Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 26th, 2019, 5:13 pmMaterialism is complicated.Physics is complicated, physicalism is comparatively simple.
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Consul wrote: ↑May 26th, 2019, 10:59 pm"The candid student, in fine, cannot be blamed if he concludes that the only reason that physical realism seems vulnerable at all is that it explains so much more so much better than other philosophies that the imperfections of its explanations are noticeable. As solipsism gains undeserved credit by being so preposterous that its bare possibility looks like evidence in its favor, so materialism suffers by having so few difficulties that one difficulty more or less makes a difference. A blasé public does not expect idealisms and dualisms to explain anything. With innocent cynicism, we appreciate that these philosophies were designed for a different purpose and are doing all that can be expected in a logical way if they avoid contradicting themselves and the obvious facts of experience. The physical realist seems constantly riding for a fall because he is on the only horse really entered in the chase.Right he is, because when antimaterialists/spiritualists complain about brain/body science not (yet) having succeeded in explaining mind or consciousness in neurophysiological terms, they forget that an antimaterialistic/spiritualistic mind/soul science is a nonstarter. There just is no such science, and there will never be any!
(pp. 237-8)
(Williams, Donald Cary. "Naturalism and the Nature of Things." 1944. In Principles of Empirical Realism: Philosophical Essays, 212-238. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1966.)
Consul wrote: ↑May 26th, 2019, 11:24 pmthis is a great argument against certain positions, iow ones that would try to reject scientific research and its conclusions. Or to contrast it with some posited anti-material science or research. But the problem is that science isn't materialistic. It is a methodology based on empirical approaches (mainly) with verification procedures. It is not committed to a metaphysics, such as physical realism, since if it turns out that nothing is particularly physical (which I think qm offers a basis for arguing), this would not stop the continued research, observations, data collection, conclusion, repetititon of research etc. The word physical has no meaning in science anymore. There is nothing to contrast it with and the set of things and their qualities (and the qualities these 'things' may lack) has expanded and expanded. As long as the model seems to work and results keep coming up, the metaphysics and qualities of whatever is positied is not the concern of science. yes, many will continue to use what is a metaphorical term, physical, for what would now be considered physical, but it simply means 'real'. We have decided this is real. Spiritualists, say, could argue that what they are positing is real but not yet confirmed via science. Of course they join the debate taking physical and non-physical seriously as terms, rather than say different ends of a spectrum of the real or just dropping the metaphysical framing. IOW they bear responsibility for keeping alive the mess, just as the physicalists hang onto a useless, now placeholder, metaphor, in reaction to dualists or really, in the main, the major religions. We are not them, we plant our flag here. Even though this 'here' keeps expanding and no longer means anything. Let's remember that scientists up into the early 70s punished each other for believing that animals had conscoiusness, emotions, goal orientation, intentions etc. The people who accepted their own direct knowledge of animal consciousness knew better.Consul wrote: ↑May 26th, 2019, 10:59 pm"The candid student, in fine, cannot be blamed if he concludes that the only reason that physical realism seems vulnerable at all is that it explains so much more so much better than other philosophies that the imperfections of its explanations are noticeable. As solipsism gains undeserved credit by being so preposterous that its bare possibility looks like evidence in its favor, so materialism suffers by having so few difficulties that one difficulty more or less makes a difference. A blasé public does not expect idealisms and dualisms to explain anything. With innocent cynicism, we appreciate that these philosophies were designed for a different purpose and are doing all that can be expected in a logical way if they avoid contradicting themselves and the obvious facts of experience. The physical realist seems constantly riding for a fall because he is on the only horse really entered in the chase.Right he is, because when antimaterialists/spiritualists complain about brain/body science not (yet) having succeeded in explaining mind or consciousness in neurophysiological terms, they forget that an antimaterialistic/spiritualistic mind/soul science is a nonstarter. There just is no such science, and there will never be any!
(pp. 237-8)
(Williams, Donald Cary. "Naturalism and the Nature of Things." 1944. In Principles of Empirical Realism: Philosophical Essays, 212-238. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1966.)
"Compare now what the neuroscientist can tell us about the brain, and what she can do with that knowledge, with what the dualist can tell us about spiritual substance, and what he can do with those assumptions. Can the dualist tell us anything about the internal constitution of mind-stuff? Of the nonmaterial elements that make it up? Of the nonphysical laws that govern their behavior? Of the mind's structural connections with the body? Of the manner of the mind's operations? Can he explain human capacities and pathologies in terms of its structures and defects? The fact is, the dualist can do none of these things because no detailed theory of mind-stuff has ever even be formulated. Compared to the rich resources and the explanatory successes of current materialism, dualism is not so much a theory of mind as it is an empty space waiting for a genuine theory of mind to be put in it."
(Churchland, Paul M. Matter and Consciousness. 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. p. 31)
Consul wrote: ↑May 25th, 2019, 1:47 pmSince all options of Western philosophy are unsupported or directly contradicted by evidence, all we can do is unlearn fantastical ideas like: dualism, substance theory, thing-ness, subject/object, emergence, fundamental separateness, separate I (and some others). Not really possible to see the other 2-3 options before that.Atla wrote: ↑May 25th, 2019, 1:25 pm All the options you listed are wrong. Reality isn't mental, it's not physical, "neutrality" isn't neutrality between the mental/physical, and neutrality has no actual nature or substance. (Both dualism and substance theory are nonsense.)What additional options are there?
