Renee wrote:Untruths, ab ovo, ought not to be fascinating to philosophers.
If you are a philosopher who is only interested in amassing a hoard of (supposedly) true propositions, then yes, untruths ought not to be fascinating to you. But if you are a philosopher who wants to go deeper and further, then you will have to ask the following questions and more:
1) Is truth prior to being, is being prior to truth, or is neither prior to the other?
2) If being is prior to truth, then what is truth?
3) Is there something prior to truth, and if yes, what is it and how is it prior to truth?
4) Is truth objective or subjective?
5) Is there something beyond the dichotomy of truth and falsehood, and if yes, what?
6) Why is truth so fundamental to our thinking?
These questions will necessarily lead you to contemplate things before and/or beyond truth (e.g. to answer the second part of question 5). Also, if the answer to question 4 is “subjective” or if you cannot answer that question (yet), you may have to deal with what you are not sure to be objectively true.
Let us now consider a real-world example of why fascination with the (possibly or supposedly) untrue is not only a self-purpose justified by the beauty of some concepts, but also very useful for progress. Before the discovery and subsequent experimental evidence for general relativity, it was widely believed that space is Euclidean. Non-Euclidean geometry would consequently have been considered untrue. However, that did not bother some mathematicians whose fascination with the pure concept of non-Euclidean geometry motivated their work in that field regardless of whether actual space is Euclidean or not. That fascination had very fortunate consequences, for hadn’t it been for those mathematicians’ work on non-Euclidean geometry, Einstein could not have developed his general theory of relativity, from which it follows that actual space is non-Euclidean, contrary to earlier beliefs. The latter would ultimately prove to be correct and now is a main pillar of contemporary physics, arguably the most important intellectual discipline for scientific and technological progress.
Renee wrote:When someone finds a god-concept fascinating, and their consideration is impervious to all the reasons in the world, then skepticism is incapable of showing the way to the truth.
But to have a dogmatic conviction runs against the principles of skepticism.
Talking about fascination, fascination with a God-concept can spur on our thinking. For example, considering the omnipotence paradox forces us to think outside the box of logic. That positive effect is independent of whether or not there actually is an omnipotent entity.
If there is truth (and that is by no means certain), then skepticism is very good at showing the way to it because a skeptic refuses to accept dogmata which are obstacles on the road to truth. For example, if nobody had doubted the geocentric model and ancient creation myths, would we have the scientifically very useful and important theories of modern cosmology and evolution?