Consul wrote: ↑May 24th, 2019, 11:22 pm"…there is nothing in the world over and above the entities of physics…"
(Smart, J. J. C. Our Place in the Universe: A Metaphysical Discussion. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. p. 79)
Physics is the basic natural science of MEST (Matter-Energy-Space-Time); and physicalism is
realistic or
non-spiritualistic about its science-specific subject matter or ontology, so a non-realistic or spiritualistic interpretation of it (à la Berkeley) is ruled out by physicalism: Matter isn't Mind!
"Physics—The study of the laws that determine the structure of the universe with reference to the matter and energy of which it consists. It is concerned not with chemical changes that occur but with the forces that exist between objects and the interrelationship between matter and energy."
—Oxford Dictionary of Physics
"The physicalist is the materialist who has learnt the lessons of twentieth-century physics. The most basic teaching of both relativity and quantum physics is that our intuitions are of no help in the scientific quest to understand the fundamental nature of matter. The world, as conceived by modern physics, both in its vastness, as described by astrophysics and cosmology, and in its minuteness, as revealed by the quantum-mechanical Standard Model of particle physics, is so strange, so immensely complex and difficult to grasp, that speculations based on ordinary ideas can contribute nothing to the painstaking practice of science."
(Brown, Robin Gordon, and James Ladyman.
Materialism: A Historical and Philosophical Inquiry. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019. p. 121)
The term "physicalism" is nowadays much more fashionable than the good old label "materialism", partly because the former lacks the latter's negative/pejorative connotations. But, actually,
metaphysical/ontological materialism is totally independent of and doesn't include
ethical or
economic materialism, according to which nothing has value except material goods, money, riches, or wealth. Nor does it include a primitive hedonism according to which all that matters in life are sensual pleasures.
"A quite different sense of the word 'Materialism' should be noted in which it denotes not a metaphysical theory but an ethical attitude. A person is a Materialist in this sense if he is interested mainly in sensuous pleasures and bodily comforts and hence in the material possessions that bring these about. A man might be a Materialist in this ethical and pejorative sense without being a metaphysical Materialist, and conversely. An extreme physicalistic Materialist, for example, might prefer a Beethoven record to a comfortable mattress for his bed; and a person who believes in immaterial spirits might opt for the mattress."
—J. J. C. Smart:
Materialism in Encyclopaedia Britannica
As far as I'm concerned, I still like and use the good old term "materialism" because…
"[Materialism] was so named when the best physics of the day was the physics of matter alone. Now our best physics acknowledges other bearers of fundamental properties: parts of pervasive fields, parts of causally active spacetime. But it would be pedantry to change the name on that account, and disown our intellectual ancestors. Or worse, it would be a tacky marketing ploy, akin to British Rail's decree that second class passengers shall now be called 'standard class customers'."
(Lewis, David. "Reduction of Mind." In
A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel D. Guttenplan, 412-431. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. p. 413)
"I say 'materialistic' where some would rather say 'physicalistic': an adequate theory must be consistent with the truth and completeness of some theory in much the style of present-day physics. ('Completeness' is to be explained in terms of supervenience.)
Some fear that 'materialism' conveys a commitment that this ultimate physics must be a physics of matter alone: no fields, no radiation, no causally active spacetime. Not so! Let us proclaim our solidarity with forebears who, like us, wanted their philosophy to agree with ultimate physics. Let us not chide and disown them for their less advanced ideas about what ultimate physics might say."
(Lewis, David. "Naming the Colours." In
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 332-358. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 332n2)