Atla wrote: ↑May 27th, 2019, 3:49 amHowever this leads to a worldview alien beyond our wildest predictions, and many people don't want to go there, it can be too much / no longer worth it.Consul wrote: ↑May 25th, 2019, 1:47 pmSince all options of Western philosophy are unsupported or directly contradicted by evidence, all we can do is unlearn fantastical ideas like: dualism, substance theory, thing-ness, subject/object, emergence, fundamental separateness, separate I (and some others). Not really possible to see the other 2-3 options before that.
What additional options are there?
The existence of subjects isn't a "transcendental condition" of the possibility of a world of objects. There is absolutely nothing illogical about a subjectless or subject-independent ontology (set of entities).I challenge you, and everybody, to take a critical, reflective attitude to this. It is so easy to think superficially, to be satisfied with the first image that comes to mind, and say that there is no problem with a possible world without subjects: it would be like a desert, except that it would be the whole world. But all deserts are our deserts, whether they are such as Sahara or such as the early stages of our universe. I respect your ability to analyze things and make distinctions, but I am not sure if you have understood the revolutionary ontological impact of Descartes, Kant and Husserl. We must go beyond matter. Matter belongs to the structure of reality, but is not reality itself. The concrete reality is the subject's existence in the world, or consciousness of the world. And, as should be obvious, my consciousness of the world cannot be reduced to what I am conscious of.
Consul wrote: ↑May 25th, 2019, 10:32 am As for the explainability of mind/consciousness in materialistic terms, the neuroscience of consciousness is still in its infancy. There is also the neuroscience of cognition and intelligence (cognitive neuroscience), which already has explanatory success.I'd be interested in reading about mind/consciousness from a materialist perspective- that doesn't suggest that mental states are illusions created by a physical brain.
Tamminen wrote: ↑May 27th, 2019, 8:28 am @ConsulThat's because you are still under the illusion of the separate self, just like Plato, Descartes, Kant and other not-deep-enough thinkers were. You merely came up with another variation on the separate self, with the cosmic-sized subject.The existence of subjects isn't a "transcendental condition" of the possibility of a world of objects. There is absolutely nothing illogical about a subjectless or subject-independent ontology (set of entities).I challenge you, and everybody, to take a critical, reflective attitude to this. It is so easy to think superficially, to be satisfied with the first image that comes to mind, and say that there is no problem with a possible world without subjects: it would be like a desert, except that it would be the whole world. But all deserts are our deserts, whether they are such as Sahara or such as the early stages of our universe. I respect your ability to analyze things and make distinctions, but I am not sure if you have understood the revolutionary ontological impact of Descartes, Kant and Husserl. We must go beyond matter. Matter belongs to the structure of reality, but is not reality itself. The concrete reality is the subject's existence in the world, or consciousness of the world. And, as should be obvious, my consciousness of the world cannot be reduced to what I am conscious of.
Karpel Tunnel wrote: ↑May 27th, 2019, 3:24 amThis is a great argument against certain positions, iow ones that would try to reject scientific research and its conclusions. Or to contrast it with some posited anti-material science or research. But the problem is that science isn't materialistic. It is a methodology based on empirical approaches (mainly) with verification procedures. It is not committed to a metaphysics, such as physical realism, since if it turns out that nothing is particularly physical (which I think qm offers a basis for arguing), this would not stop the continued research, observations, data collection, conclusion, repetititon of research etc. The word physical has no meaning in science anymore. There is nothing to contrast it with and the set of things and their qualities (and the qualities these 'things' may lack) has expanded and expanded. As long as the model seems to work and results keep coming up, the metaphysics and qualities of whatever is positied is not the concern of science. yes, many will continue to use what is a metaphorical term, physical, for what would now be considered physical, but it simply means 'real'. We have decided this is real. Spiritualists, say, could argue that what they are positing is real but not yet confirmed via science. Of course they join the debate taking physical and non-physical seriously as terms, rather than say different ends of a spectrum of the real or just dropping the metaphysical framing. IOW they bear responsibility for keeping alive the mess, just as the physicalists hang onto a useless, now placeholder, metaphor, in reaction to dualists or really, in the main, the major religions. We are not them, we plant our flag here. Even though this 'here' keeps expanding and no longer means anything. Let's remember that scientists up into the early 70s punished each other for believing that animals had conscoiusness, emotions, goal orientation, intentions etc. The people who accepted their own direct knowledge of animal consciousness knew better.1. When physicalists say that everything real is physical, they certainly don't mean to say that "real" means "physical". It doesn't, and there is a clearly discernible contrast between physicalism/materialism, psychicalism/mentalism/spiritualism/idealism, vitalism, and platonism:
Atla wrote: ↑May 27th, 2019, 3:49 amSince all options of Western philosophy are unsupported or directly contradicted by evidence, all we can do is unlearn fantastical ideas like: dualism, substance theory, thing-ness, subject/object, emergence, fundamental separateness, separate I (and some others). Not really possible to see the other 2-3 options before that.It would be helpful if you tried to describe those alleged other (metaphysical/ontological) options!
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