Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Tamminen]

Kierkegaard needed about 500 pages for his Concluding Unscientific Postscipt. I do not need as many words to say the obvious:

Without subjects there is nothing.

[Sy Borg]

I still think not. After all, science makes clear that death is not the clear-cut moment that we'd assumed. So if life is not on/off, why would consciousness be such? Nature tends to be more analogue than digital.

What is clear-cut is what we perceive to be consciousness or not. It's only the apparentness based on responsiveness tests that is on/off because we cannot readily perceive the subtleties of unstable inbetween states.

What happens in our brains may be analogue, but our subjective time is a succession of experiential contents. And what happens between successive contents in the physical world has no relevance to consciousness defined in this way. The "inbetween states" are states all the same, and they have a content even if we do not recognize it.

Yes, those states do have even more content than usual that we don't recognise. That's my point, the states can be more akin to animal consciousness, where the component of self awareness is removed. That suggests that consciousness is more modular than and absolute on/off situation where parts of mentality can switch on and off.

[Tamminen]

Yes, those states do have even more content than usual that we don't recognise. That's my point, the states can be more akin to animal consciousness, where the component of self awareness is removed. That suggests that consciousness is more modular than and absolute on/off situation where parts of mentality can switch on and off.

But the content is or is not, that is what I mean by on/off. Clear or diffuse, feeling or thought, aware of self or not, a content follows a content, and there is nothing between.

[RJG]

I am quite sure that the world does not end when I die as an individual subject. I can infer this from the fact that the world does not end when someone else dies

I agree. But if we look closer, aren't these other people just "objects" to you? ...as they only exist as just another perception, ...like everything else that you perceive in this universe, ...as far as you can know, aren't you the 'only' real subject that exists?

...and because the idea of its being is as absurd as it is, its being can be ruled out by appealing to its absurdity. I think this is what reductio ad absurdum means. And at the moment I think that the correct way of saying it is that its being is logically impossible…

I have never really understood this logic. Just because something is "absurd" does not necessarily mean that it is without rational merit. Claiming "reductio ad absurdum" seems itself to be more of an "ad hominen" or an "appeal-to-emotion"; logical fallacies themselves.

I have used many words to explain what I mean, but I can say it with six words:

We cannot get rid of ourselves.

This is my ontology.

Succinctly said.

That is why some believe that God Created, did not cause, the Universe.

If He created the universe, then doesn't this also mean he caused it?

[Steve3007]

A minor and incidental contribution from me:

I think the "absurd" in reductio ad absurdum usually doesn't mean "absurd" in the everyday sense of the word. It means a logical contradiction. A reductio ad absurdum argument disproves a proposition by assuming it to be true and then following the consequences until a logical contradiction occurs, not just until something that sounds absurd or silly occurs.

The classic example of a reductio ad absurdum proof is the proof that the square-root of 2 is an irrational number. The proof works by assuming that it is rational and then following the logical consequences of that assumption.

Apologies if you already new that and I've jumped in here without fully appreciating the thread of the conversation.

[RJG]

Steve, thanks for the clarification of this logical fallacy. I also just reviewed my reference book on logical fallacies (Logically Fallacious by Bo Bennett). You are spot on.

It then appears Tam may also (along with me) be misinterpreting the meaning of this fallacy.

[Tamminen]

I agree. But if we look closer, aren't these other people just "objects" to you? ...as they only exist as just another perception, ...like everything else that you perceive in this universe, ...as far as you can know, aren't you the 'only' real subject that exists?

I think that other people appear to us as subjects.

I have never really understood this logic. Just because something is "absurd" does not necessarily mean that it is without rational merit. Claiming "reductio ad absurdum" seems itself to be more of an "ad hominen" or an "appeal-to-emotion"; logical fallacies themselves.

I wonder what that rational merit can be, considering the reasoning I have presented.

