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[EMTe]

Well, the problem is internet.

Internet created sort of invisible wall between logical linguistic arguments and real life persons having emotions, troubles etc. Internet hypes abstractions created during our proto-language period to unforeseen levels, but everything happening within internet remains abstraction anyway, whenever you leave it you get punched and kicked by reality.

In the past, philosophers were elitary persons. They, usuaally, came from aristocracy - they had enough money and social position to turn their lives into one huge depressing reflection. But they were sort of natural outcasts. Today everybody is outcasted, due to individualist approach. But what was individual in the past (and natural) is no longer natural today - people purposefully create imaginary outcasted personas (take Facebook for example, teenage girls love to call themselves drunk bitches - both drunkenness and being a prostitute was negative in the past) to take part in the rat race.

My point is, people nowadays argue not because they look for any kind of collective truth or personal truth, but because of no longer consciously controlled pursuit for individualism. Basically, it looks like this: even if you agree with somebody at some point, you automatically create another problem to argue because you fear that you will be considered somebody's servant/pupil/minion/called a child/called a virgin/you'll go down a social ladder. Whatever you considered your goal when you began to argue is no longer a goal because you're now lost in the ocean of interpersonal relations. In the end only war remains, after some time you completely forget what you wanted to achieve in the first time, only the war counts.

Sorry for bad English, but I have powerful emotions to express and I have to do it within a short period of available time.

[Belinda]

Londoner, thanks for the précis of what you and Fafner have been discussing. It's true that not every discussion can include agreement concerning some basic matter such as "Is formal logic like maths of like carefully reasoned speech?"

I note that you think it is like maths. I think so too, but then I think that maths is abstracted from language. For instance the maths of base 2 depends upon the exclusive either/or. Much of our speech is concerned with analysing life situations with the help of heuristic models. For instance "Would action abc be good or bad?" This little question is transformed into synthetic statement when for instance the reply comes " yes, it would be good to do abc if and only if it benefits the persons or animals etc. concerned."

Or "Action abc was bad!" (analytic because of the presumption that any middle is excluded) . The exclamation is transformed into a synthetic proposition when the reply comes " I agree that it was bad not only because it was illegal, which it was, but more importantly because the innocent shopkeeper lost due to your theft."

I have become puzzled as to what a priori knowledgecould possibly be. Is it right to call a priori logical claims "knowledge" ? I doubt it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EMTe , you have caused me to introspect regarding why I do philosophy. Is it silly chitchat? Sometimes it is silly chitchat when I do philosophy. However please remember that having fun also can contribute to learning. Actually I do find new vistas, consolation, and challenges from doing philosophy not only here in philosophyclub but also reading some book by some eminent philosopher, reading the Bhagavad Gita, and reading a modern novel all of which I am doing these days and from all of which I can glean new vistas, consolations or challenges. Even walking the dog can let me start thinking philosophy.

EMTe, reading yours above this one, I wondered what it would be like for you if you became a hermit, say, forcibly marooned on a desert island. Then you would free from those annoying social pressures to conform. Personally I am too old by far to bother about social pressures to conform, so thanks for reminding me of this consolation for old age.

[Londoner]

Sorry for bad English, but I have powerful emotions to express and I have to do it within a short period of available time.

You put across your views very well.

I think that in these discussions we often betray our impatience when the other person seems unwilling to accept an obvious point. Sometimes we get stuck there. But often, either at the time or later when reflecting on 'what I should have said' we come to understand the reason for our mutual incomprehension - where each argument was really rooted.

I also think that when we come to know other contributors we feel free to try an argument out, like chess players testing a new permutation in a game opening that both sides know well. There isn't always an emotional need to 'win'.

And also, we tend to reply in what we think is an appropriate style. If the other party makes fun of us, we do it back. (I have often been struck by the level of crude insult incorporated in legal and theological arguments by historical philosophers, but in their age this was seen as a perfectly acceptable way of adorning a complex argument.) Of course, as in normal life we misjudge the tone and offend, but I find that when people declare they have been offended then the other party is always ready to apologise.

