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[Consul]

…My final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is that it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it, and definitely to ascertain the correlations of these with brain-processes is as much as psychology can empirically do. From the metaphysical point of view, it is true that one may claim that the correlations have a rational ground; and if the word Soul could be taken to mean merely some such vague problematic ground, it would be unobjectionable. But the trouble is that it professes to give the ground in positive terms of a very dubiously credible sort. I therefore feel entirely free to discard the word Soul from the rest of this book. If I ever use it, it will be in the vaguest and most popular way. The reader who finds any comfort in the idea of the Soul, is, however, perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul; they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes."

(James, William. The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1. 1890. Chapter X: The Consciousness of Self; The Theory of the Soul.)

This is concise, simple and fair, and it reads like it was written yesterday instead of a century ago. It leads to the obvious conclusion that the answer is unknown.

That the postulation of immaterial souls is scientifically superfluous and useless (because "it explains nothing and guarantees nothing"), that there is absolutely no scientific evidence for their existence, and that there is not even a coherently intelligible concept of an immaterial soul are strong reasons to disbelieve in their existence. That science hasn't positively "established the non-existence of the soul" doesn't mean that there is an empirical or rational justification for the metaphysical belief in its existence. In fact, substance dualism is extremely implausible for several philosophical and scientific reasons.

The great Australian philosopher (and reductive physicalist) David Armstrong writes the following:

"There is no certainty in philosophy. No philosopher can know that his or her arguments are true."

(Armstrong, D. M. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. xi)

"One moral that I draw is that in the fields of philosophy and religion there is no knowledge. We can only know what our beliefs are."

(Armstrong, D. M. "A Naturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73.2 (November 1999): 77-89. p. 82)

Beliefs that fall short of knowledge can still be justified or unjustified, rational/reasonable or irrational/unreasonable, probable or improbable, plausible or implausible.

The fact that a free will does not serve science says nothing useful or important, as long as science can not contradict it. It does serve me, and I think, all men, to believe we have a will, and that our actions therefore have some meaning.

Why would anyone voluntarily assent to something unproven, if doing so negates their very existence? I'm not trying to attack anyone here, but the only reason I can see is a cop out. Perhaps they are too lazy or frightened to take on life, and would prefer to think of themselves as being pushed along by events at all times, rather than having some say in outcomes (and thereby some accountability for outcomes).

I'm assuming above that most people would not be 'compatibalists' and be able to reconcile a free will with materialism and/or determinism. However, I think it would be interesting to see someone try to support that position.

Materialists surely don't "negate( ) their very existence". As I already mentioned, materialism is consistent with the negation of determinism, and there is disagreement among the determinists over whether compatibilism or incompatibilism is true. For example, Daniel Dennett is a staunch materialist and determinist, but he rejects incompatibilism.

If you think that you directly experience the falsity of determinism and the existence of totally undetermined, libertarian free will, you are wrong insofar as this is a theoretical interpretation of your self-experience and your intentional actions that may well be false. This sort of free will ("superfree will") may well be (and arguably is) a subjective illusion.

How do you know that when you do x at time t, you could have done otherwise at t?

[Consul]

All occurring things are physical.
All consciousness is an occurring thing.
Therefore, all consciousness is physical.

This argument is formally valid; but, once again, you're circularly arguing from physicalism for it, since premise 1 is equivalent to "Physicalism is true". Of course, if physicalism about everything is true, then a fortiori physicalism about consciousness is true too; but where are your arguments for physicalism about everything?! For dualists will simply reject your premise 1, and merely asserting its truth isn't arguing for it.

(Don't take me wrong, I'm a physicalist myself; so I don't criticize you for being a physicalist but for your failure to present non-circular, non-question-begging arguments for physicalism.)

[chewybrian]

Materialists surely don't "negate( ) their very existence". As I already mentioned, materialism is consistent with the negation of determinism, and there is disagreement among the determinists over whether compatibilism or incompatibilism is true. For example, Daniel Dennett is a staunch materialist and determinist, but he rejects incompatibilism.

