Maxcady10001 wrote: ↑May 25th, 2019, 1:50 pmAs I said earlier, materialism also posits an unconditional world. Everything is conditioned, based on a premise. I can speak to you based on the premise that I have access to the internet. Without a condition or a premise a thing does not exist. It has no relation or platform to exist. If the world is entirely materialistic, It is in-itself, and unconditioned, meaning it cannot exist. The definition of a thing, is it's relationship to other things. If a thing has no relations, what is it?
If the whole world is one big physical thing, it can very well be self-existent/-subsistent. (Independence is a traditional defining feature of substances.)
Maxcady10001 wrote: ↑May 25th, 2019, 1:50 pmWhy is materialism even worth discussing, when it posits a world independent of sensation? How can it deny what proves it's existence?
Also, although materialism is absurd for denying subjectivity, there are much better ways of doing it. Just the realization that there are no constants, results in a denial of subjectivity.
There's a difference between
eliminative materialism about subjective experience and
reductive materialism about it, the latter of which is
ontologically conservative, because it affirms its existence. There is also a
nonreductive materialism that affirms its existence too.
The difference between
reductive (equative/constitutive) materialism and
nonreductive (emergentive/causative) materialism is that according to the former subjective experiential properties ("qualia") or events/states are
constituted by or composed of ("lower-level") objective neural properties or events/states (and are thus
identical with complex neural properties/events/states), whereas according to the latter subjective experiential properties or events/states are
caused or produced by ("lower-level") objective neural properties or events/states (and are thus
different from, but dependent and supervenient on, complex neural properties/events/states ).