And yes, you are quite right, if my wife has given me a hard time I might react by finding something to beat somebody up about on these Philosophy Boards. But generally, I am optimistic. Even over a detached medium like the internet, people don't like unresolved conflict. At some point our anger is exhausted and we find we want to build bridges, to reach some sort of resolution in human terms - even though we can never resolve the philosophical problem.

[Consul]

"Consider empiricists who claim to know this to be true: 'There is no synthetic a priori knowledge.' This statement itself would have to represent synthetic a priori knowledge. For the statement is synthetic (it is not true by virtue of how we defined the terms 'synthetic' and 'a priori'—and it is not self-contradictory to deny). And it would have to be known a priori (since surely we cannot know it on the basis of sense experience). So the empiricists' claim would be synthetic a priori knowledge—the very thing it rejects."

(Gensler, Harry J. The A to Z of Logic. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006. pp. 3-4)

[Londoner]

Re: Consul's quote (above)

I think this uses the term 'knowledge' in an ambiguous way. We can think that there are objects, so there is something that is potentially 'knowable'. These objects can cause our experiences, so we have knowledge that results from those objects. But what we can't prove is that our experiences represent reliable knowledge of the reality of those objects.

The quote explains 'a priori' as knowledge not obtained through sense experience, but that is not quite right. It is also knowledge that must be correct, because its negation would be self-contradictory. To note that we cannot experience the world except through the medium of our senses and minds is not to argue a priori, it is to make an empirical observation.

So; 'There is no synthetic a priori knowledge' is surely to be understood as 'there is no empirical proposition that could not potentially be negated'.

More technically, the argument is a bit suspect in that it misleads us right from the beginning by saying '...empiricists who claim to know this to be true'. If it is going to claim this, then we would need to know what those empiricists' understanding of 'true' would be. For example, I might say 'There is no synthetic a priori knowledge' and mean that there is no example of it; but that would not be the same thing as saying it is impossible. And in the case of some empiricists they would say 'There is no synthetic a priori knowledge' because they disagreed that there were any a priori truths at all! So to just invite us to 'Consider empiricists' is to set up something of a straw man.

[Mlw]

Most philosophers deny that a priori truths exist, because they are only tautological. Moreover, I believe that Gödel's proof that there are inherent limitations of axiomatic systems, has caused the belief in transcendental everlasting logical truths to fade. An axiomatic system cannot demonstrate its own consistency, nor can a finitary consistency proof for mathematics ever be created. So it's like we are only inventing a new board game when we think we are doing transcendental logic. We invent rules that must be accepted ad hoc, and then we start playing the game. That's what we are doing: playing games. Kantian philosophy is such a game, following certain "house rules". /Mats

[Consul]

Most philosophers deny that a priori truths exist, because they are only tautological.

David Bourget and David J. Chalmers: What Do Philosophers Believe? (2013)

"Abstract: What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on thirty central philosophical issues.…"

"1. A priori knowledge: yes 71.1%; no 18.4%; other 10.5%."
…
4. Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes 64.9%; no 27.1%; other 8.1%."
(p. 14)

-- Updated May 21st, 2014, 3:33 pm to add the following --

Re: Consul's quote (above)
I think this uses the term 'knowledge' in an ambiguous way.

No, it doesn't. We're only talking about propositional knowledge (knowledge-that).

The quote explains 'a priori' as knowledge not obtained through sense experience, but that is not quite right. It is also knowledge that must be correct, because its negation would be self-contradictory.

Knowledge entails truth, since you cannot know that p if p is false. (In this case, you can only know that ~p.)

To note that we cannot experience the world except through the medium of our senses and minds is not to argue a priori, it is to make an empirical observation.

We certainly cannot experience the world in a nonexperiential way, nonempirically; but the question is whether experience is our only source of knowledge. And this question is not decidable empirically, in terms of observations or perceptions alone, because the empirical data don't eliminate the possibility that some propositions are knowable nonempirically.

So; 'There is no synthetic a priori knowledge' is surely to be understood as 'there is no empirical proposition that could not potentially be negated'.

If by "empirical proposition" you mean "contingent/non-necessary proposition", then you can negate such propositions (concerning matters of fact in Hume's sense) without contradicting yourself. However, this is not what "There is no synthetic a priori knowledge" means. It means that all synthetic knowledge is based on or derived from experience.