I think the "absurd" in reductio ad absurdum usually doesn't mean "absurd" in the everyday sense of the word. It means a logical contradiction. A reductio ad absurdum argument disproves a proposition by assuming it to be true and then following the consequences until a logical contradiction occurs, not just until something that sounds absurd or silly occurs.

My reasoning tries to show that positing the possibility of x lies outside of logic, outside of the space where logic can be used. This has nothing to do with silliness, although the conclusion cannot be achieved by a logical proof, just because it is outside of the possibilities of using logic. So the impossibility of the original claim is proved by showing that there is no logical justification to make that claim. It is based on the ontology of logic, not logic itself. What is the correct term for this, I do not know.

[Tamminen]

Claiming "reductio ad absurdum" seems itself to be more of an "ad hominen" or an "appeal-to-emotion"; logical fallacies themselves.

Appealing to the limits of logic is not appealing to emotion.

[Sy Borg]

Yes, those states do have even more content than usual that we don't recognise. That's my point, the states can be more akin to animal consciousness, where the component of self awareness is removed. That suggests that consciousness is more modular than and absolute on/off situation where parts of mentality can switch on and off.

But the content is or is not, that is what I mean by on/off. Clear or diffuse, feeling or thought, aware of self or not, a content follows a content, and there is nothing between.

But the content is always there while alive or not in the very deepest of comas. Even in deep sleep there is some level of body awareness. This level of physical awareness gradually increases as sleep becomes lighter and during REM sleep and (some states of) wakefulness then a mental awareness emerges. What you are saying is basically, "We either notice consciousness or not".

[Tamminen]

But the content is always there while alive or not in the very deepest of comas. Even in deep sleep there is some level of body awareness. This level of physical awareness gradually increases as sleep becomes lighter and during REM sleep and (some states of) wakefulness then a mental awareness emerges. What you are saying is basically, "We either notice consciousness or not".

There is no such thing as bodily consciousness. The phenomenology of consciousness is such that it is or is not, independent of our noticing or not noticing it.

[Sy Borg]

But the content is always there while alive or not in the very deepest of comas. Even in deep sleep there is some level of body awareness. This level of physical awareness gradually increases as sleep becomes lighter and during REM sleep and (some states of) wakefulness then a mental awareness emerges. What you are saying is basically, "We either notice consciousness or not".

There is no such thing as bodily consciousness. The phenomenology of consciousness is such that it is or is not, independent of our noticing or not noticing it.

Brain scans show that humans make decisions before becoming consciously aware of the decisions. This makes clear that what we refer to as "consciousness" exists upon a layer of unconscious processing, and the line between those layers is indistinct. So one can be barely conscious, minimally conscious, almost unconscious, drifting off, various meditative states - all manner of in-between states.

[Tamminen]

Brain scans show that humans make decisions before becoming consciously aware of the decisions. This makes clear that what we refer to as "consciousness" exists upon a layer of unconscious processing, and the line between those layers is indistinct. So one can be barely conscious, minimally conscious, almost unconscious, drifting off, various meditative states - all manner of in-between states.

How would you describe a state that is between conscious and non-conscious? Phenomenologically, not physiologically. I think we are speaking of concepts here.

[Sy Borg]

Brain scans show that humans make decisions before becoming consciously aware of the decisions. This makes clear that what we refer to as "consciousness" exists upon a layer of unconscious processing, and the line between those layers is indistinct. So one can be barely conscious, minimally conscious, almost unconscious, drifting off, various meditative states - all manner of in-between states.

How would you describe a state that is between conscious and non-conscious? Phenomenologically, not physiologically. I think we are speaking of concepts here.

I would describe what we call "consciousness" as a small subset of a larger phenomenon, responsiveness, which is part of a larger phenomenon - reactivity. Everything reacts and responds to something to some extent, certainly everything that we consider to be part of our reality.

