Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Spectrum]

Spectrum wrote:

That is my point which I have been arguing strongly, i.e. all ideas of God will ultimately, naturally, necessarily and logically gravitate towards an ontological Being, i.e. a God [Being not person] than which no greater exists. Note St. Anselm, Descartes, Islam's Allah, and others.

But Spinoza's idea of God-or-Nature doesn't gravitate towards any unique ontological being other than nature.True Spinoza's God-or-Nature fits 'than whom nothing is greater '. However Spinoza's God-or-Nature is not a supernatural being who intervenes in history by means of miracles.

'Nature' is always conditioned by the empirical-rational.
Kant even stated, 'nature' is interdependent with humans and do not stand alone independently.

If Spinoza's God is 'Nature' then it must be conditioned by the empirical-rational.
But no one has produced any empirical evidence to justify the Spinozan's God exists.

If it is related to 'nature' it cannot qualify as 'than whom nothing is greater ' as nature is always subjected to infinite regression.

If it is related to 'nature', then we can look for the Spinozan's God as a 'substance' within nature, i.e. the best path is via physics.
Many Hindus claim their God is something like the common 'substance' of 'energy'. Some claim God is like quarks and lately the God particle.
The point here is whatever is inferred from Physics, it is conditioned by a human-made Scientific Framework and System.
Thus if the Spinozan's God is reasoned related to 'Nature' and out of Physics [Science] then it is ultimately a human-made thing.

Since the Spinozan's God via 'nature' is reduced to a human-made thing, it make no sense as a God per se. If one insist, then bring the empirical evidence to prove such a God exists.

Ultimately the Spinozan's God [albeit not as crude] arose out of psychological impulses related to the existential crisis to provide the necessary sliver of consonance.

[Spectrum]

You know the more I read about people's definitions of God the less clearly I can myself define god.

Note my response to Belindi re God is defined ultimately as 'God is a Being than which no greater can exists'.

The basis is psychological and emotional, the mind will be driven ultimately to the above definition of God when any deficiency of the theists' present definition is highlighted.

Note Trump's 'my button is much bigger and more powerful than his' and this is happening most especially in grade school grounds. And such primal instinct is most active and necessary within theism to enable psychological existential security.

[Spectrum]

I do not think it is argued that God objectively exists in the sense of being a finite bundle of perceptions, that everyone will share.

This is exactly the case.

Both theologians and philosophers tend to shy away from any mention of religious experience being a major contributor to religion all over the globe because of its subjective nature. Yet, in spite of Spectrum's neverending tirade, there is a large body of empirical scientific studies demonstrating the validity of religious experience as an actual experience of something, and the effects of having such experiences are indicative of something actually experienced.

There are two basic types of sensation: (1) the sense of the numinous: the understanding that there is something transcendent and “sacred” afoot in the universe. This is usually communicated through a sense of the totality of love embodied in a sense of an all-pervasive presence. (2) Undifferentiated unity: the sense that all differentiation of being is illusory and all things are actually one. The former is predominant in the West and the latter in the East. As a panentheist, I suggest that both are right.

What is experienced in the above cases are merely effects of brain activities and not of something that is independent of the self and brain.

I have pointed out the above experiences are common with mental illnesses, brain damage, stressed brain, and
the above experiences can be repeated with drugs, hallucinogen, chemicals, electrical stimulations, meditation [long term], and others.

Obviously what is evidenced is more likely than what is merely speculated.
In addition I have provided arguments such speculations are moot and non-starters.

If insist, bring the evidence to justify God exists within an empirical-rational reality or other verifiable circumstances?

[Spectrum]

(buzzer) sorry, there is no study demonstrating the objective existence of subjective experience.

In anticipation, I have done very extensive research into this area since long ago.
There are many sources.
One of the more famous researcher is Andrew Newberg.

Dr. Andrew Newberg is a neuroscientist who studies the relationship between brain function and various mental states. He is a pioneer in the neurological study of religious and spiritual experiences, a field known as “neurotheology.” His research includes taking brain scans of people in prayer, meditation, rituals, and trance states, in an attempt to better understand the nature of religious and spiritual practices and attitudes.
http://www.andrewnewberg.com/

Is God only in our brain?
Our research indicates that our only way of comprehending God, asking questions about God, and experiencing God is through the brain.
But whether or not God exists “out there” is something that neuroscience cannot answer.
For example, if we take a brain image of a person when she is looking at a picture, we will see various parts of the brain being activated, such as the visual cortex. But the brain image cannot tell us whether or not there actually is a picture “out there” or whether the person is creating the picture in her own mind.