If you think that you directly experience the falsity of determinism and the existence of totally undetermined, libertarian free will, you are wrong insofar as this is a theoretical interpretation of your self-experience and your intentional actions that may well be false. This sort of free will ("superfree will") may well be (and arguably is) a subjective illusion.

How do you know that when you do x at time t, you could have done otherwise at t?

I know because I experience it. I am aware prior to every action that I have a host of possible choices, and I pick one. As I walk out my door, I can head in any direction, or sit down, or go back inside. Tell me which way you think I can not go and I'll prove you wrong, unless you say "up" or "down". Whatever I choose, you'll simply say that was the predetermined choice, while I will maintain it was my active choice. I think we'll always be at an impasse. How do you know that you could not have done otherwise?

My faculty of sight does not deceive me into thinking I am seeing, does it? Do you contend that my faculty of hearing deceives me into thinking I hear sounds when I do not? But, somehow, my faculty of reason alone is built to deceive me, and to give me the false impression that I am thinking and deciding when I am pulled along unwillingly at all times?

I am not able to reconcile materialism or determinism with free will. *If* it turns out that we have a free will built on a foundation of materialism, that would suit me fine. I just don't 'get' how that would be (yet).

If someone denies their own free will, then they deny their own existence in my view. You are taking the position that you are just a stick floating in the river of reality, pushed along by the flow, with no hope of diverting your trajectory at any point. You might as well jump off a high building, because that will turn out to have been the only choice you could have possibly made. I can not reconcile that view with the actual life I am experiencing (and see no compelling need to do so), and I seriously don't understand why anyone wants to go on living if they believe that, and I have to question if they really hold that belief, deep down.

All occurring things are physical.
All consciousness is an occurring thing.
Therefore, all consciousness is physical.

This argument is formally valid; but, once again, you're circularly arguing from physicalism for it, since premise 1 is equivalent to "Physicalism is true". Of course, if physicalism about everything is true, then a fortiori physicalism about consciousness is true too; but where are your arguments for physicalism about everything?! For dualists will simply reject your premise 1, and merely asserting its truth isn't arguing for it.

(Don't take me wrong, I'm a physicalist myself; so I don't criticize you for being a physicalist but for your failure to present non-circular, non-question-begging arguments for physicalism.)

Thank you! I've seen this several times now, and it's just circular logic.

Try this:

1. Physical things behave according to known rules
2. We can not prove that our consciousness follows these rules
3. We can not prove that our consciousness is physical.

[Sy Borg]

Interesting seeing the final episode of Westworld, whose ideas called to mind Dawkins's idea of life being effectively "survival machines" for their genes (and, later, memes). It was pointed out in the show that humans are not free because we cannot change our "prime directive" - to survive. Of course, that's not strictly true, given the numerous things people have risked their lives for - children and other kin, although it could be argued that the social benefit gained through sacrifice of non-kin frequently benefits the offspring of the "martyr" through raised status or compensation.

Further, those who may have "changed their prime directive" will necessarily be the minority because they logically will have less chance to pass on their genes than those who focus on staying alive and reproducing.



However, if the "empty space" through which we move was truly empty it would suck us in an annihilate us like a black hole. It's a strange thing. By the same token, the ultrapure water used to clean small electronics parts would similarly kill you by sucking out your body's nutrients - literally, the water would consume you until some degree of equilibrium was achieved. Life is basically constructed of dirt and it requires a measure of dirt in all things.

Thing is, "space" is relative. For instance, you can walk through a thin fog as if it's nothing at all. However, if a neutron star was travelling in the Earth's trajectory, such is the density difference that the Earth would be akin to a thin fog to the rogue object as it passed through.

The empty space in which our physical body exists, is such that a neutrino, being extremely small, may pass through our body without touching a single cell. Forces, like gravity or energy like light, may pass through empty space, but are not a property of empty space. Although we are protected from the vacuum of empty outer space, by our atmosphere, both the Earth and it’s atmosphere still exist in empty space and travel through it around the sun.

That "empty space" in our bodies is not truly empty, PA. A pure vacuum is a relative concept with no true ontological status. Outer space, what we called a vacuum is not empty. If space was truly empty it would immediately pull any space craft apart that left the Earth's atmosphere (just as we once believed that the "vacuum" of space would explode us if we were ejected into space unprotected (in truth, you just suffocate until your blood boils through lack of pressure).

