- November 18th, 2012, 9:23 pm
#108938
@skakos -I am interested in running an idea by you which might have some bearing on the OP.
I think that science qua natural philosophy, 'assumes nature'. That is, science starts with the fact of nature and then works to understand the general principles and laws which underlie it.
With the advent of Darwinian theory, this view is now widely presumed to understand the basic principle behind human existence itself through the lens of evolutionary theory.
However here naturalism runs into a vicious circularity. This is simply that, though evolutionary theory, science presumes to explain the mind that is doing the explaining. In other words, science believes that it understands the basis of reason itself in terms of the outcome or result of the evolutionary process. However as the evolutionary process is understood in strictly non-teleological terms, then the human capacity to reason, like the process of which it is a part of, is understood to be the product of an undirected, hence fundamentally non-rational, process.
I think this gives rise to a fundamental confusion about what can and cannot be explained through science. Although we can explain an extraordinarily wide range of natural phenomena through the scientific method, the question of the nature of explanation itself, is a different kind of question to the kind of questions that can be explored through science. This is apparent when you consider the state of a subject like philosophy of number. If you look into philosophy of number, you will find there are fundamental disagreements amongst various schools of thought, as to what number is - whether it is real in its own right, as Platonists say, or whether it is generalized experience, as the empiricists say, and so on. I don't want to go into the details here, but merely to observe that the results we have been able to obtain through mathematical physics are obviously amazing, even if we don't actually know what 'number' is.
What I am driving at is that science qua natural philosophy, already works at a high level of abstraction - a much higher level than philosophy proper. Accordingly it is not actually dealing with reality itself but with models of aspects of reality. And why? Because reality includes the observer. The observer brings to the scene, considerable unstated and implicit powers, not least mathematical and rational ability (per Kant).
I think that modern empiricism falsley assumes that it understands what the basis of these abilities are. And I don't think it is understood, precisely because questions as to 'what is number' and 'what is reason', are a different kind or level of question, to the kinds of questions that we can investigate using number and reason.
'For there are many here among us who think that life is but a joke' ~ Dylan