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[Tamminen]

So, with or without logic, there is NO WAY to conclude/claim "an unobserved world couldn't exist". ...but yet you continue to claim this, why???

Because even if it cannot be logically concluded, there may be ways to introduce to the idea behind this claim. But I am pessimistic at the moment.

The subject-world ontological perspective is a relativistic viewpoint that does NOT support the conclusion that "an unobserved world couldn't exist". -- For without a subject, there can be no "observing" or concluding of ANYTHING.

In fact the subject-world ontology says the same thing as my claim, so I confess I have cheated a bit for the sake of introducing to the idea, because as I have said, we cannot avoid circularity in this kind of reasoning. Summing up: if you do not see it, then you don't, and I cannot help.

Tam, it appears to me, that you are jumping between two reference views (relativistic, and external) to create the conclusion that "an unobserved world couldn't exist". Pick one reference view from which to make your stand/claim, and you'll see that it fails either way.

First: there is only one reference view. Second: it has to fail, logically. But it is still true.

[Consul]

No 'I', no existence. Because that is what existence means. I am not going to prove this. It cannot be proved. But for me it is obvious.

This is very surprising to me, because I find it bleeding obvious that the world doesn't depend on me or any other egos.
Of course, if there were no subjects of experience, there would be no experience of existence (existence-experience); but unexperienced (unperceived/unconceived) existence doesn't mean nonexistence: No existence-experience, no existence! – this is a false conditional!

[Tamminen]

you have utterly failed to establish a necessary (onto-)logical connection between the existence of something and the existence of somebody.

There is no logical connection. The connection is outside of logic. It is entirely ontological, and therefore it cannot be proved. It is an unreasonable demand.

As usual, we can perhaps agree to disagree.

[Halc]

I think that definition is reasonable. For me it is a premise.

Your P1 says there are no other worlds, observed or not. Yes, that is a premise, but a premise is evidence of absolutely nothing.
I might have said that another world is nonexistent to me, but since I'm potentially nonexistent to something in that world, I don't appear to have special status. I very much can posit another world, despite my personal definition of it not existing to me.

[Tamminen]

No 'I', no existence. Because that is what existence means. I am not going to prove this. It cannot be proved. But for me it is obvious.

This is very surprising to me, because I find it bleeding obvious that the world doesn't depend on me or any other egos.
Of course, if there were no subjects of experience, there would be no experience of existence (existence-experience); but unexperienced (unperceived/unconceived) existence doesn't mean nonexistence: No existence-experience, no existence! – this is a false conditional!

Perhaps this is the subtle difference between materialism and anti-materialism: is the world without subjects existent or nonexistent?

[RJG]

Tam, it appears to me, that you are jumping between two reference views (relativistic, and external) to create the conclusion that "an unobserved world couldn't exist". Pick one reference view from which to make your stand/claim, and you'll see that it fails either way.

First: there is only one reference view.

The 'two' reference views are 1) from the zombie (or non-existent subject) himself, and 2) from your and my seats as we discuss this possibility (i.e. from an external view looking in at it).

[Tamminen]

I might have said that another world is nonexistent to me, but since I'm potentially nonexistent to something in that world, I don't appear to have special status. I very much can posit another world, despite my personal definition of it not existing to me.

I am not sure if I understand what you mean, but if you posit another world parallel to this one, you can posit it with or without subjects and there is no problem, and we can define the world = this world + all the parallel worlds. But we are positing alternate worlds, and that makes the big difference. But what you say is a bit too complicated for my small brain.

[Tamminen]

The 'two' reference views are 1) from the zombie (or non-existent subject) himself, and 2) from your and my seats as we discuss this possibility (i.e. from an external view looking in at it).

All right. From our view the world is still there even if there is no one experiencing it, but this is only because we are here imagining its existence. But in fact we are participants of the zombie world, and so everything just vanishes away. There is no external point of view.

[RJG]

The 'two' reference views are 1) from the zombie (or non-existent subject) himself, and 2) from your and my seats as we discuss this possibility (i.e. from an external view looking in at it).

All right. From our view the world is still there even if there is no one experiencing it, but this is only because we are here imagining its existence. But in fact we are participants of the zombie world, and so everything just vanishes away.