To a certain degree, we all create our own sense of reality. Getting at what is really real is the tricky part.

[Spectrum]

But we do not think the concept of a chair objectively exists, not in the sense that all our perceptions of it are very similar. On the contrary, the concept of a chair is free of any particular perception i.e. my concept of a chair can be any colour, any size and so on. In fact the concept of a chair is very fuzzy round the edges; e.g. is any object used as a chair a chair, can something be both a table and a chair, etc.?

I would say the same is true of the concept of God. I do not think it is argued that God objectively exists in the sense of being a finite bundle of perceptions, that everyone will share.

I tend to be more sympathetic to God as a concept because I do not feel that it is stranger than any of the other concepts we are obliged to use to make sense of the world.

Kant differentiated between ideas and concepts.

Concepts are mental conceptions that has an empirical basis linked to experiences and the senses, and are rationalized with the understanding [reason and intellect].

Ideas [philosophical] are thoughts that are rationalized and idealized via pseudo basis and do not contain any empirical elements [known and possible] at all.
There are only three extra-ordinary philosophical ideas that are empirically-rationally impossible, i.e. 1. God, 2. Soul, 3. The Total Universe [created by a God].

These 3 philosophical ideas are illusory and an impossibility within empirical-rational reality. They are only possible within thoughts rising from pseudo-rationality.

OP: Why Believe in a God when It is Impossible to Prove?
These ideas I asserted arose out of psychological impulses and reasons and are only useful for psychological reasons.
Whilst the idea of God is useful psychologically, it is double-edged and as evident had caused a history of terrible evils and violence within the history of mankind. It is also a critical threat to humanity in the future.

As responsible citizens of humanity we need to address the above issues.

[Londoner]

Me: But you do believe in something. If your own belief is not 'illusory' and exists 'in the empirical-rational reality' you never spell out how you know this.

Why not?

My belief 'God is an Impossibility' is not within the empirical-rational reality, it is purely rational only, i.e. based on 'refined' reasoning. What I have done is to prove the theses 'God is possible' and God is possible within empirical rational reality' are false. In this case, I have shown the thesis 'God is possible' is moot and a non-starter. How I "know" is based on the Framework and System of logic and rationality.

The point here, the thesis 'God is possible' cannot even pass abductively as a thesis to be considered for empirical-rational testing.
If one jump to made an empirical claim, God exists, then bring the empirical evidences to justify it.

My belief that the idea of God arose from psychological factors is based on empirical evidences. I have not proven it conclusively but the evidences do give us a clue and doubts whether God is ever possible within the empirical-rational reality.

You repeat your conclusions, but do not give your reasons.

What clues you do drop raise a number of questions. For example, I do not understand how you can 'know' something 'based on the Framework and System of logic and rationality'. Logic deals with the relationship between propositions, it cannot deliver facts. Facts are empirical.

Elsewhere you write of 'empirical-rational reality'. I have no idea what you mean by this. As I say above, empirical relates to experience, and as such it is distinguished from the 'rational' because the rational deals with concepts. Now it may be you have your own theory about the nature of experience, and you may mean something particular by 'rational', but as it stands I cannot make sense of it.

'Justified true knowledge' is always conditioned upon 'personal conviction', i.e.

• 1. Personal conviction - based on one's own internal Framework and System.
  2. Justified true knowledge - based on the intersubjective consensus of collective personal convictions with a specific Framework and System

Again, where is the argument? All you give are two (doubtful) definitions.

Example: Einstein surely had a personal conviction his E=MC2 is true but it was not a scientific speculative theory until there was sufficient intersubjective consensus of collective personal convictions among his peers. It was only scientific knowledge when his accepted speculated theory was proven with empirical evidence and rationalized within the specific scientific Framework and System based on intersubjective consensus of collective personal convictions among his peers.

The important bit there is the empirical evidence. The reason an 'intersubjective consensus' about Einstein arose was that everyone could do the experiments.

For Philosophy sake, we need to be mindful how Justified True Beliefs are linked to an intersubjective consensus of personal convictions within a specified system.

How do you mean 'linked'? Suppose we had a 'justified true belief'. Then it is certainly likely that people would believe it. But they would believe it because they thought it was true. They would not think it had become true because they believed it.

Nope I am not relying on the personal conviction based on pure faith and very strong primal psychological impulses like the theist.
My basis is using refined reason [prefrontal cortical] to counter the pseudo-reason of the theists.

We can only judge whether that is right if you produce the reasoning. You talk about your reasoning, about how good it is, but never give it.

