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[Consul]

Quantum mechanics has repeatedly demonstrated that there is no extant objective reality.

No, it hasn't.

[Consul]

'Something' is a word, a concept, that denotes something, and for that something to be there it must be possible to refer to it. There cannot be "something" without someone or something for whom or for what that something is. Something in itself does not make sense. It escapes all thinking and imagination. There is always a subject for an object if there is any meaning in saying that the object is. Of course objects are there independent of any individual subject, but not independent of some subject somewhere sometime in the physical spacetime of our universe.

There's a distinction between objects in the psychological sense—objects of thought (perception or imagination or cognition/knowledge)—and ones in the ontological sense—"objects of being" (things). The latter can but needn't be objects in the former sense, i.e. "objects for a subject/subjects".

In short: If I did not exist, there would be nothing, which is absurd, and if there were no subjects, there would be nothing, which is absurd.

There's no absurdity because your conditional statements are false. Ontological objects don't depend for their being on the being of subjects (that think about, perceive or imagine them).

We cannot escape the ontological and methodological starting point of phenomenology: our immediate reality as it appears to us.

Yes, we can. That is to say, the subject matter of ontology or cosmology is not reducible to the subject matter of phenomenology or psychology.

"Cognition [is] not a creation, production or bringing about of the object, as old-school and new-school idealism wants to indoctrinate us, but an apprehension of something that exists prior to all cognition and is independent of it."
[my transl. from German]

(Hartmann, Nicolai. Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. [Foundations of a Metaphysics of Cognition/Knowledge.] 4th ed. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1949. p. 1)

To seek an explanation for the being of consciousness in the objects of consciousness by means of consciousness is a Munchhausen's trick and does not lead anywhere.

??? – There's nothing impossible or inconsistent about a physical realism which assumes that conscious states are brain states and hence physically explainable.

[The Beast]

Life: It is all that exist.
All that exist has the drive towards higher energy states.
Under the right conditions inert forms of life attained a higher state of energy called consciousness.
Human is the present evolving mechanism of consciousness.
In the search for the intrinsic search of a higher energetic state I see three fundamental variables.
1.- The basic necessities of consciousness (energy)
2.- The suffering
3.- The not suffering ()
Consciousness goal is the attainment of a higher energy by the different means or the 3 fundamental variables. Ultimately, it is a return to the energies present at the Big Bang. They may result in the breaking of symmetry (again) or in some other unknown Time in the non-Universal setting.

[Tamminen]

There's a distinction between objects in the psychological sense—objects of thought (perception or imagination or cognition/knowledge)—and ones in the ontological sense—"objects of being" (things). The latter can but needn't be objects in the former sense, i.e. "objects for a subject/subjects".

The being of the objects of thought is dependent on the being of an individual subject, but the being of the "objects of being" is not. However, the being of those objects is dependent on the the fact that there are subjects whose world they belong to. I understand that this is not obvious for everyone, but for me it is as clear as the sky in Helsinki today.

"Cognition [is] not a creation, production or bringing about of the object, as old-school and new-school idealism wants to indoctrinate us, but an apprehension of something that exists prior to all cognition and is independent of it."

I agree, because my standpoint is not subjective idealism. I would say "...an apprehension of something that exists prior to all personal cognition and is independent of it".

There's nothing impossible or inconsistent about a physical realism which assumes that conscious states are brain states and hence physically explainable.

I strongly disagree.

[Consul]

The being of the objects of thought is dependent on the being of an individual subject, but the being of the "objects of being" is not. However, the being of those objects is dependent on the the fact that there are subjects whose world they belong to. I understand that this is not obvious for everyone, but for me it is as clear as the sky in Helsinki today.

Of course, nothing is an (actual) object of thought unless there is at least one subject thinking of it; but it doesn't follow that every object which is an (actual) object of thought depends for its being on being an object of thought. For (actually) being an object of thought doesn't entail necessarily or essentially being one. Of course, the concept of an unthought thought-object is self-contradictory, but the concept of a thought-independent thought-object is not.

There's an important logical difference between

1. Necessarily, if x is an object of thought, then x is an object of thought.
and
2. If x is an object of thought, then, necessarily, x is an object of thought (x is essentially an object of thought).

1 is certainly true, but 2 is not.

I agree, because my standpoint is not subjective idealism. I would say "...an apprehension of something that exists prior to all personal cognition and is independent of it".

But yours is still an "intersubjective idealism", isn't it? For you believe that objects are at least generically existentially dependent on subjects, don't you?