More technically, the argument is a bit suspect in that it misleads us right from the beginning by saying '...empiricists who claim to know this to be true'. If it is going to claim this, then we would need to know what those empiricists' understanding of 'true' would be.

The correspondence theory of truth is neutral between empiricism and rationalism, so we don't have to distinguish between "empiricist truth" and "rationalist truth".

For example, I might say 'There is no synthetic a priori knowledge' and mean that there is no example of it; but that would not be the same thing as saying it is impossible. And in the case of some empiricists they would say 'There is no synthetic a priori knowledge' because they disagreed that there were any a priori truths at all!

Strictly speaking, there is a difference between the non-modal statement "There is no synthetic a priori knowledge" and the modal statement "There can be no synthetic a priori knowledge"; but when empiricists utter the former, they mean to say that there isn't any such knowledge because there cannot be any such knowledge. They do not mean to say that we happen to lack such knowledge at present but might acquire such knowledge in the future. They mean to say that we are in principle incapable of acquiring synthetic a priori knowledge. All empiricists agree with this. But some of them go one step further and also deny the possibility of analytic a priori knowledge. Let's call this group the radical empiricists. The other group are the moderate empiricists, who acknowledge the possibility (and actuality) of analytic a priori knowledge at least.

So to just invite us to 'Consider empiricists' is to set up something of a straw man.

No, simply because the argument draws a logically valid conclusion from the authentic principle of empiricism.

"Empiricism may be defined as the assertion 'all synthetic knowledge is based on experience.'"
(p. 437)

"…We can now sum up our conclusions as to the degree of truth in the doctrine that all our synthetic knowledge is based on experience. In the first place, this doctrine, if true, cannot be known, since it is a universal proposition of just the sort that experience alone cannot prove. This does not prove that the doctrine is not true; it proves only that it is either false or unknowable. This argument, however, may be regarded as logic-chopping; it is more interestig to inquire more positively into the sources of our knowledge. All particular facts that are known without inference are known by perception or memory, that is to say, through experience. In this respect, the empiricist principle calls for no limitation."
(p. 445)

(Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. 1948. Reprint, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.)

[Wayne92587]

Re: Is a priori knowledge possible?

EMTe Post Number:#172 PostMay 17th, 2014, 1:18 pm

"Are you some sort of fundamentalist Christian troll? "

No EMTe, I am a sworn Infidel!!!

I am an Atheist that believes in God.

Hermes Trismegistus Keeper of the Holy Grail, Lord of the Ring------>O

Ya! Amen Ra! Make it so!!!

-- Updated May 21st, 2014, 8:39 pm to add the following --

EMTe #159

"The expression "a priori knowledge" is utterly idiotic, it's oxymoron. In common sense use, knowledge is by definition something you LEARN with time."

Source of knowledge is always external, because you learn from interactions with environment. What comes from inside of you is not knowledge."

Wayne wrote;

I am sure it does not matter to you whether I agree with you or not; but I will tell you anyway.

I Whole Heartedly agree with you.

So called Priori Knowledge is a belief, a speculation, a concept, a theory, is born of the Imagination, born of the Air, that which is above; Priori Knowledge being Transcendental, making its appearance as a Flash of Insight, making its appearance right out of thin, Rarefied, Air, appearing as if by Magic right out of nowhere, from somewhere far out in Left Field.

I was talking to Immanuel the other night, Immanuel Kant, and he confided in me saying, " I call all knowledge transcendental if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects even before we experience them. He also equated transcendental with that which is "...in respect of the subject's faculty of cognition.

Something is transcendental if it plays a role in the way in which the mind "constitutes" objects and makes it possible for us to experience them as objects in the first place. Ordinary knowledge is knowledge of objects; transcendental knowledge is knowledge of how it is possible for us to experience those objects as objects.

Prior Knowledge of whatever is born of the Imagination, of that which is above; Priori Knowledge being the Knowledge an Illusion, an Illusion being a Reality, an Illusion not even existing as an Illusion unless mistaken to be Reality; an Illusion is a Reality.

