Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Belindi]

Peter, I know that is the point of your OP.
My answer boils down to it's impossible for morality to be objectively true. This question should be relegated to a discussion about theories of truth

[Peter Holmes]

Belindi. Nicely succinct.

[ThomasHobbes]

My question was: what could make morality objective?

In effect, this means: what has to be the case for a moral assertion to be factually true?

Reflecting on the many interesting suggestions here, I think there's a simple problem: they all beg the question. For example:

Q Why is slavery wrong? A Because it destroys personal freedom. Q Why is it wrong to destroy personal freedom? A Because ... and so on.

Any justification for a moral judgement boils down to: 'Because X is morally right / wrong' - so the premise is used to justify itself - begging the question. And that was the point of my OP.

CIN please note!
And shove your tiddlywinks where they deserve to go: up your objective Sh1t trap.

[Karpel Tunnel]

You are making a category error. The shape of the earth, whatever you think it is, is not a value judgement. It is a fact about a physical object.

It's both. Try to stop begging the question. (If you don't know what 'begging the question' means, look it up.)
The rest of your response is ill-mannered and intellectually vacuous. You are obviously no good at philosophy. Perhaps you should take up tiddlywinks.

Ill-mannered being a taste issue and not an objective evaluation.
IOW he has not done anything objectively morally wrong.

[Peter Holmes]

Just a sidebar on the mistaken view that moral subjectivism entails moral nihilism.

Moral nihilism is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong. But if things cannot be morally right or wrong – or if moral rightness and wrongness are not properties that things can have – the claim of moral nihilism is merely trivially true by definition.

The conclusion that moral subjectivism entails moral nihilism depends on the truth of the objectivist claim that moral assertions are factual. In other words, the supposed nightmare of moral nihilism is the dark flip-side of moral objectivism.

When we see that moral objectivism – both secular (such as Aristotelian or Kantian) and theistic – is a mistake, we can see that we have always built and repaired the framework of our moral values on foundations of our own making - because we have no choice.

So we could (finally) move to overcome slavery, the oppression of women and homosexuals, the genital mutilation of children, economic inequality, and so on. And thank goodness for that.

[Burning ghost]

Just a sidebar on the mistaken view that moral subjectivism entails moral nihilism.

Moral nihilism is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong. But if things cannot be morally right or wrong – or if moral rightness and wrongness are not properties that things can have – the claim of moral nihilism is merely trivially true by definition.

The conclusion that moral subjectivism entails moral nihilism depends on the truth of the objectivist claim that moral assertions are factual. In other words, the supposed nightmare of moral nihilism is the dark flip-side of moral objectivism.

When we see that moral objectivism – both secular (such as Aristotelian or Kantian) and theistic – is a mistake, we can see that we have always built and repaired the framework of our moral values on foundations of our own making - because we have no choice.

So we could (finally) move to overcome slavery, the oppression of women and homosexuals, the genital mutilation of children, economic inequality, and so on. And thank goodness for that.

All ideologies are gibberish at the extreme. If something appears to be more right than wrong morally then morality is representative of something not nothing - that is trivially true.

[Karpel Tunnel]

So we could (finally) move to overcome slavery, the oppression of women and homosexuals, the genital mutilation of children, economic inequality, and so on. And thank goodness for that.

Or decide not to. If there are no objective morals you're reactions to these things are subjective and up for grabs. Obviously some people like these things. I know you know this, I just found it an odd end to the post and the thread so far.

IOW in context it sounds like you are saying: whew, it's a good thing that we no longer have the moralities of the theists and do not believe in objective morals so we can finally make these good choices.

It would make sense to say, I'm glad we're done with theist morals, I think this might make it more likely for things to be the way I like.

But what I quoted seemed to have implicit objective morals in it.

I do realize our languages are
saturated with this, but still...

[Peter Holmes]

Karpel Tunnel

I take your point. And I've often argued with fellow subjectivists about the post-objective redeemability of moral language.

I suppose my point is that our words mean what we (largely collectively) use them to mean - so that we use 'good', 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' to express moral values and judgements that (rightly) matter deeply to us - but that recognising their subjectivity allows us to develop and change their meanings.

I think that if we refuse to acknowledge and talk about what we call moral goodness, we may, at least tacitly, concede something to objectivists. But I fully understand your reservations.

[CIN]

So we could (finally) move to overcome slavery, the oppression of women and homosexuals, the genital mutilation of children, economic inequality, and so on. And thank goodness for that.