"…a generic notion of existential dependence, defined as follows:

(EDG) x depends_G for its existence upon Fs =_df Necessarily, x exists only if some F exists."

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/depe ... tological/

There's nothing impossible or inconsistent about a physical realism which assumes that conscious states are brain states and hence physically explainable.

I strongly disagree.

Do you have an argument against physical realism?

"Physical realism makes two claims. The first is that the physical world is ontologically independent of the human mind—something whose existence is logically independent of facts about human mentality. I have labelled this its independence claim. The second is that the physical world is something whose existence is philosophically fundamental. I have labelled this its fundamentalist claim. I have tried to set out, in some detail, how these claims are to be understood, and what they do and do not commit the realist to accepting. In particular, I have made it clear that the independence claim is to be understood as applying to the world with respect to every portion of its spatio-temporal spread. And I have made it clear that the fundamentalist claim excludes any kind of reduction of something physical to something non-physical—whether the conceptual (analytical) reduction of certain physical statements to non-physical statements or the constitutive (metaphysical) reduction of certain physical facts to non-physical facts.

Standing in radical opposition to physical realism, and in opposition to both its claims, is the position I have labelled phenomenalistic idealism. This asserts that the physical world is something whose existence is constituted by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of non-physical facts in which such experiential facts centrally feature. The version of phenomenalistic idealism which concerns us—the only version, as I see it, which has any prospect of acceptability—is one that assigns the central constitutive role to what I have termed sensory organization. This organization is the unified system of provisions and constraints that controls the course of human sensory experience and disposes it to conform to its world-suggestive pattern. The central thesis of the relevant form of idealism is that, whether on its own or as part of a richer complex, and in the context of certain endowments of the human mind—endowments that render the mind empirically receptive to the orderly character of its sensory experiences—the sensory organization secures the constitutive creation of the physical world by disposing things to appear systematically worldwise at the human empirical viewpoint, and it logically determines the detailed character of the world by disposing things to appear systematically worldwise in the relevantly specific ways. I shall refer to this version of phenomenalist idealism as canonical idealism (the label indicating that it is the version which I think that the idealist needs to adopt.)"

(Foster, John. A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 123-24)

[Consul]

Do you have an argument against physical realism?

Speaking of arguments against physical realism/for idealism, here's a new book (which I haven't read yet) that might interest you:

Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics

[Dachshund]

There's nothing impossible or inconsistent about a physical realism which assumes that conscious states are brain states and hence physically explainable.

Consul

Regarding Identity Theory, I think there is some strong support for this thesis in recent published research into the pharmacology (i.e. the pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics) of psychotomimetic drugs. I will use LSD-25 as an example.

When doses of, (for example) ,200 mcg of LSD - 25 are given orally to groups of adult research volunteers and a plot of the blood plasma concentrations of LSD in the subjects versus time is then made, the resulting graph is very similar indeed in shape to that of the plot of changes in subjective experience (i.e. the magnitude of changes in phenomenal diurnal consciousness) the drug induces in the volunteers over time.

What I mean is that LSD-25 causes certain changes in phenomenal waking consciousness such as: the experience of unity; audio-visual synsthesiae; heightened levels insightfulness and spirituality; the experience of oceanic boundlessness, the state of blissfulness, feelings of derealisation and depersonalisation, awareness of alterations in the meaning of percepts, and so on. These so-called "psychedelic" effects are known to occur when LSD-25 molecules in the volunteers' plasma attach themselves to 5HT- 2A serotonin receptor sites in the brain. What is interesting is that when reports of the subjective experience of these kind of psychedelic changes in the consciousness of healthy research volunteers are quantified using validated psychometric scales, it has been found that they increase at precisely the same rate as the plasma concentration of the LSD increases after an initial oral dose ( of 200 mcg, for example) is ingested, peak at the time ( i.e. after about 2.5 hours) and then to diminish at very much the same rate that the plasma concentration of the drug does as it is subsequently eliminated from the blood by enzymatic degradation in the liver.

Regards

Dachshund

[The Beast]

There are no categories only energy signatures.
The question of decay is one of change. As such the knowledge of a human or his experience is within many non-existent generations of cells and the present existing cells. By logic, the knowledge of objects belongs to an identity called consciousness which span many generations. The emergent quality of free will allows conscious states to direct the source of the future. It may be one of suppression of suffering and non-suffering with the only aim to higher energies or one of love in the pursue of higher energies or one in the evolution of sin… etc. If no free will then the object of the body is the object of consciousness. On the other hand, the existence of Free Will is the existence of the master of consciousness. The emergence of Free Will allows for individuality and (in one form) as the desire for love and the union with the highest energy state with that signature. However, we (presently) have limitations or boundaries dictated by the nature of our existence. Free Will is the energy signature produced by consciousness responding to the knowledge acquisition of the body. It is the question of: Who is your master?