Conclusion, Priori Knowledge is theoretical in nature, exists as a belief, a concept, speculation, exists as Absolutely Bad Knowledge, as an Illusion of Reality, mistaken to be Absolutely Good Knowledge; Absolutely bad Knowledge having a dual quality, being the Knowledge of Good and Evil, being Guileful, Duplicitous, Deceptive, a Lie;

Priori Knowledge, being born of Transcendence being the Greatest cause of Unnecessary Suffering, Unnecessary Suffering being born of Man's Guilefulness, Priori Knowledge.

[A_Seagull]

Knowledge entails truth, since you cannot know that p if p is false. (In this case, you can only know that ~p.) .)

But how can one determine whether p is true or false?

Suppose I see a table in front of me and I say: 'I know there is a table in front of me'. I suggest that that would constitute knowledge. But you say it can only be knowledge if there really is a table in front of me. How can one determine whether there really is a table in front of me or not?

In fact 'truth' is just a label to denote a lack of doubt.

[Mlw]

Most philosophers deny that a priori truths exist, because they are only tautological.

David Bourget and David J. Chalmers: What Do Philosophers Believe? (2013)

"Abstract: What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on thirty central philosophical issues.…"

"1. A priori knowledge: yes 71.1%; no 18.4%; other 10.5%."
…
4. Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes 64.9%; no 27.1%; other 8.1%."
(p. 14)

Correction: "All philosophers with an IQ above 130 deny that a priori truths exist."

The problem is that philosophers have used the terms in very different ways. Many would perhaps regard "All bachelors are unmarried" as a priori knowledge, in a sense. But if you qualify the question, then they would perhaps agree that there is no a priori knowledge that is "logically necessary". It depends on how we define a priori knowledge. To build statistics on simple questions is risky. But I am slightly surprised by these figures, because I thought that Wittgenstein had made a much greater impact on modern philosophy. /Mats

[Belinda]

Consul wrote:

They mean to say that we are in principle incapable of acquiring synthetic a priori knowledge. All empiricists agree with this. But some of them go one step further and also deny the possibility of analytic a priori knowledge. Let's call this group the radical empiricists. The other group are the moderate empiricists, who acknowledge the possibility (and actuality) of analytic a priori knowledge at least.

If all synthetic facts are not de novo but are acquired by way of, and depend upon, specific heuristics( e.g. modern biology) then if someone asserts this to be so is the person a radical empiricist or a moderate empiricist ?

[Londoner]

Consul

We certainly cannot experience the world in a nonexperiential way, nonempirically; but the question is whether experience is our only source of knowledge. And this question is not decidable empirically, in terms of observations or perceptions alone, because the empirical data don't eliminate the possibility that some propositions are knowable nonempirically

.

This just chases its tail. If a proposition was knowable non-empirically then it wouldn't be empirical knowledge. As to whether we could gain empirical knowledge in some other way, that is the point at issue. Personally I think the answer looks like 'no' because nobody has come up with a convincing example.

If by "empirical proposition" you mean "contingent/non-necessary proposition", then you can negate such propositions (concerning matters of fact in Hume's sense) without contradicting yourself...

Yes; that is what I wrote. Empirical propostions are capable of being negated.

...However, this is not what "There is no synthetic a priori knowledge" means. It means that all synthetic knowledge is based on or derived from experience.

I did not say that was what '(no) synthetic a priori' meant.

As for your own gloss, what does it mean? Why does it use the word 'synthetic'? In what way is your meaning different from: 'empirical knowledge is derived from experience'?

But remember, there is no point in you telling me what you consider it means. We were discussing a quote which claims the phrase is self-contradictory. If somebody - me for example or any other philosopher - does not understand it in the way claimed, then the criticism doesn't apply.

Me: More technically, the argument is a bit suspect in that it misleads us right from the beginning by saying '...empiricists who claim to know this to be true'. If it is going to claim this, then we would need to know what those empiricists' understanding of 'true' would be.

The correspondence theory of truth is neutral between empiricism and rationalism, so we don't have to distinguish between "empiricist truth" and "rationalist truth".

Again, that isn't for you to say. The quote is saying what a third party, those 'empiricists' claim. Its truth depends on whether it is an accurate description of how those empiricists' might have used the word in that context (if they ever did)...(And assuming that you can bracket together Hume and Berkeley and Wittgenstein and Russell (?) etc. as if they all thought alike).

