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[Consul]

I'm not sure if we're on the same page here and defining these terms in the same way.
My understanding is as follows: Panpsychism is a form of property dualism (In this thread, I'm using the the terms interchangeably). If property dualism (PD) is true, then there is only one substance. People who adhere to PD are monists about substances, but accept property dualism. If property dualism is true, then consciousness is an irreducible property of the universe. If PD, then just as things have mass and length, they also have a consciousness (although simple objects would have a very simple form of consciousness).

Substance dualism (SD) is the theory that there is more than one substance. If SD, then there are physical substances and a mental substances. (or physical stuff and soul stuff). People who believe we have souls believe in SD.

Strictly speaking, substance dualism and substance monism aren't about the number of substances, but about the number of basic kinds of substances. SD says it's 2 (both material ones and spiritual ones), and both materialist and spiritualist SM say it's 1 (either material ones or spiritual ones). Neither SD nor SM says anything about the number of existing (material or spiritual) substances. There might even be infinitely many of them.

[anonymous66]

@Consul
Let me see if I can sum up what you're been saying...
You reject that idea that consciousness is an illusion. You believe that consciousness is just as real as the physical and that consciousness is reducible to the physical. And you believe that your views are consistent with physicalism.

You also believe that although there aren't currently any physicalist theories of mind (TOM) that can explain consciousness, you also believe that only a physicalist TOM will ever be able to explain consciousness.

Is my summation correct?

[Consul]

I meant to say, "If PD then there are mental properties are an irreducible property of the universe". Consciousness is a mental property. If PD then every physical thing has mental properties and is conscious.

There's a distinction between

1. emergentist property dualism [EPD] (according to which mental properties have not always existed in the universe as properties of physical things)

2. fundamentalist property dualism [FPD] (according to which mental properties have always existed in the universe as properties of physical things)

3. "omnipresentist" property dualism [OPD] (panpsychism with "pan-" taken literally, according to which all microscopic physical things and all macroscopic physical things in the universe have mental properties)

Chalmers states that the Greek prefix "pan-" (= "all") needn't be taken literally, so that panpsychists needn't accept OPD:

"Panpsychism, taken literally, is the doctrine that everything has a mind. In practice, people who call themselves panpsychists are not committed to as strong a doctrine. They are not committed to the thesis that the number two has a mind, or that the Eiffel tower has a mind, or that the city of Canberra has a mind, even if they believe in the existence of numbers, towers, and cities.
Instead, we can understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical entities have mental states. For example, if quarks or photons have mental states, that suffices for panpsychism to be true, even if rocks and cities do not have mental states. Perhaps it would not suffice for just one photon to have mental states. The line here is blurry, but we can read the definition as requiring that all members of some fundamental physical types (all photons, for example) have mental states."

(Chalmers, David J. "Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism." In Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, 19-47. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 19)

[Consul]

I am not that familiar with PD. I would say Nagel and Searle are "Duel Aspect" philosophers…

But what exactly is an aspect, ontologically asking? If aspects are just perspectives or points of view, different ways of viewing/regarding/considering things, different ways of thinking about things, or different ways things appear or are perceived, then aspect dualism is compatible with (materialist or spiritualist) property monism. And if aspects aren't just perspectives or points of view, aspect dualism is the same as property dualism.

[Wayne92587]

Consciousness exists as a state of mind, as a level of consciousness which is directly relative to whether or not our knowledge is absolutely Good Knowledge or Absolutely Bad Knowledge, or a combination of the Two.

Absolutely Good Knowledge being monotheistic in Nature.
Absolutely Bad Knowledge being dualistic in Nature, meaning, Absolutely Bad Knowledge is easily mistaken to be absolutely Good Knowledge, Absolutely Bad Known to be the Knowledge of Good and Evil.

Deception, guile-fullness, born of Absolutely Bad Knowledge being the Greatest cause of all unnecessary suffering.

It is very difficult to challenge suffering born of a series of events, that is born of cause and effect, that is in part a natural process.

[anonymous66]

Galen Strawson is a self-declared materialist/physicalist who thinks that "physical" is a natural-kind term:

"[T]here is a strong tension between a descriptively committed use of the term 'physical' and a less descriptively committed, natural-kind-term-like (or, at the limit, proper-name-like) use. The tension is a source of potentially bewildering indeterminacy: it is right that we should be ready to admit the incompleteness of our understanding of the nature of the physical and still feel able to go on talking of the physical—of the physical-whatever-exactly-its-nature. And yet we would presumably go too far if we began to treat 'the physical' as a mere proper name, so that we were indefeasibly correct in asserting the existence of the physical, since the word would now mean 'whatever it is that gives rise to the experiences that we think of as experiences of physical phenomena'."

