Tamminen wrote: ↑May 31st, 2018, 7:44 am
Consul:
There is very strong scientific evidence that experiential states don't just correlate with, but are both causally and existentially dependent on neural states
It depends on what we mean by causality. A chemical can cause a change in brain functions and, because of the brain/mind correspondence, the change shows itself as a change in consciousness. If we want to extend the concept of causality in this way, I have nothing against it.
Tamminen,
To be fair, you should read one or both of either U.T. Place's or Jack Smart's seminal papers on materialist ("Type") Identity Theory. I have provided the reference for Place's 1956 paper in a post above I sent to Felix. For J.J.C ("Jack") Smart's paper, just google the terms:" J.J.C Smart Sensations and Brain Processes 1959" and your computer will bring up a free access copy.
Both Place and Smart's papers are not lengthy documents, nor are they unreasonably dense in terms of their conceptual content. You could read each of them in 15-20 minutes. This is another good reason for you to have a look them, and then share your thoughts re the merit ( or lack of merit) in the general case they put forward with those physicalists/materialists you are currently challenging on this thread.
Their (Place and Smart's) basic argument is not so much that neurophysiological/neurobiochemical, etc; brain states/events/processes CAUSE phenomenal consciousness - as Consul has indicated in the quotation of his (?) above - but rather that they are IDENTICAL in a strict sense with the experience of diurnal/dream phenomenal consciousness; (in the same strict sense that, for ex, 7 x 7 is necessarily identical with 49), and in the same sense that a bolt of lightening is actually identical with a stream of minute electrically charged particles or a cloud in the sky is, in fact, identical with countless millions of tiny droplets of suspended water molecules in the atmosphere.
You will need to keep an open mind and be ready to use your imagination in order to properly grasp the essence of the argument that Place and Smart are expounding, but that's all.
Regards
Dachshund