If I wrote 'Atheists claim to know that it is true that God doesn't exist' we could construct a similar paradox; that this implies they have the God-like knowledge required to prove a negative, therefore the atheists must be claiming they are God.

The atheists would reply; We don't claim to know absolutely God doesn't exist; what we say is that we have never seen God and nor can we see an argument for thinking he exists. Rather like the 'synthetic a priori'.

[Consul]

But how can one determine whether p is true or false? Suppose I see a table in front of me and I say: 'I know there is a table in front of me'. I suggest that that would constitute knowledge. But you say it can only be knowledge if there really is a table in front of me. How can one determine whether there really is a table in front of me or not?

By relying on one of your sources of knowledge such as perception. Of course, it does matter how objectively reliable your sources of knowledge are; and it is arguable that none of them is infallible. For instance, apparently veridical perceptions can be illusions or hallucinations.

-- Updated May 22nd, 2014, 11:03 am to add the following --

The problem is that philosophers have used the terms in very different ways. Many would perhaps regard "All bachelors are unmarried" as a priori knowledge, in a sense. But if you qualify the question, then they would perhaps agree that there is no a priori knowledge that is "logically necessary". It depends on how we define a priori knowledge.

A priori knowledge is knowledge of propositions which are either logically/logico-conceptually or ontologically/metaphysically necessary (*. I know no epistemological rationalist who claims that only nomologically necessary propositions, i.e. laws of nature, are knowable a priori.

(* A few philosophers, e.g. Kripke, have argued that some non-necessary/contingent propositions are knowable a priori; but whether the alleged examples are genuine ones is a very contentious issue in the philosophical community.)

-- Updated May 22nd, 2014, 11:11 am to add the following --

If all synthetic facts are not de novo but are acquired by way of, and depend upon, specific heuristics( e.g. modern biology) then if someone asserts this to be so is the person a radical empiricist or a moderate empiricist ?

Both moderate and radical empiricists hold that synthetic knowledge is acquirable only a posteriori, empirically. This includes both ordinary perceptions in everyday situations and methodically planned, controlled and documented scientific observations or experimentations.

[Belinda]

Thanks for replying Consul, but I think I haven't made myself clear enough.

Belinda wrote:If all synthetic facts are not de novo but are acquired by way of, and depend upon, specific heuristics( e.g. modern biology) then if someone asserts this to be so is the person a radical empiricist or a moderate empiricist ?

Consul replied:

Both moderate and radical empiricists hold that synthetic knowledge is acquirable only a posteriori, empirically. This includes both ordinary perceptions in everyday situations and methodically planned, controlled and documented scientific observations or experimentations.

I don't question that all synthetic knowledge is acquired a posteriori, empirically. Nor do I question that this goes for everyday knowledge as well as scientifically acquired knowledge. What seems to me to be the case is that although 'synthesis' may be thought to refer to invention without regard to frames or what is acceptable as evidence, I doubt if it ever is so, even in dreams or hallucinations. Synthesis is more likely to consist of a gestalt of novel reassemblage of evidence in the field of an old or a new paradigm.

Consul wrote, below:

"Synthetic knowledge" is not synonymous with "empirical/a posteriori" knowledge. The analytic/synthetic distinction is a logical/logico-semantic one, whereas the a priori/a posteriori distinction is an epistemological one:

I think this might answer my question. By accumulating knowlege we acquire knowledge ( epistemology) does not suit the term 'synthesis' . However when we add semantics to logic I, personally, cannot differentiate between synthesis and empiricism.

[Consul]

This just chases its tail. If a proposition was knowable non-empirically then it wouldn't be empirical knowledge. As to whether we could gain empirical knowledge in some other way, that is the point at issue. Personally I think the answer looks like 'no' because nobody has come up with a convincing example.

Knowledge which hasn't been acquired by empirical means isn't empirical knowledge.

As for the question of convincing examples, there are doubtless numerous convincing examples of analytic knowledge a priori at least, which is logical/conceptual/logico-conceptual knowledge (given the definition of an analytic truth as an explicit or implicit logical truth). The radical-empiricist assertion that not even analytic truths such as "Bachelors are unmarried" are knowable a priori seems indefensible to me.

