Replying to this:
viewtopic.php?p=320775#p320775
which was a comment on my post addressed to ThomasHobbes, here:
viewtopic.php?p=320744#p320744
GE Morton wrote:TH appears to subscribe to a non-cognitivist view of ethics, perhaps the the emotivist view:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/
https://moralphilosophy.info/metaethics ... ressivism/
Possibly. ThomasHobbes (if you're reading this) is this you?
Many propositions asserting moral principles or judgments indeed express nothing more than the speaker's unfounded and uninformed opinion, likely derived from his emotional responses to morally problematic scenarios.
I would put it like this: Many propositions asserting moral principles or judgements are actually, on closer inspection, propositions as to what course of action will (the speaker suggests) most likely lead to what outcome. In other words, they are not, in themselves, declarations of the speaker's "core values" (as I've called them). They are propositions about cause and effect.
I am a moral cognitivist. I think moral theories can be, and ought to be, as sound and rationally defensible as theories in any other field, and that moral judgments and principles have truth values which can be determined analytically or empirically.
I agree that they have
potential theoretical truth value if they are as I have described them above - theories about cause and effect. But if they are about what I have described as "core values" then I think arguing about them is analogous to trying to argue about personal taste. It's not possible because in this case they are the axioms on which the argument sits. Arguments about the rights and wrongs of abortion often illustrate particularly clearly what happens when core values differ and persuasion on the basis of rational argument (by either side) is therefore impossible.
But also, even if our axioms are the same, it may be impossible in practice to agree because it may be (and frequently is) impossible in practice to unambiguously demonstrate causal links in an extremely complex world, most of which we only have indirect access to.
Hence most "moral arguments" consist of people throwing supposed facts at each other that they've found on the internet. And they also usually involve anger of some kind. In a "real life" situation (as opposed to here) they also often involve such things as shouting, repeating slogans, ignoring each other, talking over each other, failing to properly understand each other's language, threatening each other with violence, or running out of time for the debate because it's nearly 9 O'Clock and someone needs to read out the weather forecast and news headlines.
Such is the messiness of real life.
A moral theory is a theory for generating rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field (a social setting).
I agree,
Like all theories it proceeds from one or more axioms expressing the aims of the theory, which are assumed to be true without proof, and from which subordinate theorems --- principles and rules --- can be logically derived.
Yes, these axioms are what I was referring to earlier as "core values"; the things that each speaker assumes to be the self-evident underlying goal of the exercise; the end to which all other sub-goals are a proposed means.
It also stipulates certain features of "human nature" and the moral field, which it takes to be either self-evident or empirically verifiable.
These count as part of the proposed cause/effect. It is proposed that human beings tend, by their nature, to act in certain ways that tend to explain/describe the reasons for certain moral problems in life. A classic example is tribalism. We often say that the tribal instincts which we evolved in small groups, though still useful in some respects, can cause some problems in others.
In principle the rules generated can be tested empirically to see whether or not they further the aims of the theory declared in the axioms.
In principle yes. In practice, experiments as to what works for entire societies over long periods of time are complex and, for reasons already described, rarely lead to objective consensus.
A sound moral theory does not depend upon anyone's values. Rather, it assumes that everyone values certain things, and that agents differ in what they value and the values they assign to different things. The theory is indifferent to values, and to the various interests and goals of agents; it is concerned only with the means agents employ to attain those goals or realize those values.
Yes, the process of constructing a rational argument does not depend on core values. It sits on top of them.