I'm constantly amused by the way those who profess moral subjectivism nevertheless hold strong moral views about what is right, wrong, good or bad. And don't see the contradiction.

What you mean, I suppose, is that you want the world to be the way you, Peter Holmes, want it to be, and may well oppose at least some attempts by anyone else to have it any other way. I believe Adolf Hitler felt exactly like that. I think your world would be objectively better than the world Hitler wanted to create, because people in your world would generally be happier, and happiness, as all of us who have experienced it and its opposite know, is better than unhappiness. Objectively so.

[CIN]

My question was: what could make morality objective?

In effect, this means: what has to be the case for a moral assertion to be factually true?

Reflecting on the many interesting suggestions here, I think there's a simple problem: they all beg the question. For example:

Q Why is slavery wrong? A Because it destroys personal freedom. Q Why is it wrong to destroy personal freedom? A Because ... and so on.

Any justification for a moral judgement boils down to: 'Because X is morally right / wrong' - so the premise is used to justify itself - begging the question. And that was the point of my OP.

CIN please note!
And shove your tiddlywinks where they deserve to go: up your objective Sh1t trap.

A delight talking to you as always, Thomas Hobbes.

It's obvious why you chose that particular philosopher as your pseudonym - it's because your posts are poor, nasty, brutish and short.

Have a nice day.

[ThomasHobbes]

CIN please note!
And shove your tiddlywinks where they deserve to go: up your objective Sh1t trap.

A delight talking to you as always, Thomas Hobbes.

It's obvious why you chose that particular philosopher as your pseudonym - it's because your posts are poor, nasty, brutish and short.

Have a nice day.

Those tiddlywinks must be pretty far up there since it took you over three weeks to find them.
I'd advise leaving them in the children's playbox where you keep your intellect,

[Peter Holmes]

So we could (finally) move to overcome slavery, the oppression of women and homosexuals, the genital mutilation of children, economic inequality, and so on. And thank goodness for that.

I'm constantly amused by the way those who profess moral subjectivism nevertheless hold strong moral views about what is right, wrong, good or bad. And don't see the contradiction.

What you mean, I suppose, is that you want the world to be the way you, Peter Holmes, want it to be, and may well oppose at least some attempts by anyone else to have it any other way. I believe Adolf Hitler felt exactly like that. I think your world would be objectively better than the world Hitler wanted to create, because people in your world would generally be happier, and happiness, as all of us who have experienced it and its opposite know, is better than unhappiness. Objectively so.

I'm constantly amused that those who profess moral objectivism are distressed by the idea that moral subjectivists can hold strong moral opinions. Why must the fact that moral judgements are subjective mean that they're absurd or impossible? Whence this misunderstanding?

[Felix]

The question posed in the OP was "What could make morality objective?" But instead of answering that question, folks have been debating whether morality is or is not subjectively based and if mark's twain can ever meet.

So let us address the actual question...

If everyone who possesses a normal amount of empathy (that is to say, not counting those who lack it, such as sociopaths and psychopaths) received a "good" well rounded education, would that not lead to the formation of an objective morality?

This was the idea I was leading to before when I talked about prescriptive truth, i.e., if we understand the facts about human nature, what people require to live a "good" life, to thrive and realize their innate potential, we can base an objective moral code on that knowledge.

[Karpel Tunnel]

The question posed in the OP was "What could make morality objective?" But instead of answering that question, folks have been debating whether morality is or is not subjectively based and if mark's twain can ever meet.

So let us address the actual question...

If everyone who possesses a normal amount of empathy (that is to say, not counting those who lack it, such as sociopaths and psychopaths) received a "good" well rounded education, would that not lead to the formation of an objective morality?

This was the idea I was leading to before when I talked about prescriptive truth, i.e., if we understand the facts about human nature, what people require to live a "good" life, to thrive and realize their innate potential, we can base an objective moral code on that knowledge.

It would lead to empathy being a factor in social relations, which is not necessarily a morality. It is just a pattern of interaction.

[Karpel Tunnel]

I'm constantly amused that those who profess moral objectivism are distressed by the idea that moral subjectivists can hold strong moral opinions. Why must the fact that moral judgements are subjective mean that they're absurd or impossible? Whence this misunderstanding?

It seems like they would simply be preferences. Which is fine. I don't believe in objective morals. Subjective morals seems oxymoronic to me. I believe that is wrong but not objectively. I don't know what that means. I don't like it, that I understand.