Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Wayne92587]

JamesOfSeattle

I don’t think that follows. I think a “mental state” is a particular kind of physical process happening over and over. Why do you think it follows from physicalism that mental states are illusions?

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Knowledge having a dual quality, Absolutely Bad Knowledge often mistaken to be Absolutely Good Knowledge is an Illusion of Reality, meaning that much of our Knowledge of Reality, that our Mental State, exists as an Illusion of Reality, the Knowledge of Good and Evil; Illusion being the Greatest cause of both Mental and Physical Suffering.

[JamesOfSeattle]

If a physical eyeball linked to physical motor neurons linked to leg muscles can do all the causal work of me running away when I encounter a twiger, then what's the evolutionary advantage of the experiential states of 'seeing' it, 'feeling fear', having my Subjective states of meaning purpose and value? Where's the evolutionary pressure for this additional experiencing coming from, if the material systems can account for all my survival behaviour, every behaviour, without them?

The evolutionary pressure comes from being able to remember things and tell stories about them, because it’s impossible to encode in the genes every pattern you need to know. Some patterns, like faces, and probably fanged faces, are gene encoded. But other things that are worth knowing, like the meaning of fresh tiger droppings, or bear claw marks on trees. So it’s worth having a system for remembering that soon after you saw those droppings, you saw the tiger that made them and so you ran away. It’s even better to have a system where you can communicate that those particular droppings mean “be super alert for tigers!” without ever actually having to see the tiger. The “seeing it” and the “feeling fear” are the same. The difference is being able to remember these events and to combine them into patterns that can be remembered either for planning or for more sophisticated responses.

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[anonymous66]

It's just that if physicalism is true (everything reduces to the physical world), then it follows that mental states ( beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, the "what it is like-ness", the private inner goings on in our brains that I assume we all have as conscious humans) are illusions..

I don’t think that follows. I think a “mental state” is a particular kind of physical process happening over and over. Why do you think it follows from physicalism that mental states are illusions?

What physical properties do mental states have?

[JamesOfSeattle]

What physical properties do mental states have?

Mental states don’t have physical properties per se. A mental state is a particular kind of physical process happenening over and over. The process in question will have certain properties, but they will be the properties related to a process, not what we usually refer to when we say “physical properties”, like location, mass, velocity, etc. I guess you would say mental states have physical descriptions as opposed to properties.

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[anonymous66]

What physical properties do mental states have?

Mental states don’t have physical properties per se. A mental state is a particular kind of physical process happenening over and over. The process in question will have certain properties, but they will be the properties related to a process, not what we usually refer to when we say “physical properties”, like location, mass, velocity, etc. I guess you would say mental states have physical descriptions as opposed to properties.

So, are you saying that it's the case that when you think something like, "I think I'll walk to the store" it's actually just your physical brain doing stuff?

[JamesOfSeattle]

Yep.

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[anonymous66]

Yep.

I can't get from mental states are just physical states to: mental states are real. I understand that some people think it's possible.

[anonymous66]

Yep.

I can't get from mental states are just physical states to: mental states are real. I understand that some people think it's possible.

And furthermore, I believe it is the case that anyone who does accept mental states is by definition, not a physicalist.
Mental states have mental properties. If mental properties are real, then physicalism is false.

[Felix]

JamesOfSeattle: A mental state is a particular kind of physical process happening over and over.

No offense but your hypothesis is incoherent, no amount of evolutionary pressure is going to cause a mechanical process to develop into an intelligent operating system.

[JamesOfSeattle]

And furthermore, I believe it is the case that anyone who does accept mental states is by definition, not a physicalist.
Mental states have mental properties. If mental properties are real, then physicalism is false.

Well that explains it. If you’re defining consciousness as something that cannot have a physical explanation, then there’s nothing I can say. You can define it to mean anything you want. All I can say is that when I talk about consciousness, I am talking about how I experience a red ball, or the thought that I will go walk to the store, and all the things I’m talking about have a physical explanation.

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[JamesOfSeattle]

No offense but your hypothesis is incoherent, no amount of evolutionary pressure is going to cause a mechanical process to develop into an intelligent operating system.

No offense taken, but what do you mean by an intelligent operating system? Are you saying evolution could not produce people?

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[Felix]

all the things I’m talking about have a physical explanation.

A description is not an explanation. As the saying goes, "correlation is not causation."

[Felix]

Are you saying evolution could not produce people?

Yes, if it was purely a mechanical process, as you've suggested, instinctual behaviour would be it's ultimate goal. Termites, ants, etc., would be it's crowning achievements.

[anonymous66]

And furthermore, I believe it is the case that anyone who does accept mental states is by definition, not a physicalist.
Mental states have mental properties. If mental properties are real, then physicalism is false.

Well that explains it. If you’re defining consciousness as something that cannot have a physical explanation, then there’s nothing I can say. You can define it to mean anything you want. All I can say is that when I talk about consciousness, I am talking about how I experience a red ball, or the thought that I will go walk to the store, and all the things I’m talking about have a physical explanation.

So all is physical, and mental states are not an illusion? Your brain really is doing its physical stuff, and you have a non-physical mind that is thinking and emoting, and intending and feeling?

From my point of view, I have a physical body that includes my brain. And I have a mind that perceives and dreams and imagines and plans and reasons. The 2 interact. Physical states can cause mental states: When I cut my body, I experience a mental state-pain. And mental states can cause physical states: My mental state of desire to go to the store causes my physical body to go to the store. My mental state of embarrassment causes my physical body to blush.

As far as a definition of consciousness? I see no reason to disagree with how the term is used by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

2. Concepts of Consciousness

The words “conscious” and “consciousness” are umbrella terms that cover a wide variety of mental phenomena. Both are used with a diversity of meanings, and the adjective “conscious” is heterogeneous in its range, being applied both to whole organisms—creature consciousness—and to particular mental states and processes—state consciousness (Rosenthal 1986, Gennaro 1995, Carruthers 2000).

[ThomasHobbes]

From my point of view, I have a physical body that includes my brain. And I have a mind that perceives and dreams and imagines and plans and reasons. The 2 interact.

This last sentence is the exact point where the age old dualism blinds us to what is the case.
The 2 do not 'interact'
The mind is what the brain does.
The mind is the activity of the brain.
Saying that it 'interacts' forces us to conceive of the the mind and brain as two separate things. And that is exactly where the problem starts; imagining an incorporeal force or spirit which is infused in the matter.