(Strawson, Galen. Mental Reality. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. p. 55)

It appears to me that Strawson (at least according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) is arguing against emergence and for panpsychism.

More recently, Galen Strawson (2006a) has defended a similar argument from the untenability of radical emergence. Whereas Nagel’s aim is merely to establish the disjunction of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, the conclusion of Strawson’s argument is very definitely the truth of panpsychism. Strawson begins by arguing that radical emergence is upon reflection unintelligible:

Emergence can’t be brute. It is built into the heart of the notion of emergence that emergence cannot be brute in the sense of there being absolutely no reason in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is (so that it is unintelligible even to God). For any feature Y of anything that is correctly considered to be emergent from X, there must be something about X and X alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y (Strawson 2006a: 18)

There are of course cases in which one property arises from another, e.g., liquid arises from individual molecules each of which is not itself liquid. However, in all such cases, Strawson argues, the emergence is perfectly intelligible:

We can easily make intuitive sense of the idea that certain sorts of molecules are so constituted that they don’t bind together in a tight lattice but slide past or off each other (in accordance with van de Waals molecular interaction laws) in a way that gives rise to—is—the phenomenon of liquidity. So too, with Bénard convection cells we can easily make sense of the idea that physical laws relating to surface tension, viscosity, and other forces governing the motion of molecules give rise to hexagonal patterns on the surface of a fluid like oil when it is heated. In both these cases we move in a small set of conceptually homogeneous shape-size-mass-charge-number-position-motion-involving physics notions with no sense of puzzlement…. Using the notion of reduction in a familiar loose way, we can say that the phenomena of liquidity reduce without remainder to shape-size-mass-charge-etc. (Strawson 2006a: 18)

Thus, the crucial feature of intelligible emergence, according to Strawson, is that the relationship between the product of emergence and its producer can be adequately characterized using a single set of conceptually homogeneous concepts. But it’s very hard to see how any set of conceptually homogeneous concepts could capture both the experiential (i.e., consciousness-involving) and the non-experiential (non-conscious-involving), and hence hard to see how the thesis that consciousness emerges from non-consciousness could be rendered intelligible. Strawson argues that it is only by supposing that human and animal consciousness emerges from more basic forms of consciousness, that we have hope of avoiding the emergence of animal consciousness being a brute and inexplicable miracle.

[Consul]

@Consul
Let me see if I can sum up what you're been saying...
You reject that idea that consciousness is an illusion. You believe that consciousness is just as real as the physical and that consciousness is reducible to the physical. And you believe that your views are consistent with physicalism.

You also believe that although there aren't currently any physicalist theories of mind (TOM) that can explain consciousness, you also believe that only a physicalist TOM will ever be able to explain consciousness.

Is my summation correct?

* Yes, I believe that consciousness/experience (as we all know it from our first-person perspective) is real—physically real and really physical. So I am a physicalist about it. Is my physicalism reductionistic or emergentistic? Well, it is (ontologically) reductionistic about all mental properties which aren't experiential/phenomenal ones (= dispositional mental properties [e.g. propositional attitudes] or mental abilities), and it is (ontologically) emergentistic (in a noncausal sense of "emergence") about experiential/phenomenal properties (qualia)—in the sense that qualia are emergent and hence irreducible physical qualities sui generis. However, my physicalistic property dualism is unorthodox, because I think that qualia or "secondary qualities" are second-order physical qualities of primary physical qualities of the brain. Phenomenal qualities (which constitute the subjective qualitative content of experiences) are subjective "gestalt qualities" of (complexes or structures of) objective physical (or chemical) properties instantiated by central nervous systems.

As for the problem of mental causation emergentists are faced with, I think phenomenal properties qua properties of (non-phenomenal and causally non-epiphenomenal) physical properties are intrinsically epiphenomenal. However, they may be said to be extrinsically non-epiphenomenal by "piggybacking" on powerful physical properties (whose properties they are).

* Yes, I'm convinced that if the hard problem of consciousness will be solved at all, and the explanatory gap will be closed at all, it will be solved/closed physicalistically by neuroscience.

[Consul]

It appears to me that Strawson (at least according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) is arguing against emergence and for panpsychism.

That's correct. Strawson thinks that strong or ontological emergence is impossible, and he's actually been arguing for a panpsychistic physicalism (e.g. in the paper "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism"). Many doubt that his position is properly called physicalistic, but even the great David Lewis entertained the possibility of a panpsychistic materialism (without believing in its truth):

"…the very possibility of what I shall call Panpsychistic Materialism. It is often noted that psychophysical identity is a two-way street: if all mental properties are physical, then some physical properties are mental. But perhaps not just some but all physical properties might be mental as well; and indeed every property of anything might be at once physical and mental."