What we refer to as nothingness is replete with roiling, bubbling energy at all times, whether it reacts to neutrinos or anything else or not.

[Mosesquine]

All occurring things are physical.
All consciousness is an occurring thing.
Therefore, all consciousness is physical.

This argument is formally valid; but, once again, you're circularly arguing from physicalism for it, since premise 1 is equivalent to "Physicalism is true". Of course, if physicalism about everything is true, then a fortiori physicalism about consciousness is true too; but where are your arguments for physicalism about everything?! For dualists will simply reject your premise 1, and merely asserting its truth isn't arguing for it.

(Don't take me wrong, I'm a physicalist myself; so I don't criticize you for being a physicalist but for your failure to present non-circular, non-question-begging arguments for physicalism.)

The set of numerous scientific official results firmly supports physicalism. Science itself defends premise 1 above. Dualism is, rather, a question begging position. No scientific evidence supports dualism so far.

[ThomasHobbes]

This argument is formally valid; but, once again, you're circularly arguing from physicalism for it, since premise 1 is equivalent to "Physicalism is true". Of course, if physicalism about everything is true, then a fortiori physicalism about consciousness is true too; but where are your arguments for physicalism about everything?! For dualists will simply reject your premise 1, and merely asserting its truth isn't arguing for it.

(Don't take me wrong, I'm a physicalist myself; so I don't criticize you for being a physicalist but for your failure to present non-circular, non-question-begging arguments for physicalism.)

The set of numerous scientific official results firmly supports physicalism. Science itself defends premise 1 above. Dualism is, rather, a question begging position. No scientific evidence supports dualism so far.

The case against dualism is far worse.
Dualism is an ancient assumption based on the observation that 'something' must leave the body upon death. Ignorance about the most basic workings of the body leads to the idea that the pneuma and/or psyche must 'depart', acts to 'explain' motionless corpses.
Dualism has no basis beyond this.

Just about everything science has learned asserts the absurdity of the notion that an incorporeal force animates otherwise dead tissue. The concept of the soul is so absurd that its proponents even deny it to other livings things, which they reserve for humanity.

Special cases require special evidence. It is simply less absurd to note that whatever keeps the lowest creatures alive is most likely of the same kind of phenomena that keeps human, cats and dogs alive.

[Gertie]

James

Gertie, sorry for late response, I went camping.

Nice, gorgeous weather for it - here anyway.

You're discounting 'substance dualism' at the outset then? On what basis?

I’m discounting substance dualism based on the arguments summarized nicely by Consul (and those useful quotes, ahem) and also Occam’s razor, in that all the phenomenon in question seem to be explainable in standard physical terms.

OK.

Being nit-picky here, but I think it would be clearer to say that one single process of Input -> Mechanism -> Output is at the bottom of the heirarchy, rather than the model itself.

I’m not sure what you mean here. My hierarchy is is a hierarchy of kinds (classes?). Did you mean one single kind of process, or exactly one specific example of a process should be at the bottom?

No biggie, I'm just being tidy, but I'd have thought the process you're building your heirarchy of complexity on ie Input -> Mechanism -> Output, should have the simpest at the bottom - one iteration of the process - rather than the process itself, if you follow me?

To understand what I’m saying you have to use a slightly expanded definition of “purpose”. I think “conatus” is a term that has been used. It’s a kind of pressure that causes things to happen in a certain direction. Natural selection creates a kind of pressure to be more fit, because things that are more fit tend to out-reproduce things that are less fit. That’s the explanation for physical structures (like eyeballs) which would not happen without some kind of pressure like this. You can call this pressure “Natural purpose” if you must.

I think this needs explaining - where is the conatus coming from? Or is it merely an anthropomorphically (giving conscious characteristics to unconscious stuff) biased description of stuff interacting according to the laws of nature?

This looks crucial to me, isn't it the difference between happenstance, and a claim to some innate teleology in the nature of stuff and/or how stuff interacts?


If it's happenstance, then there's nothing worth calling purpose. If there's some innate 'inclination' towards a 'goal', that's a big claim.

