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[chewybrian]

In the late 1950s, many of scientists and philosophers of mind stated that ideas are physical. For example, ideas can be brain processes. Perhaps, ideas are brain processes with attitudes. Furthermore, ideas can be both physical and observable. Ideas are physical, in the sense of brain processes, and they are observable, in the sense of speaking sounds or writing sentences like this reply post I am typing on the screen. So, your objection to physicalism is not successful!!!

[Consul]

Ideas are not physical, yet they exist. Ideas are simply thoughts expressed, so perhaps your thoughts or consciousness lack a material existence as well. It is possible, in your 'everything is physical' reality, to say your mind does not exist, if it acts in ways not compatible with the laws governing physical things. It's not clear if it does or not. It's becoming clear, though, that you are only concerned with making declarations, so I'll stop bothering you with questions.

In the late 1950s, many of scientists and philosophers of mind stated that ideas are physical. For example, ideas can be brain processes. Perhaps, ideas are brain processes with attitudes. Furthermore, ideas can be both physical and observable. Ideas are physical, in the sense of brain processes, and they are observable, in the sense of speaking sounds or writing sentences like this reply post I am typing on the screen. So, your objection to physicalism is not successful!!!

The word "idea" is ambiguous between "percept" (sense-impression), "concept", and "mental image"; and a Platonic idea (form) is a universal that doesn't exist in minds. A concept as a (concrete token of a) mental representation does exist in minds, whereas a concept as an abstract Fregean sense or predicate-meaning doesn't.

[Consul]

We still don't have a (complete and detailed) scientific explanation of abiogenesis (the emergence of life from nonlife) and apsychogenesis (the emergence of conscious life from nonconscious life), but the scientists are working hard on it; and the existence of these explanatory gaps doesn't justify the rejection of physicalist naturalism about life and consciousness.

I'm not so sure. Haven't we been able to explain pretty much all physical events? Even those we can't verify are still thought to be understood, like what is happening inside the sun. The fact that we can't explain the emergence of life does tend to make you think something else might be going on there. I'd say it's reasonable enough to hold off 'picking a side', at least.

What might that "something else" be? If certain physicochemical processes and structures aren't both necessary and sufficient for life and consciousness, what's missing?

[Consul]

It's a set theory: (∀x)(x ∈ the set of nonphysical things → x ∈ the set of nonexistent things)

This simply means that there are no nonphysical things, and it begs the question against dualism. So what you need to do is to present arguments for physicalism. The mere assertion that it is true won't do.

[chewybrian]

I'm not so sure. Haven't we been able to explain pretty much all physical events? Even those we can't verify are still thought to be understood, like what is happening inside the sun. The fact that we can't explain the emergence of life does tend to make you think something else might be going on there. I'd say it's reasonable enough to hold off 'picking a side', at least.

What might that "something else" be? If certain physicochemical processes and structures aren't both necessary and sufficient for life and consciousness, what's missing?

We don't know, but evidently something if we can not recreate the event.

For any other physical process, if you give me the raw materials, maybe some super collider or reactor, and a Stephen Hawking type to help out, I could, at least theoretically, recreate that process, right? If this (life) is the one and only thing we can not recreate, or even think of how we might recreate in theory, that should be a red flag.

If you bump into God, could you ask Him and get back to us?

[Consul]

What might that "something else" be? If certain physicochemical processes and structures aren't both necessary and sufficient for life and consciousness, what's missing?

We don't know, but evidently something if we can not recreate the event.
For any other physical process, if you give me the raw materials, maybe some super collider or reactor, and a Stephen Hawking type to help out, I could, at least theoretically, recreate that process, right? If this (life) is the one and only thing we can not recreate, or even think of how we might recreate in theory, that should be a red flag.

It is true that original abiogenesis is not (yet) chemically re-enactable in the laboratory, but this circumstance doesn't give us a good reason to deny or doubt that there is nothing non-physicochemical involved in the transition from non-living matter to living matter. The dualistic postulation of occult supernatural/hyperphysical extra ingredients is theoretically and explanatorily useless for scientists.