Me: So let us take something very basic. From your criticisms of others, you seem to believe that right and wrong (in the moral sense) are meaningful judgments. Why do you think this? Is there something 'in the empirical-rational reality'' that makes such judgments meaningful? Or are your opinions based on 'personal conviction'? That they simply feel that way to you, and that you find it hard to believe that everyone else would not feel the same way.

I am not sure of your point above.
My belief is, an efficient Moral and Ethical Framework and System must be guided [not enforced] by absolute moral laws...

It is interesting that you cannot follow the question. You jump straight into your own beliefs about morality and 'absolute moral laws' without having considered the nature of moral judgments. Yes, I know you have this 'belief' but your belief is not an argument. You need to be able to show that your belief is better than any other belief. That depends on showing why any moral judgement is meaningful.

That is what I asked you. Unless you can explain what you think are the nature of moral judgments, then your pronouncements about 'moral laws' are built on sand.

[Londoner]

Kant differentiated between ideas and concepts.

Concepts are mental conceptions that has an empirical basis linked to experiences and the senses, and are rationalized with the understanding [reason and intellect].

If he did, then he was having an off day since that word 'linked' begs the question. (But he didn't.)

Ideas [philosophical] are thoughts that are rationalized and idealized via pseudo basis and do not contain any empirical elements [known and possible] at all.

That is just defining 'Ideas' as wrong/'pseudo'. I think I can see where this is going.

There are only three extra-ordinary philosophical ideas that are empirically-rationally impossible, i.e. 1. God, 2. Soul, 3. The Total Universe [created by a God].

These 3 philosophical ideas are illusory and an impossibility within empirical-rational reality. They are only possible within thoughts rising from pseudo-rationality.

So the entire argument is (a) All 'ideas' are wrong. (b) God etc. is an 'idea'. (c) Therefore God is wrong.

[Londoner]

"There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is but a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the fact of our own life, than the common-sense hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations." -- Bertrand Russell

But how does that hypothesis 'account for the fact of our own life'?

That there may be 'objects independent of us' would not account for anything in our own life - if they are indeed 'independent of us'. In fact, these 'objects' seem to have the contradictory nature of simultaneously being part of our lives, in that they 'cause our sensations', yet are simultaneously entirely independent of us.

So what can we say about these 'objects'? Nothing derived from our sensations, since the nature of these objects is that are independent of our sensations. So, any sensations not only fail to tell us anything about the objects, but we know that anything they appear to tell us must be wrong. (Since any experienced sensation we have must involves both us and the object, therefore it cannot be identical to that object).

So I do not see how suggesting that there are 'objects', of which we can know nothing, is a hypothesis at all. Since we can know nothing about what these 'objects' might be in themselves, they might still be dreams, deities or whatever (assuming such distinctions are meaningful in the world of those 'objects'). Indeed, why not forget the objects altogether and say that there are nothing except 'sensations', with no need for this metaphysical substrata? Far from 'accounting for the fact of our own life', the hypothesis of their existence makes no difference at all.

[Tamminen]

That there may be 'objects independent of us' would not account for anything in our own life - if they are indeed 'independent of us'. In fact, these 'objects' seem to have the contradictory nature of simultaneously being part of our lives, in that they 'cause our sensations', yet are simultaneously entirely independent of us.

So what can we say about these 'objects'? Nothing derived from our sensations, since the nature of these objects is that are independent of our sensations. So, any sensations not only fail to tell us anything about the objects, but we know that anything they appear to tell us must be wrong. (Since any experienced sensation we have must involves both us and the object, therefore it cannot be identical to that object).

So I do not see how suggesting that there are 'objects', of which we can know nothing, is a hypothesis at all. Since we can know nothing about what these 'objects' might be in themselves, they might still be dreams, deities or whatever (assuming such distinctions are meaningful in the world of those 'objects'). Indeed, why not forget the objects altogether and say that there are nothing except 'sensations', with no need for this metaphysical substrata? Far from 'accounting for the fact of our own life', the hypothesis of their existence makes no difference at all.

Our immediate reality, immanence, or consciousness, is such that it has always a relation to transcendence, objects "out there", but we can never say what those objects are like. We can make good and exact descriptions of them, like modern physics with its amazingly accurate theories, but nevertheless they are just descriptions of how objects appear to us. So it is true that in this sense it is meaningless to speak of the nature of objects as they are "in themselves". But if there were no objects, we would not exist either. And if we did not exist, there would be no objects. So the subject-object relation is ontologically fundamental.