Speaking of 'semantic information' presupposes already existing consciousness, because the (syntactical) material processes are only meaningful (semantic) if there's a conscious subject already there to find meaning in them. And material responses are only valuable to already conscious critters who …

Again, I am using a broader definition of “semantic”, and like above you can refer to it as “naturally semantic” if you must. The point is that at some point natural selection created a mechanism whose natural purpose was to create an output, and the natural purpose of that output was to be a sign ... okay, a “natural sign”, and the natural purpose of that natural sign was to be an Input for a subsequent mechanism, and the natural purpose of that subsequent mechanism was to generate an output which was a valuable (naturally valuable?) response to the “natural meaning” of the natural sign.

This is a different way of describing cause and effect, or how stuff interacts according to the laws of nature, right?

So again, it seems to me you're attributing some kind of innate teleological purpose, will, meaning and value, to either the basic components (stuff), and/or the laws of nature (how stuff interacts).

So the What if... is something like this? -

It's a brute fact that stuff, or stuff interacting (I'm still not clear which you're claiming), has innate purpose and drive, which is towards meaning and value, and realised through increasing complexity. Hence awareness of 'what it's like' experiential states (in eg humans) result from this?

[Gertie]

I think Consul should be moderated out for using this thread as a dump for quotes.

Disagree. The ones I've read are generally informative, substantive and on point.

We don't have to read them, but I appreciate the opportunity to.

[Consul]

How do you know that when you do x at time t, you could have done otherwise at t?

I know because I experience it. I am aware prior to every action that I have a host of possible choices, and I pick one. As I walk out my door, I can head in any direction, or sit down, or go back inside. Tell me which way you think I can not go and I'll prove you wrong, unless you say "up" or "down". Whatever I choose, you'll simply say that was the predetermined choice, while I will maintain it was my active choice. I think we'll always be at an impasse. How do you know that you could not have done otherwise?

First of all, what is meant by "free will":

"free will (in the traditional sense): the power or ability (1) to choose and to act upon an array of alternative possibilities, so that we could have chosen or acted otherwise and (2) to choose and act in such manner that the origins or sources of our choices or actions are in us and not in something else over which we have no control. Incompatibilists believe that determinism would rule out a power satisfying these conditions. Compatibilists argue either that determinism would not rule out such a power or that these features are not really required for free will." (p. 287)

"libertarianism (concerning free will). (from the Latin liber, meaning 'free'), the view that (1) free will in the traditional sense is incompatible with determinism and that (2) humans do possess such an incompatibilist free will, so that determinism is false. Libertarians are both incompatibilists and indeterminists." (p. 288)

(Kane, Robert, ed. Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.)

You seem to believe in libertarian free will (what I call "superfree will"), which requires…

"The Freedom of Self-determination: the power or ability to act of your own free will in the sense of a will (character, motives and purposes) of your own making—a will that you yourself, to some degree, were ultimately responsible for forming.
…
The Freedom of Self-formation: the power to form one’s own will in a manner that is undetermined by one’s past by virtue of will-setting or self-forming actions (SFAs) over which one has plural voluntary control."

(Kane, Robert. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. pp. 168+172)

That is, if we have superfree will, the following is true:

"[E]ach of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen."

(Chisholm, Roderick M. On Metaphysics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. p. 12)

So superfree will in this sense requires the possibility of absolute/total self-determination (absolute/total autonomy over and responsibility for one's choices/decisions and actions), and absolute/total self-determination requires the possibility of self-creation. But nobody can be a self-creator, a causa sui, so superfree will is impossible. All your choices/decisions and actions are determined or influenced by some factors—e.g. innate dispositions, personality-forming conditions of socialization (upbringing)—which cannot be determined or influenced by you, and for which you cannot be (causally or morally) responsible.

See this interview with Galen Strawson—"You Cannot Make Yourself the Way You Are"—which contains a compelling argument against libertarian free will: https://www.believermag.com/issues/2003 ... w_strawson

If you cannot make yourself the way you are, you cannot have superfree will. You cannot make yourself the way you are; therefore, you cannot and don't have superfree will.

[Consul]

How do you know that when you do x at time t, you could have done otherwise at t?

