain why water won't run my car? Despite it being made of two highly inflamable elements?
Now compare the amazing complexity of the human brain.

There is no problem to consciousness. It is a property of neural matter. And great strides have been made is describing how this all works, replacing the naive dualism of the past.
What's the problem?

This is THE problem of consciousness: surely you must realize that you are having direct experiences like red, or yellow, or the feeling of pain, or sound and so on.

The question is, why are there experiences? Why isn't matter just happening 'in a silent, dark nothingness', without any such experiences?

This is not a problem for materialism since we know that all this happens because of the presence of neural matter.
What's your solution? Something immaterial?? I think you might have more problems with that.

[Consul]

This is not a problem for materialism since we know that all this happens because of the presence of neural matter. What's your solution? Something immaterial?? I think you might have more problems with that.

The hard problem of consciousness/experience materialists are faced with is how it is realized by neural (electrochemical) processes in the brains of animals. However, if this is mysterious, it's much more mysterious how it could be realized by an immaterial soul—especially in the light of the circumstance that a soul is zero-dimensional like a mathematical point, such that there is no inner space, no inside or interior where consciousness-generating internal processes or structures can occur. An immaterial soul as a simple point is absolutely static, lacking any inner dynamics or motion. So it is plainly illogical to say that consciousness is generated by processes in immaterial souls.
(Note that as soon as you postulate some three-dimensional "soul-stuff", the soul becomes a material thing, a body!)

[Sculptor1]

This is not a problem for materialism since we know that all this happens because of the presence of neural matter. What's your solution? Something immaterial?? I think you might have more problems with that.

The hard problem of consciousness/experience materialists are faced with is how it is realized by neural (electrochemical) processes in the brains of animals. However, if this is mysterious, it's much more mysterious how it could be realized by an immaterial soul—especially in the light of the circumstance that a soul is zero-dimensional like a mathematical point, such that there is no inner space, no inside or interior where consciousness-generating internal processes or structures can occur. An immaterial soul as a simple point is absolutely static, lacking any inner dynamics or motion. So it is plainly illogical to say that consciousness is generated by processes in immaterial souls.
(Note that as soon as you postulate some three-dimensional "soul-stuff", the soul becomes a material thing, a body!)

Indeed.

[Tamminen]

I thought I said clearly enough that I do not believe in soul-substances any more than material substances. Consciousness is not a property of soul any more than it is a property of matter. It is the subject's way of being in the world. And if there were no subjects, there could be no consciousness, because there is no soul-substance floating around independent of matter and the subject. As I said, we need no other substance than the triadic structure 'the subject's consciousness of the world'. The subject alone, consciousness alone, and matter alone, are mere abstractions of this "holy trinity", and this triadic structure can be found in everything real. This is also the reason why the idea of a possible world without subjects is a mere abstraction without a real correlate even in imagination.

What you haven't said clearly enough is what you think subjects are. You say they are neither souls nor bodies, and I don't understand what it means to say that they are "mere abstractions of this 'holy trinity'." Of course, an (actual) subject and its consciousness are interdependent in the sense that there cannot be one without the other: A(n actual) subject necessarily has consciousness, and consciousness necessarily has a subject.

We can say that the subject is what carries subjective time from moment to moment. It is the present abstracted from its content. It is the eternal reference point of existence. It is Wittgenstein's limit of the world. In this sense it is an abstraction, but its consciousness of the world is concrete and real. This is the transcendental subject, and as you see I have used many metaphorical expressions to describe it so that people can hopefully get an idea of what I mean. So the subject is something that is common to all "animals", as you call them, i.e. all individual subjects. I think memory connects the succesive presents of subjective time so that we can speak of individual subjects, but I have not a clear picture of how those "projects" like Tamminen and Consul are constituted.

But a/the world doesn't necessarily have subjects in it that are conscious of it!

There is only one world, the world, and therefore, as I said, a possible alternate world cannot exist without subjects. This is the crucial point that makes a difference between materialism and the kind of idealism I represent. I have showed this very clearly in several posts during our discussions, but it seems that you and others have missed the point completely. The key in my argument is understanding that although logic is transcendental, it is not transcendent: it cannot be applied to anything that lies outside of its scope of usage, i.e. outside of our world, the world of subjects. To posit the possibility of the world without subjects is to posit an abstraction, not a possible concrete and real world.