"[T]he moment some non-metabolic (downhill) replicator acquired an energy-gathering capability, could be thought of as the moment that life began."
 (p. 158)

"Abiogenesis and biological evolution are one continuous process—abiogenesis (the transformation of non-living matter to earliest life) is the low-complexity phase, biological evolution is just the high-complexity phase. That unification serves to clarify the physical process that led from simple abiotic beginnings right through to complex life. By uncovering the process that connects inanimate to animate, the essence of what it is to be alive begins to materialize. The emergence of life was initiated by the emergence of a simple replicating system, because that seemingly inconsequential event opened the door to a distinctly different kind of chemistry—replicative chemistry. Entering the world of replicative chemistry reveals the existence of that other kind of stability in nature, the dynamic kinetic stability of things that are good at making more of themselves. Exploring the world of replicative chemistry helps explain why a simple primordial replicating system would have been expected to complexify over time. The reason: to increase its stability—its dynamic kinetic stability (DKS).
Yes, living systems involve chemical reactions, lots of them, but the essence of life, the process that started it all off, was replication." (p. 162)
 


"Biology then is just a particularly complex kind of replicative chemistry and the living state can be thought of as a new state of matter, the replicative state of matter, whose properties derive from the special kind of stability that characterizes replicating entities—DKS [dynamic kinetic stability]. That leads to a working definition of life: a self-sustaining kinetically stable dynamic reaction network derived from the replication reaction." (pp. 163-4)

"So there we have it. Even though life is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon, the life principle is surprisingly simple. Life is just the resultant network of chemical reactions that emerges from the continuing cycle of replication, mutation, complexification, and selection, when it operates on particular chain-like molecules—in the case of life on Earth, the nucleic acids. It is possible that other chemical systems could also exhibit this property, but so far this question has yet to be explored experimentally. Life then is just the chemical consequences that derive from the power of exponential growth operating on certain replicating chemical systems." (p. 164)


(Pross, Addy. What is Life? How Chemistry becomes Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.)

As for consciousness, consider a nonconscious human zygote that develops into a self-conscious person. This development is a continuous physicochemical process and, as far as scientists can tell, there is no stage when some spiritual "special sauce" is added.

"[O]ne of the difficulties for Dualism is that it must assign the coming into existence of the immaterial mind to a definite point of time in the development of the organism, although there seems to be no natural point at which such an entity could emerge. The same difficulty holds for the Attribute theory. At what point in the gradual growth of an organism do these new, non-material, properties of the substance appear? ...[O]n the physical side we seem to have no more than a gradual increase in physical complexity without a break at any point that might betoken the emergence of something new."

(Armstrong, D. M. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. pp. 47-8)

[Consul]

"[T]he important point about the standard evolutionary story is that the human species and all of its features are the wholly physical outcome of a wholly physical process. Like all but the simplest organisms, we have a nervous system. And for the same reason: a nervous system permits the discriminating guidance of behavior. But a nervous system is just an active matrix of cells, and a cell is just an active matrix of molecules. We are notable only in that our nervous system is more complex and more powerful than those of our evolutionary brothers and sisters. Our inner nature differs from that of simpler creatures in degree, but not in kind.
If this is the correct account of our origins, then there seems neither need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into our scientific account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we should learn to live with that fact."

(Churchland, Paul M. Matter and Consciousness. 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. p. 35)

[Consul]

The dualistic postulation of occult supernatural/hyperphysical extra ingredients is theoretically and explanatorily useless for scientists.

"The theory of the Soul is the theory of popular philosophy and of scholasticism, which is only popular philosophy made systematic. It declares that the principle of individuality within us must be substantial, for psychic phenomena are activities, and there can be no activity without a concrete agent. This substantial agent cannot be the brain but must be something immaterial; for its activity, thought, is both immaterial, and takes cognizance of immaterial things, and of material things in general and intelligible, as well as in particular and sensible ways, - all which powers are incompatible with the nature of matter, of which the brain is composed. Thought moreover is simple, whilst the activities of the brain are compounded of the elementary activities of each of its parts. Furthermore, thought is spontaneous or free, whilst all material activity is determined ab extra; and the will can turn itself against all corporeal goods and appetites, which would be impossible were it a corporeal function. For these objective reasons the principle of psychic life must be both immaterial and simple as well as substantial, must be what is called a Soul. The same consequence follows from subjective reasons. Our consciousness of personal identity assures us of our essential simplicity: the owner of the various constituents of the self, as we have seen them, the hypothetical Arch-Ego whom we provisionally conceived as possible, is a real entity of whose existence self-consciousness makes us directly aware. No material agent could thus turn round and grasp itself – material activities always grasp something else than the agent. And if a brain could grasp itself and be self-conscious, it would be conscious of itself as a brain and not as something of an altogether different kind. The Soul then exists as a simple spiritual substance in which the various psychic faculties, operations, and affections inhere.
…
The great difficulty is in seeing how a thing can cognize anything. This difficulty is not in the least removed by giving to the thing that cognizes the name of Soul. The Spiritualists do not deduce any of the properties of the mental life from otherwise known properties of the soul. They simply find various characters ready-made in the mental life, and these they clap into the Soul, saying, 'Lo! behold the source from whence they flow!' The merely verbal character of this 'explanation' is obvious. The Soul invoked, far from making the phenomena more intelligible, can only be made intelligible itself by borrowing their form, - it must be represented, if at all, as a transcendent stream of consciousness duplicating the one we know.
Altogether, the Soul is an outbirth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim, according to Dr. Hodgson, is: 'Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else.'
…
The Soul-theory is, then, a complete superfluity, so far as accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious experience goes. So far, no one can be compelled to subscribe to it for definite scientific reasons. The case would rest here, and the reader be left free to make his choice, were it not for other demands of a more practical kind.
…
My final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is that it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it, and definitely to ascertain the correlations of these with brain-processes is as much as psychology can empirically do. From the metaphysical point of view, it is true that one may claim that the correlations have a rational ground; and if the word Soul could be taken to mean merely some such vague problematic ground, it would be unobjectionable. But the trouble is that it professes to give the ground in positive terms of a very dubiously credible sort. I therefore feel entirely free to discard the word Soul from the rest of this book. If I ever use it, it will be in the vaguest and most popular way. The reader who finds any comfort in the idea of the Soul, is, however, perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul; they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes."