I know because I experience it. I am aware prior to every action that I have a host of possible choices, and I pick one.

On the basis of your self-experience as an acting person, you cannot rule out the possibility that your actual choice is determined or influenced by factors which you cannot determine or influence, and of which you may not even be aware?

As I walk out my door, I can head in any direction, or sit down, or go back inside. Tell me which way you think I can not go and I'll prove you wrong, unless you say "up" or "down". Whatever I choose, you'll simply say that was the predetermined choice, while I will maintain it was my active choice. I think we'll always be at an impasse. How do you know that you could not have done otherwise?

There is a compatibilist sense in which you could have done otherwise that doesn't require the falsity of determinism: If you had wanted to do otherwise, you could and would have done otherwise.

"[C]ompatibilists argue that to be free, as we ordinarily understand it, is (1) to have the power or ability to do what we want or desire to do, which in turn entails (2) an absence of constraints or impediments (such as physical restraints, coercion, and compulsion) preventing us from doing what we want. Let us call a view that defines freedom in terms of 1 and 2 'classical compatibilism'. Most traditional compatibilists, such as Hobbes, Hume, and Mill, were classical compatibilists in this sense. Hobbes stated the view succinctly, saying a man is free when he finds 'no stop in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do.' And Hobbes noted that if this is what freedom means, then freedom is compatible with determinism. For, as he put it, there may be no constraints or impediments preventing persons from doing what they 'will or desire to do', even if it should turn out that what they will or desire was determined by their past.

But doesn’t freedom also require alternative paths into the future, and hence the freedom to do otherwise? How do classical compatibilists account for the freedom to do otherwise? They begin by defining the freedom to do otherwise in terms of the same conditions 1 and 2. You are free to do otherwise than take the bus if (1) you have the power or ability to avoid taking it, which entails (2) that there are also no constraints preventing you from not taking the bus, if you wanted to (no one is holding a gun on you, for example, forcing you to get on the bus.)

Of course, an absence of constraints preventing you from doing otherwise does not mean you will actually do otherwise. But, for classical compatibilists, the freedom to do otherwise does mean that you would have done otherwise (nothing would have stopped you) if you had wanted or desired to do otherwise. And they argue that if the freedom to do otherwise has this conditional or hypothetical meaning (you would..., if you wanted to), then the freedom to do otherwise would also be compatible with determinism. For it may be that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted to, even though you did not in fact want to do otherwise, and even if what you wanted to do was determined."

(Kane, Robert. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. pp. 13-4)

[chewybrian]

You seem to believe in libertarian free will (what I call "superfree will"), which requires…

"The Freedom of Self-determination: the power or ability to act of your own free will in the sense of a will (character, motives and purposes) of your own making—a will that you yourself, to some degree, were ultimately responsible for forming.
…
The Freedom of Self-formation: the power to form one’s own will in a manner that is undetermined by one’s past by virtue of will-setting or self-forming actions (SFAs) over which one has plural voluntary control."

Yes, I do concur, although your definitions seem to conflict or over-reach at certain points.

I know I can form my own will because I work on this daily through stoic philosophy, and I am certainly no sage, yet I have definitely made positive progress. I was at one point 100 pounds overweight, and at another point I cycled 300 miles in a day. How else can you explain that difference in will, other than to say I made an active choice to improve, and put in the effort to do so? No outside force was acting on me; nobody threatened me or offered incentives.

Through work and practice, I am much more able to avoid anger, frustration and even depression. I can choose to perceive events and others' behavior differently, more rationally, and my reaction must necessarily be different if my perception differs. I am a very different person than I was in the past, and many people around me have told me so of their own accord, though I asked none of them. Others make similar progress through cognitive behavioral therapy, psychotherapy, or some other program, like AA. Would you deny that they can make progress?

But, you also can not say your will is fully undetermined by your past. Tendencies arise from nature and nurture, but these can be overcome to varying degrees if you choose to do the work.

That is, if we have superfree will, the following is true:

"[E]ach of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen."