Why does "everything just vanish away"? ...you don't mean this 'literally', do you? From the Zombie's point of view, he has no way of knowing if things exist or not exist (or vanish). His 'not-knowing' should not be conflated with things actually existing or not existing (vanishing).

[Tamminen]

Why does "everything just vanish away"? ...you don't mean this 'literally', do you? From the Zombie's point of view, he has no way of knowing if things exist or not exist (vanish). His 'not-knowing' should not be conflated with things actually existing or not existing (vanishing).

I mean that such a zombie world does not exist, because existing demands a reference point, a subject. Nothing vanishes, because nothing has ever been. So I did not mean temporal vanishing.

[Tamminen]

No 'I', no existence. Because that is what existence means. I am not going to prove this. It cannot be proved. But for me it is obvious.

This is very surprising to me, because I find it bleeding obvious that the world doesn't depend on me or any other egos.
Of course, if there were no subjects of experience, there would be no experience of existence (existence-experience); but unexperienced (unperceived/unconceived) existence doesn't mean nonexistence: No existence-experience, no existence! – this is a false conditional!

We live in this world. I think language reflects ontology. The word 'this' refers to 'us'. So, if this world were without us, what kind of an ontological leap would that be? We are speaking of an alternate world, aren't we? So the alternate world would be our world without us, without there ever being us. This is very surprising to me.

I am trying to defend my claim from different angles.

[RJG]

Why does "everything just vanish away"? ...you don't mean this 'literally', do you? From the Zombie's point of view, he has no way of knowing if things exist or not exist (vanish). His 'not-knowing' should not be conflated with things actually existing or not existing (vanishing).

I mean that such a zombie world does not exist, because existing demands a reference point, a subject.

Firstly, sorry Tam for what appears as a multi-angled attack. It appears many of us struggle to understand your claim that "an unobserved world couldn't exist". Back to your most recent response.

The "not-knowing" of a object, does not necessarily equate to the "non-existence" of the object, ...do you agree with this?

[Tamminen]

The "not-knowing" of a object, does not necessarily equate to the "non-existence" of the object, ...do you agree with this?

Yes.

[RJG]

The "not-knowing" of a object, does not necessarily equate to the "non-existence" of the object, ...do you agree with this?

Yes.

The "not-knowing" of a world of objects, does not necessarily equate to the "non-existence" of that world of objects, ...do you likewise agree with this?

If there are no subjects, then there is no "knowing" of anything. Not-knowing does not equate to not-existing. Therefore, it is possible for a world of objects to exist, without anyone 'knowing', or without 'anyone' to know.

[BigBango]

The "not-knowing" of a object, does not necessarily equate to the "non-existence" of the object, ...do you agree with this?

Yes.

The "not-knowing" of a world of objects, does not necessarily equate to the "non-existence" of that world of objects, ...do you likewise agree with this?

If there are no subjects, then there is no "knowing" of anything. Not-knowing does not equate to not-existing. Therefore, it is possible for a world of objects to exist, without anyone 'knowing', or without 'anyone' to know.

It seems Analytical Philosophy usually ends up simply with quarrels about the meaning of words. Tamminem has simply introduced us to a new way of thinking about what it means to "Exist" by identifying a new "Ontological" criteria that needs to be met before anything can claim the status of "Existing".

I prefer to focus on how these ideas either promote or stifle scientific research and secondarily how it effects the metaphysically castrated eloquence of analytical philosophy.

Certainly there are "objects" of which we know nothing. However, they must be capable of being known or whether or mot we give them the status of "existing" has no significance. That is the beauty of Tamminen's thesis.

Let me give some relevant examples. Science doesn't know what dark matter/energy is yet it knows that visibly known matter is only 10% of the mass of the known universe. They do not know much about the missing mass but they know something about it. they know it produces gravity. We know it exists through our instruments even though we cannot see it we know it exits. If it existed and was not knowable in anyway to "us" the subjects then it might as well not exist for us. it actually may exist for more intelligent beings but it may as well not exist for us.

In the many worlds of QM there are practically uncountable hypothesized worlds all of which have no known effect on our world. Whether they are given the status of "existing" has no practical significance.

We should thank Tamminen for incorporating a new meaning into our language that raises the status and importance of the subject over the status of inanimate matter.