(James, William. The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1. 1890. Chapter X: The Consciousness of Self; The Theory of the Soul.)

[ThomasHobbes]

I think Consul should be moderated out for using this thread as a dump for quotes.

[Mosesquine]

I think that dualistic nonphysical mind itself is a very question begging. No scientific results proved the existence of nonphysical entities. Every scientific thought endorses only physical entities. So, the dualist assumption fails to be scientific at all.

[Sy Borg]

Interesting seeing the final episode of Westworld, whose ideas called to mind Dawkins's idea of life being effectively "survival machines" for their genes (and, later, memes). It was pointed out in the show that humans are not free because we cannot change our "prime directive" - to survive. Of course, that's not strictly true, given the numerous things people have risked their lives for - children and other kin, although it could be argued that the social benefit gained through sacrifice of non-kin frequently benefits the offspring of the "martyr" through raised status or compensation.

Further, those who may have "changed their prime directive" will necessarily be the minority because they logically will have less chance to pass on their genes than those who focus on staying alive and reproducing.

In my view, there are things, made up of matter, that have mass and there are no-things, like empty space, which have no matter or mass. If it were not for nothing, things would no have space to exist in.

However, if the "empty space" through which we move was truly empty it would suck us in an annihilate us like a black hole. It's a strange thing. By the same token, the ultrapure water used to clean small electronics parts would similarly kill you by sucking out your body's nutrients - literally, the water would consume you until some degree of equilibrium was achieved. Life is basically constructed of dirt and it requires a measure of dirt in all things.

Thing is, "space" is relative. For instance, you can walk through a thin fog as if it's nothing at all. However, if a neutron star was travelling in the Earth's trajectory, such is the density difference that the Earth would be akin to a thin fog to the rogue object as it passed through.

[JamesOfSeattle]

Gertie, sorry for late response, I went camping.

You're discounting 'substance dualism' at the outset then? On what basis?

I’m discounting substance dualism based on the arguments summarized nicely by Consul (and those useful quotes, ahem) and also Occam’s razor, in that all the phenomenon in question seem to be explainable in standard physical terms.

Being nit-picky here, but I think it would be clearer to say that one single process of Input -> Mechanism -> Output is at the bottom of the heirarchy, rather than the model itself.

I’m not sure what you mean here. My hierarchy is is a hierarchy of kinds (classes?). Did you mean one single kind of process, or exactly one specific example of a process should be at the bottom?

At (probably) the next higher level we have a process that serves a functional purpose. This includes mechanisms created by natural selection, like cell surface receptors, eyeballs, and brains. If your personal preference for the fundamental unit of consciousness is purposeful function, you’re a functionalist, and you would say bacteria are conscious.

I think that seeing Purpose as significant to consciousness in this way would need justifying. Natural selection doesn't have a purpose itself, it's just a result of gene mutation, happy accidents.

To understand what I’m saying you have to use a slightly expanded definition of “purpose”. I think “conatus” is a term that has been used. It’s a kind of pressure that causes things to happen in a certain direction. Natural selection creates a kind of pressure to be more fit, because things that are more fit tend to out-reproduce things that are less fit. That’s the explanation for physical structures (like eyeballs) which would not happen without some kind of pressure like this. You can call this pressure “Natural purpose” if you must.