What about convincing examples of synthetic knowledge a priori? Well, it turned out that such examples are very hard to come by. But what about e.g. "Dogs aren't numbers" or "Holes don't have holes"? If these were analytic truths, they would be synonymous with a tautology. And in order to show they are, you have to validly transform them into a tautology (logical truth). As far as I'm concerned, I'm not able to do so, which is a reason for me to regard them as synthetic truths—and as synthetic truths which are knowable a priori. For I don't think I have to observe dogs or holes in order to be able to come to know that dogs aren't numbers and holes don't have holes.

The hard problem of drawing a clear and precise distinction between analytic propositions/truths and synthetic propositions/truths is primarily a problem for moderate empiricists, since radical empiricists don't have to care about it, given their absolute denial of the possibility of a priori knowledge, be it analytic or synthetic.

...However, this is not what "There is no synthetic a priori knowledge" means. It means that all synthetic knowledge is based on or derived from experience.

I did not say that was what '(no) synthetic a priori' meant. As for your own gloss, what does it mean? Why does it use the word 'synthetic'? In what way is your meaning different from: 'empirical knowledge is derived from experience'?

"Synthetic knowledge" is not synonymous with "empirical/a posteriori" knowledge. The analytic/synthetic distinction is a logical/logico-semantic one, whereas the a priori/a posteriori distinction is an epistemological one:

* Analytic knowledge is knowledge of propositions whose truth depends on and is determined by nothing beyond their form and meaning; and synthetic knowledge is knowledge of propositions whose truth depends on and is determined by something beyond their form and meaning.
* A priori knowledge is propositional knowledge whose source is different from perception, introspection, and recollection, i.e. whose source is rational intuition; and a posteriori knowledge is propositional knowledge whose source is different from rational intuition, i.e. whose source is perception, introspection, or recollection.

But remember, there is no point in you telling me what you consider it means. We were discussing a quote which claims the phrase is self-contradictory. If somebody - me for example or any other philosopher - does not understand it in the way claimed, then the criticism doesn't apply.

What different ways of understanding are there in the context of empiricism?

The correspondence theory of truth is neutral between empiricism and rationalism, so we don't have to distinguish between "empiricist truth" and "rationalist truth".

Again, that isn't for you to say. The quote is saying what a third party, those 'empiricists' claim. Its truth depends on whether it is an accurate description of how those empiricists' might have used the word in that context (if they ever did)...(And assuming that you can bracket together Hume and Berkeley and Wittgenstein and Russell (?) etc. as if they all thought alike).

That's a red herring! For the empiricists and the rationalists do understand their own and their opponents' position sufficiently well.

If I wrote 'Atheists claim to know that it is true that God doesn't exist' we could construct a similar paradox; that this implies they have the God-like knowledge required to prove a negative, therefore the atheists must be claiming they are God. The atheists would reply; We don't claim to know absolutely God doesn't exist; what we say is that we have never seen God and nor can we see an argument for thinking he exists. Rather like the 'synthetic a priori'.

Knowledge claims entail (subjective) certainty. You don't claim to know that p unless you are certain that p. But mere belief doesn't entail certainty or a knowledge claim. Empiricists believe that all synthetic knowledge is based on experience, but their claim isn't itself knowable empirically. However, that empiricists cannot (and therefore shouldn't claim to) know that empiricism is true doesn't mean that they cannot justifiably, reasonably or plausibly believe it is, with that belief falling short of knowledge. Of course, if you uphold the general normative principle that one is never justified in believing what is unknown or unknowable, then one must stay agnostically neutral between empiricism and rationalism.

There is a difference between claiming that the truth of a synthetic proposition is not strictly knowable a priori, and claiming that there can be no belief-justifying a priori evidence for the truth of synthetic propositions. That is, there is a difference between saying that synthetic propositions cannot be known to be true in a non-empirical way and saying that they cannot even be justifiably believed to be true in a non-empirical way, in the sense that there cannot be any non-empirical evidence for their truth, be it conclusive or inconclusive.