The responses are either more or less complex, depending on the number of feedback loops. So the waking consciousness of we adult humans is more flexibly responsive than that of children and other intelligent species, which are more flexibly responsive than babies and less intelligent species (the latter two perhaps being roughly equivalent to weakly conscious adult states).

If we consider our own journey into consciousness, our interpretation is that at some point "the lights came on". When might that be? An infant's consciousness is very different to an adults' - and very much less sophisticated that the average pet dog, with its years of life experience. Yet an infant is awake and has a visceral sense of being, and presumably that came about when the brain and senses permitted enough input for the foetus to gain some experience, such as hearing the heartbeat, voices and local sounds.

It's the interplay of potential to make connections and the experience needed to to make them that brings about the kind of awareness that philosophers wax lyrical over as Consciousness (big C).

Yet do we value all these senses of experience or just the adult human mind? If we did value simple minds with a sense of being, we would not kill and eat any organisms with a nervous system.

So we only value that very narrow band of consciousness - the part that allows us to wax lyrical about consciousness. If we lost the capacity to think to that level, would we still value our minds?

So it depends on whether we are talking about the visceral sense of being or the associated adult human capacity to operate at a somewhat sophisticated level? There is a phenomenological gradation between them, but hard barriers in terms of what we notice and value.

[Tamminen]

I have said that there are necessarily subjects in the world. However, the subjects are not in the world in the same way as material objects are in the world. Our being in the world, as subjects, means that we are conscious of the world. The world appears to us, or discloses itself for us, more or less. This appearing itself has its material correlate in the world as our bodies have material and spatio-temporal relations to one another and to the rest of the world. A subject, as subject, has no extension, not even a temporal extension, because subjective time consists of successive experiential contents, as the present gets replaced with a new present. The relationship between subjective time and physical time is one of the fundamental questions of philosophy if we want to think of our existence in the universe that we cannot escape from.

[Tamminen]

I would describe what we call "consciousness" as a small subset of a larger phenomenon, responsiveness, which is part of a larger phenomenon - reactivity. Everything reacts and responds to something to some extent, certainly everything that we consider to be part of our reality.

The responses are either more or less complex, depending on the number of feedback loops. So the waking consciousness of we adult humans is more flexibly responsive than that of children and other intelligent species, which are more flexibly responsive than babies and less intelligent species (the latter two perhaps being roughly equivalent to weakly conscious adult states).

If we consider our own journey into consciousness, our interpretation is that at some point "the lights came on". When might that be? An infant's consciousness is very different to an adults' - and very much less sophisticated that the average pet dog, with its years of life experience. Yet an infant is awake and has a visceral sense of being, and presumably that came about when the brain and senses permitted enough input for the foetus to gain some experience, such as hearing the heartbeat, voices and local sounds.

It's the interplay of potential to make connections and the experience needed to to make them that brings about the kind of awareness that philosophers wax lyrical over as Consciousness (big C).

Yet do we value all these senses of experience or just the adult human mind? If we did value simple minds with a sense of being, we would not kill and eat any organisms with a nervous system.

So we only value that very narrow band of consciousness - the part that allows us to wax lyrical about consciousness. If we lost the capacity to think to that level, would we still value our minds?

So it depends on whether we are talking about the visceral sense of being or the associated adult human capacity to operate at a somewhat sophisticated level? There is a phenomenological gradation between them, but hard barriers in terms of what we notice and value.

Fine, I agree on everything you say, but if this is the answer to my question of what is between conscious and non-conscious, none of this is between, all you say is either non-consious or conscious. When "the light is on" we are conscious, otherwise not. It is on/off. And if it is off, we do not exist in the existential sense and there is a gap in physical time, but not in subjective time. But this is part of the phenomenological definition of consciousness. Therefore I asked you to give a phenomenological description of possible in-between states so that we could get a better definition, a definition that would allow those in-between states. I would say that no such description is possible. You give physiological decriptions and descriptions of behavior, but they are not relevant if we want to define consciousness as it is in itself, as it appears to us in reflection.