Speaking of 'semantic information' presupposes already existing consciousness, because the (syntactical) material processes are only meaningful (semantic) if there's a conscious subject already there to find meaning in them. And material responses are only valuable to already conscious critters who find value in them.

Again, I am using a broader definition of “semantic”, and like above you can refer to it as “naturally semantic” if you must. The point is that at some point natural selection created a mechanism whose natural purpose was to create an output, and the natural purpose of that output was to be a sign ... okay, a “natural sign”, and the natural purpose of that natural sign was to be an Input for a subsequent mechanism, and the natural purpose of that subsequent mechanism was to generate an output which was a valuable (naturally valuable?) response to the “natural meaning” of the natural sign.

At a higher levels, you might requirer that at least part of the output constitutes memory, or that the input and/or output constitute concepts, or that input and/or output concepts be self-referential.

You're no longer talking about material processes, you're talking about mental states (remembering, conceptualising, self-awareness).

Um, no, I’m explaining the physical processes that generate these “mental states”. I take that back. I’m describing a framework which can be used to explain those mental states. And I would emphasize that “mental state” can refer to 1 of 2 things: either a dynamic state, where the same process is happening over and over, or a physical state that has the potential for a process to happen.

Sorry but I don't see it? I don't see the explanation. [...]
Conceptually, that is an attractive conclusion. It solves the puzzle in a simple sentence. But it's when we get into the nitty gritty of explaining how that could be, it gets a lot trickier. IMO it's the beginning of the problem, not the end.

Agreed. I’ve just pointed out the Framework. But once you have that, everything falls into what Chalmers calls the easy problems, which of course are not easy.

*

[chewybrian]

I’m discounting substance dualism based on the arguments summarized nicely by Consul (and those useful quotes, ahem) and also Occam’s razor, in that all the phenomenon in question seem to be explainable in standard physical terms.

I'm being pulled in the opposite direction by both.

On Occam's razor, begin with my perception that I have a free will. If indeed I do, this conflicts with the usual laws regarding the behavior of physical things. Also, it appears to be about the only thing not well explained by science, and about the only physical event (if it is such) that can not be reproduced, even in theory. The simple, easy answer is that my consciousness is not physical.

On the other hand, suppose that my will is not free, yet I perceive that it is. Why, then was only this faculty of reason, among all the faculties granted to me, set up in a form that deceives me at all times, instead of attempting to feed me reliable information about my environment?

As to the quotes, they go in several directions, but I like this one which sums up the problem quite well:

"The theory of the Soul is the theory of popular philosophy and of scholasticism, which is only popular philosophy made systematic. It declares that the principle of individuality within us must be substantial, for psychic phenomena are activities, and there can be no activity without a concrete agent. This substantial agent cannot be the brain but must be something immaterial; for its activity, thought, is both immaterial, and takes cognizance of immaterial things, and of material things in general and intelligible, as well as in particular and sensible ways, - all which powers are incompatible with the nature of matter, of which the brain is composed. Thought moreover is simple, whilst the activities of the brain are compounded of the elementary activities of each of its parts. Furthermore, thought is spontaneous or free, whilst all material activity is determined ab extra; and the will can turn itself against all corporeal goods and appetites, which would be impossible were it a corporeal function. For these objective reasons the principle of psychic life must be both immaterial and simple as well as substantial, must be what is called a Soul. The same consequence follows from subjective reasons. Our consciousness of personal identity assures us of our essential simplicity: the owner of the various constituents of the self, as we have seen them, the hypothetical Arch-Ego whom we provisionally conceived as possible, is a real entity of whose existence self-consciousness makes us directly aware. No material agent could thus turn round and grasp itself – material activities always grasp something else than the agent. And if a brain could grasp itself and be self-conscious, it would be conscious of itself as a brain and not as something of an altogether different kind. The Soul then exists as a simple spiritual substance in which the various psychic faculties, operations, and affections inhere.
…
The great difficulty is in seeing how a thing can cognize anything. This difficulty is not in the least removed by giving to the thing that cognizes the name of Soul. The Spiritualists do not deduce any of the properties of the mental life from otherwise known properties of the soul. They simply find various characters ready-made in the mental life, and these they clap into the Soul, saying, 'Lo! behold the source from whence they flow!' The merely verbal character of this 'explanation' is obvious. The Soul invoked, far from making the phenomena more intelligible, can only be made intelligible itself by borrowing their form, - it must be represented, if at all, as a transcendent stream of consciousness duplicating the one we know.
Altogether, the Soul is an outbirth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim, according to Dr. Hodgson, is: 'Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else.'
…
The Soul-theory is, then, a complete superfluity, so far as accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious experience goes. So far, no one can be compelled to subscribe to it for definite scientific reasons. The case would rest here, and the reader be left free to make his choice, were it not for other demands of a more practical kind.
…
My final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is that it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it, and definitely to ascertain the correlations of these with brain-processes is as much as psychology can empirically do. From the metaphysical point of view, it is true that one may claim that the correlations have a rational ground; and if the word Soul could be taken to mean merely some such vague problematic ground, it would be unobjectionable. But the trouble is that it professes to give the ground in positive terms of a very dubiously credible sort. I therefore feel entirely free to discard the word Soul from the rest of this book. If I ever use it, it will be in the vaguest and most popular way. The reader who finds any comfort in the idea of the Soul, is, however, perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul; they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes."