(Lewis, David. "New Work for a Theory of Universals." 1983. Reprinted in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 8-55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 35)

[Consul]

Strawson thinks that strong or ontological emergence is impossible, and he's actually been arguing for a panpsychistic physicalism (e.g. in the paper "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism"). Many doubt that his position is properly called physicalistic…

"…(9) is the simplest hypothesis: all physical stuff is in its fundamental nature wholly experiential in all conditions and in all respects and all the way down. (9) is pure panpsychism. It makes a claim to be the most plausible version of hard-nosed physicalist naturalism. I call it 'pure' because it goes beyond the version of panpsychism according to which all physical stuff has experiential being in addition to nonexperiential being. It's important to see that it's wholly compatible with physics. It leaves everything true in physics untouched."

(Strawson, Galen. "Real Naturalism." In Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self, Etc., 154-176. New York: New York Review Books, 2018. p. 173)

So is and does Berkeley's idealism, which nobody regards as a version of materialism/physicalism. Calling what Strawson calls pure panpsychism a version of materialism/physicalism is absurd indeed, because it's really a version of mentalism/psychicalism, which is the opposite of materialism/physicalism.

[Consul]

That's correct. Strawson thinks that strong or ontological emergence is impossible, and he's actually been arguing for a panpsychistic physicalism (e.g. in the paper "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism").

G. Strawson: Physicalist Panpsychism (draft)

I disagree with Strawson's (alleged) version, but a physicalist panpsychism/panpsychist physicalism is a logical possibility indeed:
All material/physical things (objects/substances) have mental/experiential/phenomenal properties which are either reducible to (in virtue of being composed of/constituted by) or emergent from physical properties of those things.

[BigBango]

Yes, I believe that consciousness/experience (as we all know it from our first-person perspective) is real—physically real and really physical. So I am a physicalist about it. Is my physicalism reductionistic or emergentistic? Well, it is (ontologically) reductionistic about all mental properties which aren't experiential/phenomenal ones (= dispositional mental properties [e.g. propositional attitudes] or mental abilities), and it is (ontologically) emergentistic (in a noncausal sense of "emergence") about experiential/phenomenal properties (qualia)—in the sense that qualia are emergent and hence irreducible physical qualities sui generis. However, my physicalistic property dualism is unorthodox, because I think that qualia or "secondary qualities" are second-order physical qualities of primary physical qualities of the brain. Phenomenal qualities (which constitute the subjective qualitative content of experiences) are subjective "gestalt qualities" of (complexes or structures of) objective physical (or chemical) properties instantiated by central nervous systems.

As for the problem of mental causation emergentists are faced with, I think phenomenal properties qua properties of (non-phenomenal and causally non-epiphenomenal) physical properties are intrinsically epiphenomenal. However, they may be said to be extrinsically non-epiphenomenal by "piggybacking" on powerful physical properties (whose properties they are).

* Yes, I'm convinced that if the hard problem of consciousness will be solved at all, and the explanatory gap will be closed at all, it will be solved/closed physicalistically by neuroscience.

I see Consul that your thesis is quite complicated and I, for that reason, will inch my way through my response.

To simplify my task, let us just consider your position on experiential/phenomenal mental states. First of all I don't think you should write experiential/phenomenal as if those two things were close to being the same thing. I can't imagine them as being similar in any obvious sense. The word "experiential" is used, even in this forum, as something with a "first-person" perspective. "Phenomenal", on the other hand, is usually thought of as a third person view of say a process e.g.. A fire has phenomenal properties that I enjoy while roasting marshmallows. I feel the warmth of the fire on my skin. Apparently then you see a physical, I assume nervous system/brain, producing or instantiating qualia for some other "physical" part of the brain that experiences these qualia like the fire is experienced. That is this little physical self has a third person view of his neurological sensors, his tentacles into the world. Doesn't that remind you of Wittgenstein's clear rejection of a "Humoculous" inside us that has as many metaphysical issues to explain as the one it is purposed to explain. Emergent qualities may be phenomenal but for who? For others? No. For another physical self inside you? No.

You are "Waiting for Godot" as we waited for phlogiston. We found, not phlogiston, but chemistry.

Is there some answer like chemistry dissolved phlogiston? Yes I think so, but that is another thread.