(Chisholm, Roderick M. On Metaphysics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. p. 12)

So superfree will in this sense requires the possibility of absolute/total self-determination (absolute/total autonomy over and responsibility for one's choices/decisions and actions), and absolute/total self-determination requires the possibility of self-creation. But nobody can be a self-creator, a causa sui, so superfree will is impossible. All your choices/decisions and actions are determined or influenced by some factors—e.g. innate dispositions, personality-forming conditions of socialization (upbringing)—which cannot be determined or influenced by you, and for which you cannot be (causally or morally) responsible.

See this interview with Galen Strawson—"You Cannot Make Yourself the Way You Are"—which contains a compelling argument against libertarian free will: https://www.believermag.com/issues/2003 ... w_strawson

If you cannot make yourself the way you are, you cannot have superfree will. You cannot make yourself the way you are; therefore, you cannot and don't have superfree will.

Your requirement of 'absolute/total self-determination' is a contrivance to lead to your desired conclusion that free will, or strengthening of will, is impossible, by nature of it not being perfect. No human activity is perfect, so it is not fair to impose this test of effectiveness on self-improvement by strengthening of will. Have I failed at weightlifting if I increase my abilities, yet don't win a gold medal at the Olympics? I've only failed if I had set the arbitrary, unreasonable expectation that only a gold medal would prove my progress.

You say: "You cannot make yourself the way you are", and this is mistaken, and you will miss a wonderful opportunity to improve yourself and be happier if you take that to heart. You can not choose your parents or your DNA, and much of your experience is outside your control. And, if you have never tried to form your will, then maybe you have not made yourself the way you are now (most people have not). But, you can begin today if you wish. You can work on self-improvement in almost any aspect of life, and the will is not exempt. Your attitude and interpretation of events is in fact the one aspect where you have almost total control. You could take my property or office, or injure, jail or even kill me, but you can never affect my attitude unless I consent.

You can make yourself the way you will be in the future, within very broad limits. Your heredity and environment influence the level of difficulty (sadly, I can never be a jockey), but you can exert your will, and you can train and strengthen your will, and you should!

[Consul]

I know I can form my own will because I work on this daily through stoic philosophy, and I am certainly no sage, yet I have definitely made positive progress. I was at one point 100 pounds overweight, and at another point I cycled 300 miles in a day. How else can you explain that difference in will, other than to say I made an active choice to improve, and put in the effort to do so? No outside force was acting on me; nobody threatened me or offered incentives.

Now you're talking like a compatibilist!

…But, you also can not say your will is fully undetermined by your past. Tendencies arise from nature and nurture, but these can be overcome to varying degrees if you choose to do the work.

Once you acknowledge that there is no such thing as absolutely autonomous self-determination that is "fully undetermined by your past", you thereby reject libertarian free will.

Your requirement of 'absolute/total self-determination' is a contrivance to lead to your desired conclusion that free will, or strengthening of will, is impossible, by nature of it not being perfect.

No, it's not, since libertarian free will does require the capacity for absolute/total self-determination in the sense of one's being an absolutely/totally self-determining self-creator of one's mind, one's mental nature or character (one's mental and behavioral dispositions, one's personality traits, one's desires, preferences, and interests).

Note that to deny incompatibilist libertarian free will is not to deny compatibilist free will!

No human activity is perfect, so it is not fair to impose this test of effectiveness on self-improvement by strengthening of will. Have I failed at weightlifting if I increase my abilities, yet don't win a gold medal at the Olympics? I've only failed if I had set the arbitrary, unreasonable expectation that only a gold medal would prove my progress.

You say: "You cannot make yourself the way you are", and this is mistaken, and you will miss a wonderful opportunity to improve yourself and be happier if you take that to heart. You can not choose your parents or your DNA, and much of your experience is outside your control. And, if you have never tried to form your will, then maybe you have not made yourself the way you are now (most people have not). But, you can begin today if you wish. You can work on self-improvement in almost any aspect of life, and the will is not exempt. Your attitude and interpretation of events is in fact the one aspect where you have almost total control. You could take my property or office, or injure, jail or even kill me, but you can never affect my attitude unless I consent.

You can make yourself the way you will be in the future, within very broad limits. Your heredity and environment influence the level of difficulty (sadly, I can never be a jockey), but you can exert your will, and you can train and strengthen your will, and you should!

