Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[anonymous66]

You'll have to elaborate here. Are you saying that you believe there are both mental properties and physical properties?

Of course, from the point of view of physicalism, this distinction is one within the physical world. That is, it isn't a distinction between physical properties and nonphysical ones, but between non-psychophysical properties and psychophysical ones. If all mental properties are physical properties, then some physical properties are mental properties, with these being the psychophysical (or "phenophysical") ones.

I'm not sure I understand your position in regards to properties. We both accept substance monism is the case, but some of your posts suggest that you accept that there exist 2 categories of properties: mental properties AND physical properties- that's what I believe is the case. That's what panpsychism entails.

Phenomenal properties aren't unrealized by being identified with (complex/structural) physical properties.

But other posts suggest you believe that mental properties ARE physical properties. In which case there is only one set of properties and that mental properties ARE physical properties. In which case, I don't know whether you are a physicalist or an idealist.

As long as all mental properties are physical ones, the view that all physical objects have mental properties is logically compatible with physicalism.

I'm operating under the assumption that if physicalism, then there exist only one set of properties: physical properties. And if idealism, then there are exist only set of properties mental properties. If panpsychism, then there exist 2 sets of properties, physical properties AND mental properties.

[Wayne92587]

You People are very close to being able to grab the brass ring; sad to say, however,” no” Cigar.

Mankind has a sense of Realities, Forbidden Knowledge, that he just can not put into words.

Forbidden Knowledge, Technical terminology, language, codes, mathematical symbology, sacred, secret, hidden Knowledge, Geometry, resulting in just so much Babel.

Absolutely Bad Knowledge, being mistaken to be Absolutely Good Knowledge, Knowledge having a Dual quality is the cause of the problem, the knowledge of Good and Evil.

Knowledge does not grow on trees but Knowledge sure as hell does.

all mental properties are physical ones, the view that all physical objects have mental properties is logically compatible with physicalism.

Not So!

You must know the difference between Mankind, he and she, and a rock.

Rocks although sensitive to the Environment, a rock is not Mental.

When God breathed his Breath, the Breath of Life, the Immortal spirit of God into Mankind’s Nostrils, it was the Immortal Spirit of God that became a Living Soul.

Mankind became a Conscious Being, the Spirit of God, God Consciousness alive in the Flesh Body of Mankind, he and she.

Animal Soul, Consciousness has a Physical Bent.

Man’s Soul, Consciousness is created in the image of the Immortal Spirit of God.

God and Man are Transcendental, cats, dogs, and rocks are not.

It is the Transcendental Nature, the duality of Man, Mankind, that make he and she, a wise animal.

A Truly Conscious is known to be a Humane Being the Ultimate Survivor.

[Wayne92587]

A Truly Conscious person is known to be a Humane Being, the Ultimate Survivor.

[ThomasHobbes]

We talk as if there are two different things because we have a language legacy that has evolved for a million years. Most people have not stopped to consider the deeper questions and so the language continues.
We commonly say that the sun rises in the morning - but IT DOES NOT!

You're describing eliminative materialism. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist. Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that, for the most part, we can be confident about the content of our own minds. Eliminative materialists go further than Descartes on this point, since they challenge the existence of various mental states that Descartes took for granted.

Total rubbish.
Are you 'avin' a laff mate?

[Consul]

I'm not sure I understand your position in regards to properties. We both accept substance monism is the case, but some of your posts suggest that you accept that there exist 2 categories of properties: mental properties AND physical properties- that's what I believe is the case. That's what panpsychism entails.

Physicalists don't read "mental" as "nonphysical" but as "psychophysical"; that is, they regard mental properties as a kind of physical properties. More precisely, reductive physicalists regard them as (ontologically reducible) structural physical properties that are composed of non-mental/non-psychophysical properties of and relations between parts or elements of physical systems; and nonreductive physicalists regard them as (ontologically irreducible) physical properties sui generis that emerge and are different from, yet dependent (supervenient) on structural physical properties of those physical systems which have mental/psychophysical properties.
So nonreductionist/emergentist physicalism is a physicalistic property dualism. And if it acknowledges additional, non-psychological (chemical or biological) kinds of emergent physical properties, we get a physicalistic property pluralism and a hierarchy of mutually irreducible physical properties of physical systems (exhibiting different degrees of structural and functional complexity, integration and organization).

But other posts suggest you believe that mental properties ARE physical properties. In which case there is only one set of properties and that mental properties ARE physical properties. In which case, I don't know whether you are a physicalist or an idealist.

Mental properties qua psychophysical properties are a kind of physical properties, so there are two kinds or sets of physical properties: psychophysical (mental) ones and non-psychophysical (non-mental) ones. According to reductive physicalism, psychophysical properties are identical with complex physical properties composed of non-psychophysical properties. According to nonreductive/emergentive physicalism, psychophysical properties are different but emergent from (and dependent/supervenient on) complex physical properties composed of non-psychophysical properties

Given the physicalistic distinction between psychophysical (mental) properties and non-psychophysical (non-mental) ones, we have two different sets of properties as well. Note again that physicalists who are psychological realists don't read "mental" as "nonphysical" or "physical" as "non-mental"! (If "mental" meant "nonphysical", then physicalism would be necessarily false by definition.)

[Mosesquine]

Type physicalists are concerned with types of physical and mental. They think that 'the type of mental' is the same as 'the type of physical'. On the contrary, token physicalists are interested in tokens of physical and mental. They are physicalists in that they believe that everything is physical, but they are more concerned with the distinction between physical properties and mental properties than type physicalists.
In the point of view of philosophical logic, type physicalists are doing philosophy of mind by "X is reduced to Y" or equivalent logical forms, but token physicalists are doing so by "x is such and such for y" kinds of logical forms.