[SimpleGuy]

Pehaps we will receive the answer from the one who is capable to open the scroll, in the bible revelation 5.
It's standing there:
5 Then I saw in the right hand of him who sat on the throne a scroll with writing on both sides and sealed with seven seals. 2 And I saw a mighty angel proclaiming in a loud voice, “Who is worthy to break the seals and open the scroll?” 3 But no one in heaven or on earth or under the earth could open the scroll or even look inside it. 4 I wept and wept because no one was found who was worthy to open the scroll or look inside. 5 Then one of the elders said to me, “Do not weep! See, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, has triumphed. He is able to open the scroll and its seven seals.”

[SimpleGuy]

I think, the person's then worth giving the answer at least for a simple person like me.

[SimpleGuy]

I said this , to drop a hint, what was truly meant by me. I cannot be understood directly.

[Rationalbenny]

Interesting question but then again I can create a parallel saying what is the necessity of postulating the existence of cosmic evolution if its origin remains unintuitive.
Secondly the existence of God can be substantiated through the disprove of evolution little something called reductive reasoning and if you are tempted to ask because of the laws of continuity where does God come from then you really are not being rational because anyone rational would realise that the perfect explanation of creation is an explanation that does not need an explanation otherwise the preliminary becomes superflous.

[Steve3007]

I suppose there are probably as many definitions of the word "God" as there are people. But this isn't surprising, given that things with consistent, invariant definitions tend to be things which generate similar perceptions in different people. A chair, for example, is a well defined and agreed concept because all of the individual perceptions that result in different people believing in the objective existence of the chair are very similar. Whereas there are a wide variety of perceptions and feelings that lead people to believe in the objective existence of a thing they call God. Different people have widely varying life experiences and feelings which they attribute to the existence of God.

Maybe there should be 7 billion different words for it, instead of the few that there are!

But we do not think the concept of a chair objectively exists, not in the sense that all our perceptions of it are very similar. On the contrary, the concept of a chair is free of any particular perception i.e. my concept of a chair can be any colour, any size and so on. In fact the concept of a chair is very fuzzy round the edges; e.g. is any object used as a chair a chair, can something be both a table and a chair, etc.?

To decide whether I agreed with your first sentence (above) I'd have to first define what I understand by "objectively exists". To me, the only way to define "objectivity" that is solid enough to mean anything tangible is by considering the things that various perceptions have in common. If a concept is useful in tieing together a sufficient number of different perceptions, experienced by various people, then I would regard it as objective, but with the knowledge that "sufficient number" is a variable, perhaps arbitrary, quantity.

The concept of a chair may be fuzzy, and it may not be possible to link it to one perception or reliably define the finite set of perceptions to which it is linked, but it does derive from perceptions. If nobody had ever perceived a chair then (I think it's reasonable to suppose) the concept of a chair wouldn't exist. For the concept of a chair to exist, I think it must represent a common factor in some perceptions, even if we can't precisely define what that common factor is. Your concept of a chair may indeed be any colour, size etc, but in order to exist at all, it must represent something which chair-perceptions have in common. So I think it's reasonable to class "the concept of a chair" as objective.

I would say the same is true of the concept of God. I do not think it is argued that God objectively exists in the sense of being a finite bundle of perceptions, that everyone will share.

I don't think "objectively exists" means "is a finite bundle of perceptions". To me it means something more like "is a useful common characteristic linking various perceptions" with the proviso that it's not necessarily possible to precisely list the perceptions and the thing that they have in common.

I think a lot of people do assert that God objectively exists. And I think one reason why they do that is because other people do it. So think there is a strong sense in which the God concept is indeed the common factor in various different perceptions and is purported to exist objectively for that reason. These may not be just external sensory perceptions (sight, sound, etc). They may be feelings people get by introspecting and then discuss with others.

Impossible to answer but perhaps interesting question: If an individual had never shared/compared his/her experiences with any other person, could they believe in the objective existence of anything that we would recognize as God?

[Spectrum]

My belief that the idea of God arose from psychological factors is based on empirical evidences. I have not proven it conclusively but the evidences do give us a clue and doubts whether God is ever possible within the empirical-rational reality.

You repeat your conclusions, but do not give your reasons.

What clues you do drop raise a number of questions.

I have given many examples of evidence to support my point many times in previous posts.

Here is one empirical evidence among [potentially thousands] to the clue and doubts;

I have also mentioned the 'experiences of God' also arose is many from mental illness, brain damage. These are also repeatable in great % within drugs, hallucinogen, chemicals, electrical/waves stimulation and others.