When Strawson says that "you cannot [absolutely/fundamentally] make yourself the way you are," he explicitly adds that "the claim…is not that people cannot change the way they are."

"They can, in certain respects (which tend to be exaggerated by North Americans and underestimated, perhaps, by members of other cultures). The claim is only that people cannot be supposed to change themselves in such a way as to be or become ultimately responsible for the way they are, and hence for their actions. One can put the point by saying that in the final analysis the way you are is, in every last detail, a matter of luck – good or bad."

The strength of your will(power) or your motivation to change the way you are is itself something that you haven't freely chosen; it's given to you.

See Strawson's text "Luck Swallows Everything", which contains a more detailed version of his (compelling) argument against ultimate moral responsibility and superfree will!

[Present awareness]

Those whom point to the past, saying it can’t be changed, are simply pointing out the obvious. Going on to say, if we had free will, we could change the past, is ridiculous. The past is, what it is, and has nothing to do with the choices made at the moment they were made.

Getting back to the OP, everyone knows what consciousness IS, because we all experience it directly! The question about whether it is physical comes down to how we define the word “physical”. Are thoughts physical? If so, where do they go, after we think them?

Like gravity and electromagnetic radiation, I believe consciousness to be a natural force of nature, past on to the offspring of all life forms. Similar to light, it is an energy that interacts with matter, animating all life forms. Flowing through the neurons of the brain and nervous system, stimulating all action, including thought.

Where does this energy go after death? Where does light go, after you’ve seen it?

[chewybrian]

Now you're talking like a compatibilist!
...since libertarian free will does require the capacity for absolute/total self-determination in the sense of one's being an absolutely/totally self-determining self-creator of one's mind, one's mental nature or character (one's mental and behavioral dispositions, one's personality traits, one's desires, preferences, and interests).
...Note that to deny incompatibilist libertarian free will is not to deny compatibilist free will!

I see what you are saying, but the stumbling block is that if the will is fully physical, then it seems it would be bound by all the laws relating to physical things, which seems to make it an effect of prior causes, and therefore not free. So, how can I accept materialism and not deny free will?

If I experience my will as free, and choose to acknowledge it as such, then do I not need to deny materialism to do so? Where is the compelling argument for compatiblism?

When Strawson says that "you cannot [absolutely/fundamentally] make yourself the way you are," he explicitly adds that "the claim…is not that people cannot change the way they are."

This makes sense, though I would argue that you can go a long way down that road.

"They can, in certain respects (which tend to be exaggerated by North Americans and underestimated, perhaps, by members of other cultures).

Speaking as an American, I must concede the point.

The claim is only that people cannot be supposed to change themselves in such a way as to be or become ultimately responsible for the way they are, and hence for their actions. One can put the point by saying that in the final analysis the way you are is, in every last detail, a matter of luck – good or bad."

Where, then, is the line to be drawn, where we have enough responsibility to be accountable? How can he concede we are able to change, yet deny we have a responsibility to try to change, if it could benefit us or society to do so? How does he reconcile a certain level of control with zero level of responsibility? This conclusion makes no sense.

The strength of your will(power) or your motivation to change the way you are is itself something that you haven't freely chosen; it's given to you.

Again this seems contrived. You concede that someone has the power to change, but only that power thrust upon them by forces of nature outside their control? My will expressed is merely an expression of my total lack of will, because it suits your intended conclusion?

See Strawson's text "Luck Swallows Everything", which contains a more detailed version of his (compelling) argument against ultimate moral responsibility and superfree will!

I will check it out when I have more time and report back.

[Consul]

Those whom point to the past, saying it can’t be changed, are simply pointing out the obvious. Going on to say, if we had free will, we could change the past, is ridiculous. The past is, what it is, and has nothing to do with the choices made at the moment they were made.

The question of free will is certainly not the question of the possibility of changing the past. Not even the believers in libertarian free will claim that we can change the past.

Getting back to the OP, everyone knows what consciousness IS, because we all experience it directly!

But what exactly do we know about consciousness just by experiencing it directly? We know the "what-it-is-like-ness" of our experiences, but what else do we know just by having them?