[ReasonMadeFlesh]

The science of consciousness is straight-forward, especially in behavioral terms, but metaphysically it is very mysterious. Nobody really knows why phenomenal consciousness or qualia exist. I think that as soon as I imagine anything existing, even a black darkness, there is still qualia. I think qualia are everything. I am a panpsychist or a neutral monist. There is definitely a monism, but what that "stuff" of the world is, somehow bridging the mind and body together, I know not, yet mental events are just as experiential to the conscious subject as material objects are.

BOTH are spatiotemporal!

[Count Lucanor]

My reasoning goes like this: If it is assumed that the physical is all there is, then consciousness must reduce to the physical and then mental states don't actually exist (they're just chemical reactions).

How do we get from consciousness reduced to the physical to mental states not existing?

[Consul]

I see Consul that your thesis is quite complicated and I, for that reason, will inch my way through my response.
To simplify my task, let us just consider your position on experiential/phenomenal mental states. First of all I don't think you should write experiential/phenomenal as if those two things were close to being the same thing. I can't imagine them as being similar in any obvious sense. The word "experiential" is used, even in this forum, as something with a "first-person" perspective. "Phenomenal", on the other hand, is usually thought of as a third person view of say a process e.g.. A fire has phenomenal properties that I enjoy while roasting marshmallows. I feel the warmth of the fire on my skin. Apparently then you see a physical, I assume nervous system/brain, producing or instantiating qualia for some other "physical" part of the brain that experiences these qualia like the fire is experienced. That is this little physical self has a third person view of his neurological sensors, his tentacles into the world. Doesn't that remind you of Wittgenstein's clear rejection of a "Humoculous" inside us that has as many metaphysical issues to explain as the one it is purposed to explain. Emergent qualities may be phenomenal but for who? For others? No. For another physical self inside you? No.

I do believe in (material) selves or subjects, since where there is experience there must be a subject of it; but I don't believe in homuncular selves or subjects residing in brains. In my view, selves or subjects are simply (animal) organisms (or perhaps only their brains, as some think).

As for the conceptual issue, I do use "experiential property" and "phenomenal property" synonymously. In my understanding, experiential/phenomenal properties aren't properties of objects of perceptual experience (perception) such as a fire, but properties of subjects of experience (or appearance) such as being appeared to warmly by a fire, or of experiences (experiential events/states) [or of appearances (phenomenal events/states)], or of contents of experience, in which case they are higher-order properties of properties of subjects of experience (or of parts of organismic subjects, viz. their brains). The third ontological option corresponds to my view, but I can additionally and alternatively use "experiential/phenomenal property" to refer to properties of subjects rather than of experience-contents. Then, for a subject to have an experiential/phenomenal property is for its brain to instantiate a certain (complex) neurological property with a (higher-order) experiential/phenomenal property.

In any case, all experiential/phenomenal properties are subjective ones, ones necessarily existing in and being experienced by subjects from their first-person or egocentric perspective. A subjectively unexperienced or experience-independent experiential/phenomenal property is a contradiction in terms.

In the philosophy of mind, experiential/phenomenal properties are usually ascribed to experiences qua experiential occurrences (states/events/processes), and rarely to subjects of experience. (Peter Forrest is the only philosopher I know who ascribes qualia to the contents of experience, as I do.) For example, Michael Tye's SEP entry on qualia contains a chapter titled "Which Mental States Possess Qualia?", which question presupposes that the possessors or instantiators of qualia are mental states (or events or processes) rather than their subjects or substrates. However, one can switch from experience talk to subject talk:

"A note on phenomenal properties: It is natural to speak as if phenomenal properties are instantiated by mental states, and as if there are entities, experiences, that bear their phenomenal properties essentially. But one can also speak as if phenomenal properties are directly instantiated by conscious subjects, typing subjects by aspects of what it is like to be them at the time of instantiation. These ways of speaking do not commit one to corresponding ontologies, but they at least suggest such ontologies. In a quality-based ontology, the subject-property relation is fundamental. From this one can derive a subject-experience-property structure, by identifying experiences with phenomenal states (instantiations of phenomenal properties), and attributing phenomenal properties to these states in a derivative sense. In a more complex experience-based ontology, a subject-experience-property structure is fundamental (where experiences are phenomenal individuals, or at least something more than property instantiations), and the subject-property relation is derivative. In what follows, I will sometimes use both sorts of language, and will be neutral between the ontological frameworks."

(Chalmers, David J. "The Content of Phenomenal Concepts." In The Character of Consciousness, 251-275. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 253)

[Consul]

How do we get from consciousness reduced to the physical to mental states not existing?

Only an "eliminative reduction" of the mental to the physical results in a negation of the existence of the mental; a "conservative reduction" doesn't.