[Tamminen]

The hard problem of consciousness/experience materialists are faced with is how it is realized by neural (electrochemical) processes in the brains of animals. However, if this is mysterious, it's much more mysterious how it could be realized by an immaterial soul—especially in the light of the circumstance that a soul is zero-dimensional like a mathematical point, such that there is no inner space, no inside or interior where consciousness-generating internal processes or structures can occur. An immaterial soul as a simple point is absolutely static, lacking any inner dynamics or motion. So it is plainly illogical to say that consciousness is generated by processes in immaterial souls.

There is no problem with the point-like subject if we think that consciousness is "generated" as the subject meets the material world. Consciousness is just the subject's way of existing in the world, and the world can be seen as the subject's instrument of existing, so that all the "energy" that the subject needs for existing comes from the material world. So the matter and energy that physics speaks about gives the functional powers of existing for the subject so that it can be conscious of the world and live in it in the way we do. But ontologically the subject is the prime mover and the universe with all its powers just serves it, giving it its concrete existence. Therefore the Big Bang and the cosmic evolution, the evolution of life, the rise of consciousness from matter, the community of subjects, and whatever amazing things there will be in the future. In this scenario the subject gets its properties from the world, being itself an abstraction without properties or structure. The only "structure" it has is subjective time. It is its "essence" if you like. And without the subject there is nothing. I just noticed a term 'eternal observer' in another thread, which describes perfectly what I think the subject is.

[Felix]

Tamminen: "In this scenario the subject gets its properties from the world, being itself an abstraction without properties or structure."

How is this different from the materialist claim that consciousness is an emergent quality of matter?

[Tamminen]

Tamminen: "In this scenario the subject gets its properties from the world, being itself an abstraction without properties or structure."

How is this different from the materialist claim that consciousness is an emergent quality of matter?

The subject is the 'eternal observer', the 'eternal present', 'the point of reference of all being', the 'look that does not see the eye', the 'metaphysical I', the 'limit of the world', the 'point along which the world is coordinated', just to give some metaphors. There is no consciousness without the subject. Matter does not explain the subject or its consciousness of matter. Materialism does not recognize the subject and its consciousness as original phenomena. Therefore materialism is blind. It does not see its own impossibility. But matter is an essential component of the structure of reality, the subject's consciousness of the world. We live in a material world.

[Tamminen]

...the subject and its consciousness as original phenomena

I must make a correction: the subject is not a phenomenon, it is the transcendental condition of all phenomena. It is not the "soul" of Descartes or anything like that.

[Atla]

This is THE problem of consciousness: surely you must realize that you are having direct experiences like red, or yellow, or the feeling of pain, or sound and so on.

The question is, why are there experiences? Why isn't matter just happening 'in a silent, dark nothingness', without any such experiences?

This is not a problem for materialism since we know that all this happens because of the presence of neural matter.
What's your solution? Something immaterial?? I think you might have more problems with that.

Again: neural matter is made of the same atoms etc. as the rest of the universe. So what you are saying is that if we arrange matter in a certain way, something magical happens. If that's not a problem then what is.

[Felix]

Tamminen: "Materialism does not recognize the subject and its consciousness as original phenomena" (you later modified this to "the transcendental condition of all phenomena").

You too do not recognize the subjects consciousness as primary, because just like the materialists, you say it depends upon matter for its existence. So as I see it, there is no practical difference between the materialist perspective and yours, both are empirically based and the distinction you've made is merely a semantic one. A "transcendental condition" would not depend upon material causes for it's existence.

[Tamminen]

Tamminen: "Materialism does not recognize the subject and its consciousness as original phenomena" (you later modified this to "the transcendental condition of all phenomena").

You too do not recognize the subjects consciousness as primary, because just like the materialists, you say it depends upon matter for its existence. So as I see it, there is no practical difference between the materialist perspective and yours, both are empirically based and the distinction you've made is merely a semantic one. A "transcendental condition" would not depend upon material causes for it's existence.

There is a radical difference between my view and materialism. Materialists, like Consul, claim that the world without subjects is logically possible. But it is not. Matter is an essential component of the structure of reality, but as we both seem to think, the subject is the key of all existence. The world is the subject's world. However, I see no reason to invent any mystical entities to explain our existence, I follow the principle of Occam's razor in my thinking. I take into my theories only the elements that I immediately see when I look around, and I see matter, my consiouness of matter, and myself, the transcendental subject. Some of us see only matter because they lack the simple reflective abilities needed for seeing the subject and its consciousness as essential elements of existence. But as I said, the subject alone is a mere abstraction that cannot exist on its own. How could it?