(James, William. The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1. 1890. Chapter X: The Consciousness of Self; The Theory of the Soul.)

This is concise, simple and fair, and it reads like it was written yesterday instead of a century ago. It leads to the obvious conclusion that the answer is unknown. The fact that a free will does not serve science says nothing useful or important, as long as science can not contradict it. It does serve me, and I think, all men, to believe we have a will, and that our actions therefore have some meaning.

Why would anyone voluntarily assent to something unproven, if doing so negates their very existence? I'm not trying to attack anyone here, but the only reason I can see is a cop out. Perhaps they are too lazy or frightened to take on life, and would prefer to think of themselves as being pushed along by events at all times, rather than having some say in outcomes (and thereby some accountability for outcomes).

I'm assuming above that most people would not be 'compatibalists' and be able to reconcile a free will with materialism and/or determinism. However, I think it would be interesting to see someone try to support that position.

[Mosesquine]

The simple, easy answer is that my consciousness is not physical.

All occurring things are physical.
All consciousness is an occurring thing.
Therefore, all consciousness is physical.

Proof:

1. (∀x)(Fx → Gx)
2. (∀x)(Hx → Fx)
∴ (∀x)(Hx → Gx)
3. asm: ~(∀x)(Hx → Gx)
4. (∃x)~(Hx → Gx) 3, QN
5. ~(Ha → Ga) 4, EI
6. Ha & ~Ga 5, CR
7. Ha → Fa 2, UI
8. Ha 6, S
9. Fa 7, 8, MP
10. Fa → Ga 1, UI
11. Ga 9, 10, MP
12. ~Ga 6, S
∴ 13. (∀x)(Hx → Gx) from 3; 11 contradicts 12.
Q.E.D.

If you don't find occurring things that are not physical, then your thought that your consciousness is not physical is wrong.

[Present awareness]

Interesting seeing the final episode of Westworld, whose ideas called to mind Dawkins's idea of life being effectively "survival machines" for their genes (and, later, memes). It was pointed out in the show that humans are not free because we cannot change our "prime directive" - to survive. Of course, that's not strictly true, given the numerous things people have risked their lives for - children and other kin, although it could be argued that the social benefit gained through sacrifice of non-kin frequently benefits the offspring of the "martyr" through raised status or compensation.

Further, those who may have "changed their prime directive" will necessarily be the minority because they logically will have less chance to pass on their genes than those who focus on staying alive and reproducing.

In my view, there are things, made up of matter, that have mass and there are no-things, like empty space, which have no matter or mass. If it were not for nothing, things would no have space to exist in.

However, if the "empty space" through which we move was truly empty it would suck us in an annihilate us like a black hole. It's a strange thing. By the same token, the ultrapure water used to clean small electronics parts would similarly kill you by sucking out your body's nutrients - literally, the water would consume you until some degree of equilibrium was achieved. Life is basically constructed of dirt and it requires a measure of dirt in all things.

Thing is, "space" is relative. For instance, you can walk through a thin fog as if it's nothing at all. However, if a neutron star was travelling in the Earth's trajectory, such is the density difference that the Earth would be akin to a thin fog to the rogue object as it passed through.

The empty space in which our physical body exists, is such that a neutrino, being extremely small, may pass through our body without touching a single cell. Forces, like gravity or energy like light, may pass through empty space, but are not a property of empty space. Although we are protected from the vacuum of empty outer space, by our atmosphere, both the Earth and it’s atmosphere still exist in empty space and travel through it around the sun.