[Consul]

Regarding Identity Theory, I think there is some strong support for this thesis in recent published research into the pharmacology (i.e. the pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics) of psychotomimetic drugs. I will use LSD-25 as an example.

When doses of, (for example) ,200 mcg of LSD - 25 are given orally to groups of adult research volunteers and a plot of the blood plasma concentrations of LSD in the subjects versus time is then made, the resulting graph is very similar indeed in shape to that of the plot of changes in subjective experience (i.e. the magnitude of changes in phenomenal diurnal consciousness) the drug induces in the volunteers over time.

What I mean is that LSD-25 causes certain changes in phenomenal waking consciousness such as: the experience of unity; audio-visual synsthesiae; heightened levels insightfulness and spirituality; the experience of oceanic boundlessness, the state of blissfulness, feelings of derealisation and depersonalisation, awareness of alterations in the meaning of percepts, and so on. These so-called "psychedelic" effects are known to occur when LSD-25 molecules in the volunteers' plasma attach themselves to 5HT- 2A serotonin receptor sites in the brain. What is interesting is that when reports of the subjective experience of these kind of psychedelic changes in the consciousness of healthy research volunteers are quantified using validated psychometric scales, it has been found that they increase at precisely the same rate as the plasma concentration of the LSD increases after an initial oral dose ( of 200 mcg, for example) is ingested, peak at the time ( i.e. after about 2.5 hours) and then to diminish at very much the same rate that the plasma concentration of the drug does as it is subsequently eliminated from the blood by enzymatic degradation in the liver.

The theoretical, metaphysical problem with these empirically ascertained psychophysical correlations is that they are multiply interpretable; and the facts of your example aren't only compatible with reductive/equative materialism (= the materialistic identity theory) but also e.g. with emergentive/causative materialism, according to which mental/experiential states are brain states, but they are irreducibly different from those neurophysical brain states from which they emerge or which cause/produce them.
Furthermore, psychophysical correlations can even be interpreted both non-reductionistically and non-causalistically/non-interactionistically, i.e. parallelistically, e.g. in terms of Leibniz's divinely pre-established harmony.

[BigBango]

Let us take the case of a world of "physical things". For an example, what was and now is the status of that world of physical things before any consciousness? In Tamminen's relational ontology (I think of myself as an object) objects always have subjects and its subjectivity is primary.

What is obvious, as a Helsinki sky, is that a world that has no consciousness or the potential for evolving consciousness may or may not exist, but it doesn't matter whether it does or does not exist. No matter how big it is it is less important than a thorn or a pebble that might hurt my barefoot when stepped on.

So what about a world that was just physical things, but in a "physicalists' wet dream" could evolve "consciousness". Guess what folks, QM could come to their rescue. What happens to stuff between observations by a subject? That is where Schrodinger comes to the rescue. It seems we do not need pan-psychics because Schrodinger's contribution to QM was to write the formula that describes the evolution of stuff between observations. Between observations the "stuff" changes simply according to classical deterministic laws.

So, to repeat, a world of physical things could exist and evolve according to classical laws. However, unless it evolves consciousness, it will not have any significance.

The point I am trying to make is that Tamminen's thesis may not be true, but if it isn't true then so what. A world of objects as purely physical may be the case but the world of thorns and sharp pebbles that could impede ones journey are what deserve more notoriety and attention than any mighty universe of physical objects with no potential for evolving consciousness.

[Tamminen]

Do you have an argument against physical realism?

The problem with physical realism is the claim for the ontological independence of the physical world. As I have said many times, the being of the world in itself, without the being of a subject for which the world exists, does not make sense to me. This nonsense appears in a simple phenomenological intuition - for me at least. Another intuition says to me that if I did not exist, there would be nothing. This may seem counterintuitive for someone like you, but I am sure it is because you have left your meditations half-way. I assure you that it becomes evident if you refuse to trust your first impression and take a reflective attitude. And this is the insight that logically leads to the metaphysics I have proposed in my posts on this forum: the theory of generic subjective continuity, or subjective interpersonal continuity, which I have found also others like Cycswan seem to support, with a couple of philosophers Cycswan refers to. And this insight with its consequences goes deep into our existential situation. It opens up new horizons for philosophy. But there is this big problem with it: when we understand what it really means, we also understand that we cannot speak of it. It is beyond language.