For example, I do not understand how you can 'know' something 'based on the Framework and System of logic and rationality'. Logic deals with the relationship between propositions, it cannot deliver facts. Facts are empirical.

Note I emphasized 'know' i.e. whatever that can be 'known' are always conditioned upon its specific Framework and System, e.g. Science.

I understand pure logic do not rely on empirical evidence.

Elsewhere you write of 'empirical-rational reality'. I have no idea what you mean by this. As I say above, empirical relates to experience, and as such it is distinguished from the 'rational' because the rational deals with concepts. Now it may be you have your own theory about the nature of experience, and you may mean something particular by 'rational', but as it stands I cannot make sense of it.

Empiricism itself is not totally credible [Hume's Problem of induction, empirical illusions, etc.]. Note the issue re Empiricism versus Rationalism.
Rationalism by itself is also not totally credible, and this was how Kant was awoken from his dogmatic slumber on Rationalism. Illusions can also arise from reasons [when mind is deceived]
To ensure knowledge [empirical] is more credible, one need to use reasoning power to understand [use intellect and reason] its limits, refine its processes, state assumptions, etc.

Thus to ensure credibility on knowledge re 'reality' we need basically empirical evidence which must be organized and processed with refined reasonings. This is what I would called the empirical-rational reality.

'Justified true knowledge' is always conditioned upon 'personal conviction', i.e.

• 1. Personal conviction - based on one's own internal Framework and System.
  2. Justified true knowledge - based on the intersubjective consensus of collective personal convictions with a specific Framework and System

Again, where is the argument? All you give are two (doubtful) definitions.

I have regarded the above as self-explanatory.
How else is personal conviction other than from one internal thoughts?
Justified true beliefs [= knowledge] involved personal convictions and agreements among the specific group. What else?

Example: Einstein surely had a personal conviction his E=MC2 is true but it was not a scientific speculative theory until there was sufficient intersubjective consensus of collective personal convictions among his peers. It was only scientific knowledge when his accepted speculated theory was proven with empirical evidence and rationalized within the specific scientific Framework and System based on intersubjective consensus of collective personal convictions among his peers.

The important bit there is the empirical evidence. The reason an 'intersubjective consensus' about Einstein arose was that everyone could do the experiments.

Now you agree there is an essential intersubjective element within Scientific knowledge. This meant scientific knowledge is conditioned with subjects. It is the same with all other knowledge.

For Philosophy sake, we need to be mindful how Justified True Beliefs are linked to an intersubjective consensus of personal convictions within a specified system.

How do you mean 'linked'? Suppose we had a 'justified true belief'. Then it is certainly likely that people would believe it. But they would believe it because they thought it was true. They would not think it had become true because they believed it.

You got is wrong. The point is all justified true beliefs [intersubjective consensus] always begin with some individual[s] personal conviction.
A personal conviction [belief] no matter how much one believe it is true cannot be JTB until it is subjected to testing, reproducibility and other requirements within a F&S [Framework and System].

Nope I am not relying on the personal conviction based on pure faith and very strong primal psychological impulses like the theist.
My basis is using refined reason [prefrontal cortical] to counter the pseudo-reason of the theists.

We can only judge whether that is right if you produce the reasoning. You talk about your reasoning, about how good it is, but never give it.

You missed the 500 pounds gorilla in this case.
I have given my reasonings many times all over the place.

Me: So let us take something very basic. From your criticisms of others, you seem to believe that right and wrong (in the moral sense) are meaningful judgments. Why do you think this? Is there something 'in the empirical-rational reality'' that makes such judgments meaningful? Or are your opinions based on 'personal conviction'? That they simply feel that way to you, and that you find it hard to believe that everyone else would not feel the same way.

I am not sure of your point above.
My belief is, an efficient Moral and Ethical Framework and System must be guided [not enforced] by absolute moral laws...

It is interesting that you cannot follow the question. You jump straight into your own beliefs about morality and 'absolute moral laws' without having considered the nature of moral judgments. Yes, I know you have this 'belief' but your belief is not an argument. You need to be able to show that your belief is better than any other belief. That depends on showing why any moral judgement is meaningful.

That is what I asked you. Unless you can explain what you think are the nature of moral judgments, then your pronouncements about 'moral laws' are built on sand.
[/quote]
Yes, whatever I have stated is my personal beliefs [conviction] and I have always presented my arguments to support my personal convictions.
I have presented my arguments re absolute moral laws in the 'Ethics and Morality' section of this forum. If I am mistaken we could have gone through this argument in the past before.