[Wayne92587]

How stupid can a physicalists get???

Mentality, is physical, but only In the sense the mind can only entertain thoughts of Material Realities, which an illusion is, along with Sacred Knowledge, Sacred Geometry, Codes, Metaphors; Is Forbidden Knowledge!

Man can not entertain thoughts about nothing, without giving Nothingness an Identity, a Name, without Nothing being converted, reborn Something, Transfigured.

A Singularity of One-1, is the first Singularity of Zero-O to have relative, a Numerical value of One-1, being The Reality of First Cause, 0/1.

Those that speak of, give a name to, that Identify God are irreverent, Blasphemous.

An Illusion must be Knowledge of a Material, Physical Reality, and It Is.

" Absolution Bad Knowledge". Knowledge having a dual quality, being the Knowledge of Good and Evil, the greatest cause of unnecessary Pain and Suffering.

[Wayne92587]

You can not be conscious without the possibility of occasionally being wrong about what is or is not a Reality.

The secret is not be so adamant about what you think is or is not a Reality, that you can not change you Mind.

[Wayne92587]

quote] In one of my posts I said, Knowledge does not grow on trees but Knowledge sure as hell does.[/quote]

Should read "Money does not grow on trees but knowledge sure as hell does.

[Gertie]

onsul

Physicalists don't read "mental" as "nonphysical" but as "psychophysical"; that is, they regard mental properties as a kind of physical properties. More precisely, reductive physicalists regard them as (ontologically reducible) structural physical properties that are composed of non-mental/non-psychophysical properties of and relations between parts or elements of physical systems; and nonreductive physicalists regard them as (ontologically irreducible) physical properties sui generis that emerge and are different from, yet dependent (supervenient) on structural physical properties of those physical systems which have mental/psychophysical properties.

They both have the same problem imo, that the very same lump of stuff, eg the brain, or its boundaried (this way and that) internal interactions, can simultaneously be both measurable and non-measurable, observable and non-observable. Somehow. Implying the need for further explanation. Which can't exclude a more fundamental/elemental explanation.

[ThomasHobbes]

quote] In one of my posts I said, Knowledge does not grow on trees but Knowledge sure as hell does.

Should read "Money does not grow on trees but knowledge sure as hell does.
[/quote]

It was false both times you said it.

[Consul]

They both have the same problem imo, that the very same lump of stuff, eg the brain, or its boundaried (this way and that) internal interactions, can simultaneously be both measurable and non-measurable, observable and non-observable. Somehow.

I'm not sure what you mean. Are you talking about the difference between the brain's being an object of external, sensory perception/observation (extrospection) and the mind's (or the brain's—if the mind = the brain) being an object of internal, non-sensory perception/observation (introspection)?

Implying the need for further explanation. Which can't exclude a more fundamental/elemental explanation.

…in terms of what? In terms of fundamental (i.e. both non-reducible and non-emergent) mental/experiential properties had by fundamental (micro)physical objects?

[Consul]

Type physicalists are concerned with types of physical and mental. They think that 'the type of mental' is the same as 'the type of physical'. On the contrary, token physicalists are interested in tokens of physical and mental. They are physicalists in that they believe that everything is physical, but they are more concerned with the distinction between physical properties and mental properties than type physicalists. In the point of view of philosophical logic, type physicalists are doing philosophy of mind by "X is reduced to Y" or equivalent logical forms, but token physicalists are doing so by "x is such and such for y" kinds of logical forms.

The labels "token physicalism" and "type physicalism" were coined and introduced by Jerry Fodor in 1974:

"If the bridge laws express event identities, and if every event that falls under the proper laws of a special science falls under a bridge law, we get the truth of a doctrine that I shall call 'token physicalism'. Token physicalism is simply the claim that all the events that the sciences talk about are physical events. There are three things to notice about token physicalism.
First, it is weaker than what is usually called “materialism”. Materialism claims both that token physicalism is true and that every event falls under the laws of some science or other. One could therefore be a token physicalist without being a materialist, though I don’t see why anyone would bother.
Second, token physicalism is weaker than what might be called 'type physicalism', the doctrine, roughly, that every property mentioned in the laws of any science is a physical property. Token physicalism does not entail type physicalism because the contingent identity of a pair of events presumably does not guarantee the identity of the properties whose instantiation constitutes the events; not even where the event identity is nomologically necessary. On the other hand, if every event is the instantiation of a property, then type physicalism does entail token physicalism: two events will be identical when they consist of the instantiation of the same property by the same individual at the same time."

(Fodor, Jerry A. "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)." Synthese 28 (1974): 97-115. p. 100)

I'm not very happy about Fodor's labels, because in my ontological understanding the token-type distinction doesn't correspond to the event-property distinction. Moreover, properties qua types are usually regarded as universals, whereas I regard them as unrepeatable particulars.
So I prefer the following tripartite classification, which I think is more adequate and more precise:

1. Substance Materialism/Physicalism: all substances (objects/things) are material/physical substances.

2. Occurrence Materialism/Physicalism: all mental/experiential occurrences (events/processes/states/facts) are material/physical occurrences. (= Token Materialism/Physicalism)

3. Attribute Materialism/Physicalism: all mental/experiential attributes (properties/qualities or relations) are material/physical attributes. (= Type Physicalism)

[Consul]

"If the rivals of materialism have any advantage it must be because there are some residual phenomena which they can explain better. Now, most of the phenomena which the supernaturalist throws in the naturalist's teeth are such as the supernaturalist himself has never explained."

(Williams, Donald Cary. "Naturalism and the Nature of Things." In Principles of Empirical Realism: Philosophical Essays, 212-238. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1966. p. 234)

[Wayne92587]

It was false both times you said it.

Not so ThomasHobbes, Knowledge does grow on trees.

You just do not understand the implication of that statement.