[Sy Borg]

Dachshund wrote: ↑Today, 7:37 am
Consul,

Let's keep this very simple, OK.

I am in a room in my house and I can see that there is a wooden chair in this room. I now walk out of this room and I can no longer see the chair. Even though I can no longer see the chair, I really do believe it is still in that room. That means for this wooden chair to exist it does not need to be observed by any subject , right ?
Right.

OK, still keeping things simple... Quantum mechanics has repeatedly demonstrated that there is no extant objective reality; that is, that there are LITERALLY no material objects pre-existing in any specific position in space; rather, the fact is that we (with our observing consciousness) each create in the act of observation, our own constantly changing NON-OBJECTIVE reality.

Right?

Size matters. Quantum entities can be in more than one place at one time and tunnel through seemingly impermeable barriers. However, large things cannot.

Do not believe that the nature of the quantum realm is relevant to most human scale activities; it's a common logical error. By the same token human sized entities operate differently to stars, so we can grow as large as we like but we will never reach hydrostatic equilibrium or generate nuclear fusion.

[Karpel Tunnel]

Size matters. Quantum entities can be in more than one place at one time and tunnel through seemingly impermeable barriers. However, large things cannot.

Do not believe that the nature of the quantum realm is relevant to most human scale activities; it's a common logical error. By the same token human sized entities operate differently to stars, so we can grow as large as we like but we will never reach hydrostatic equilibrium or generate nuclear fusion.

I don't know in relation to quantum tunneling, but we do not know the upper limit in relation to superposition - with implications about ontology I would not want to try to wrap my head around...
https://physics.aps.org/articles/v8/6

further quantum effects from the small scale can effect the movements of birds, at the very least, since they affect/or kinda run their magnetic sensing.

It's early days in understanding how the qm stuff is relevant at other scales. Or what it means that the entire foundational make up of the universe functions at the qm level. Statistically in relation to our day to day it experience, it may not matter much. But as far as what is really going on, in contrast to our experience, I don't think we know.

[Sy Borg]

Size matters. Quantum entities can be in more than one place at one time and tunnel through seemingly impermeable barriers. However, large things cannot.

Do not believe that the nature of the quantum realm is relevant to most human scale activities; it's a common logical error. By the same token human sized entities operate differently to stars, so we can grow as large as we like but we will never reach hydrostatic equilibrium or generate nuclear fusion.

I don't know in relation to quantum tunneling, but we do not know the upper limit in relation to superposition - with implications about ontology I would not want to try to wrap my head around...
https://physics.aps.org/articles/v8/6

further quantum effects from the small scale can effect the movements of birds, at the very least, since they affect/or kinda run their magnetic sensing.

It's early days in understanding how the qm stuff is relevant at other scales. Or what it means that the entire foundational make up of the universe functions at the qm level. Statistically in relation to our day to day it experience, it may not matter much. But as far as what is really going on, in contrast to our experience, I don't think we know.

Yes, that's why I qualified with "most human activities" (and ideally would have mentioned the situation with other species, as you mentioned).

I suspect quantum dynamics play a role in consciousness and perhaps many other things, but the main point was that at our scale we are not going to be observed in two places at once, mysteriously appearing on the the other side of seemingly impermeable boundaries or disappearing and reappearing*.



* unless perhaps humans were being viewed from a vantage point as gigantic to us as we are to quanta :)

[BigBango]

Do not believe that the nature of the quantum realm is relevant to most human scale activities; it's a common logical error. By the same token human sized entities operate differently to stars, so we can grow as large as we like but we will never reach hydrostatic equilibrium or generate nuclear fusion.

I have one nitpicking complaint about your characterization of QM. It is not really a "Logical Error" to apply it to the human scale, it is simply a "Pragmatic Error". As objects get bigger QM generally reduces to the classical view, except in the "ontological sense". QM's representation of an unobserved particle is a "wave" of probability distributions, where each point in the probability space is the likelihood that the particle will be found there. As objects get bigger that probability space changes so that there is little probability that the object will be found anywhere not predicted by classical physics. Thus it becomes more pragmatic to use classical physics. However, note that there is a big difference in the ontological implications of QM because it still portrays the large objects as having some teeny probabilities that it will not be where classical physics says it is.

The ontological distinction is a world of larger objects positioned in space by physical law vs. the QM world of objects positioned with a smidgeon of quantum indeterminacy.